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Abstract  
The correct measure and definition of liquidity in finance literature remains an unresolved 
empirical issue. The main objective of the present study was to develop, validate and test 
the liquidity mismatch index (LMI) developed by Brunnermeier, Krishnamurthy and Gorton 
(2012) empirically. Building on the work of these prior studies, the study undertook to 
develop a measure of liquidity that integrates both market liquidity and funding liquidity 
within a context of asset liability management. Liquidity mismatch indices were developed 
and then tested empirically to validate them by regressing them against the known 
determinants of liquidity. Furthermore, the study investigated the nexus between liquidity 
and profitability. The unit of analysis was a panel of 12 South African banks over the 
period 2005–2015.  
The study developed two liquidity measures – the bank liquidity mismatch index (BLMI) 
and the aggregate liquidity mismatch index (ALMI) – whose performances were 
compared to and contrasted with the Basel III liquidity measures and traditional liquidity 
measures using a generalised method of moments (GMM) model. Overall, the two 
constructed liquidity indices performed better than other liquidity measures. Significantly, 
the ALMI provided a better macro-prudential liquidity measure that can be utilised in 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, thus presenting a major 
contribution to the body of knowledge. Unlike the LMI, the BLMI and ALMI can be used 
to evaluate the liquidity of a given bank under liquidity stress events, which are scaled by 
theoretically motivated and empirically supported liquidity weights. The constructed BLMI 
contains information regarding the liquidity risk within the context of asset liability 
mismatches, and the measure used comprehensive data from bank balance sheets and 
from financial market measures. The newly developed liquidity measures are based on 
portfolio management theory as they account for the significance of liquidity spirals. 
Empirical results show that banks increase their liquidity buffers during times of turmoil 
as both BLMI and ALMI improved during the period 2007–2009. Subsequently, the 
improvement in economic performance resulted in a rise in ALMI but a decrease in BLMI. 
We found no evidence to support the theory that banks, which heavily depend on external 
funding, end up in serious liquidity problems. The findings imply that any policy 
implemented with the intention of increasing bank capital is good for bank liquidity since 
iii 
 
the financial fragility–crowding-out hypothesis is outweighed by the risk absorption 
hypothesis because the relationship between capital and bank liquidity is positive. 
 
Keywords: Liquidity mismatch index, bank liquidity, liquidity risk, measures of liquidity, 
global financial crisis, systemic risk, market liquidity, funding liquidity. 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Firstly, I would want to thank God for His undeserved love and wisdom.  
My special thanks go to my promoter, Professor Daniel Makina, for unwavering support, 
valuable guidance, comments and support throughout this doctoral programme.  
I am also thankful for the comments I got from participants of the 14th African Finance 
Journal Conference held on the 17–18 May 2017.  
Furthermore, I am grateful to Professors AQQ Aboagye, J Chisasa, A Mutezo, and Dr S 
Dzomira, for providing useful comments on this research during the masters and doctoral 
research colloquial held on the 12th of September 2014.  
Special mention goes to my wife, Rudo and my children, Tawananyasha Godfrey, Abigail 
Tadiswanashe and Reuel Joseph TavoingaIshe, my brothers Ronald, Shadreck Polite 
Mashanda and my brother and sister-in-law Johnstone Maravanyika and Immaculate 
Chibango for enduring my absence during this fruitful process.  
To my parents Kefasi and Alice Marozva, I thank you for all the sacrifices that you have 
made for me. You showed me what love is ever since I was young as you were there for 
me and fought my battles as your own. I dedicate this study to you, my parents, for their 
unwavering loving persona as a sign of my unfading gratitude. Outside Christ and my 
wife, I cannot compare you to anything in this dimension. You really project perfect love 
to me.  
Finally, my gratitude goes to Jackie Viljoen, for providing editorial assistance.  
The responsibility for any other errors rests with me.  
  
v 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Godfrey Marozva, do hereby certify that this thesis, which is submitted to the University 
of South Africa, is my own work and all sources that I have used or quoted have been 
indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
 
 
Signed………………………………………………..Date…………………………… 
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
Title page ......................................................................................................................... i 
Abstract  ...........................................................................................................................ii 
Aknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iii 
Decleration ......................................................................................................................iv 
List of tables  ...................................................................................................................ix 
List of figures ................................................................................................................... x 
List of appendices ...........................................................................................................xi 
List of acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................................ xii 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES ............. 1 
1.1 Introduction and background .................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research problem .................................................................................................. 4 
1.3 Aim and objectives of the study .............................................................................. 6 
1.4 Exegesis of banking and liquidity in South Africa ................................................... 9 
1.5 Structure of the thesis .......................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 2: BANK LIQUIDITY: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES ...................... 15 
2 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 15 
2.1 Definition and types of liquidity ............................................................................. 15 
2.2 Liquidity, systemic risk and 2007–2009 global final crisis ..................................... 16 
2.3 Theory of bank liquidity ........................................................................................ 20 
2.3.1 A neoclassical model of the banking firm and the separation theorem ........... 20 
2.3.2 Demand for money theory and liquidity preference theory ............................. 26 
2.3.3 The portfolio management theory ................................................................... 30 
2.3.4 Moral hazard incentives ................................................................................. 33 
2.3.5 Financial frictions and the business cycle ...................................................... 34 
2.3.6 Liquid assets as a residual: the role of supply and demand ........................... 36 
2.3.7 Liquid assets and liabilities: the role of market imperfections ......................... 37 
2.3.8 The ladder approach ...................................................................................... 39 
2.3.9 The risk absorption hypothesis and the financial fragility/crowding-out 
hypothesis .................................................................................................................. 40 
vii 
 
2.4 Chapter summary ................................................................................................. 40 
CHAPTER 3: MARKET LIQUIDITY, FUNDING LIQUIDITY AND LIQUIDITY SPIRALS
 41 
3 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 41 
3.1 Market liquidity ..................................................................................................... 41 
3.1.1 Definition of market liquidity ............................................................................ 42 
3.1.2 Theory of market liquidity ............................................................................... 44 
3.1.3 Measurements of market liquidity ................................................................... 50 
3.1.4 Determinants of market liquidity ..................................................................... 55 
3.1.5 Conclusion on market liquidity ........................................................................ 59 
3.2 Funding liquidity ................................................................................................... 59 
3.2.1 Definition of funding liquidity ........................................................................... 60 
3.2.2 Measurements of funding liquidity .................................................................. 61 
3.2.3 Theory of funding liquidity .............................................................................. 64 
3.2.4 Determinants of funding liquidity .................................................................... 70 
3.2.5 Conclusion on funding liquidity ....................................................................... 75 
3.3 Liquidity spirals ..................................................................................................... 76 
3.4 Chapter summary and conclusion ........................................................................ 84 
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ............................................................ 85 
4 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 85 
4.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 85 
4.2 Chapter summary ................................................................................................. 99 
CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 100 
5.2 Research paradigm and design.......................................................................... 100 
5.2.1 Data and variables ....................................................................................... 102 
5.2.2 Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) ...................................................................... 106 
5.2.3 Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) ................................................................... 107 
5.2.4 Liquidity mismatch index (LMI) ..................................................................... 108 
5.3.5 Micro- and macro-economic independent variables ..................................... 114 
5.4 Econometric model specification ........................................................................ 121 
5.4.1 The generalised method of moments (GMM) ............................................... 122 
viii 
 
5.5 Chapter summary and conclusion ......................................................................... 125 
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ................................................. 127 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 127 
6.2 Data and descriptive statistics ............................................................................ 128 
6.2.1 Data .............................................................................................................. 128 
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics for the annual panel data ............................................ 128 
6.3 Construction of the MLMI ................................................................................... 133 
6.3.1 Composition of the BLMI and the ALMI ........................................................ 134 
6.4 Econometric model estimation results, discussion and analysis ........................ 141 
6.5 Summary of results ............................................................................................ 163 
6.6 Bank profitability and MLMI ................................................................................ 164 
6.7 Chapter summary ............................................................................................... 170 
CHAPTER 7  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH ................................................................................................................ 171 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 171 
7.2 The theoretical framework of the modified liquidity mismatch index ................... 171 
7.3 Summary of results ............................................................................................ 174 
7.4 Contribution of the study .................................................................................... 178 
7.5 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research .................... 182 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 183 
Appendices ................................................................................................................ 229 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 2.1: Simplified bank balance sheet ...................................................................... 19 
Table 5.1: List if South African registered banks ......................................................... 102 
Table 5.2: Liquidity measures (dependent variables) .................................................. 103 
Table 5.3: Summary of independent variables and proxies ......................................... 114 
Table 6.1: Summary statistics for liquidity variables .................................................... 127 
Table 6.2: Summary statistics for independent variables ............................................ 130 
Table 6.3: Assets category and the allocated coefficient. ............................................ 136 
Table 6.4 Liability category and the all allocated coefficient ........................................ 139 
Table 6.5: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and the lagged dependent 
variable .................................................................................................................. 141 
Table 6.6: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and capital ratio .................. 142 
Table 6.7: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and deposits ....................... 145 
Table 6.8: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and bank size ..................... 147 
Table 6.9: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and loan growth.................. 149 
Table 6.10: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and external funding 
dependence .......................................................................................................... 151 
Table 6.11: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and GDP .......................... 153 
Table 6.12: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and inter-bank interest rates
 .............................................................................................................................. 155 
Table 6.13: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and return on assets ........ 157 
Table 6.14: Summary of results on the liquidity measures and 2007–2009 financial crisis
 .............................................................................................................................. 159 
Table 6.15: Dynamic panel-data estimations: ROA and BLMI .................................... 163 
Table 6.16: Diagnostic statistics: ROA and BLMI ........................................................ 164 
Table 6.17: Dynamic panel data estimations: ROA and ALMI ..................................... 165 
Table 6.18: Diagnostic statistics: ROA and ALMI ........................................................ 166 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1.1 Total assets and liabilities .............................................................................. 9 
Figure 1.2 Liquid assets ................................................................................................ 10 
Figure 2.1 Optimal loans or deposit volume .................................................................. 21 
Figure 3.1 Stylised time line .......................................................................................... 67 
Figure 3.2 Liquidity spirals ............................................................................................. 79 
Figure 3.3: Liquidity spirals II ......................................................................................... 80 
Figure 6.1: The calculated asset weight ...................................................................... 135 
Figure 6.2: The SABOR-treasury bill spread (STBS) .................................................. 138 
 
 
 
  
xi 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of L1 liquidity measure
 .............................................................................................................................. 226 
Appendix 2 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of L1 liquidity measure ...................... 227 
Appendix 3 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of L2 liquidity measure
 .............................................................................................................................. 228 
Appendix 4 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of L2 liquidity measure ...................... 229 
Appendix 5 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of L3 liquidity measure
 .............................................................................................................................. 230 
Appendix 6 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of L3 liquidity measure ...................... 231 
Appendix 7 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of L4 liquidity measure
 .............................................................................................................................. 232 
Appendix 8 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of L4 liquidity measure ...................... 233 
Appendix 9 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of LCR liquidity 
measure ................................................................................................................ 234 
Appendix 10 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of LCR liquidity measure ................. 235 
Appendix 11 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of NSFR liquidity 
measure ................................................................................................................ 236 
Appendix 12 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of NSFR liquidity measure ............... 237 
Appendix 13 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of BLMI liquidity 
measure ................................................................................................................ 238 
Appendix 14 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of BLMI liquidity measure ................ 239 
Appendix 15 Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of ALMI liquidity 
measure ................................................................................................................ 240 
Appendix 16 Diagnostic statistics- determinants of ALMI liquidity measure ................ 241 
Appendix 17 BLMI and ALMI computations ................................................................ 242 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ALM   asset liability management  
ALMI  aggregate liquidity mismatch index 
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements  
BLMI  bank liquidity mismatch index 
BoE  Bank of England 
CAPM  capital asset pricing model 
CEO  chief executive officer  
CPI  consumer price index 
CR  capital ratio 
DSGE  dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
ECB  European Central Bank  
EFD   external funding deposit  
EP  economic profits 
FC  fixed costs 
FE  fixed effects  
FEM   fixed effects model  
FSB  Financial Services Board  
GDP  gross domestic product 
GMM  Generalised method of moments 
HQLA  high-quality liquid assets  
IBR   interbank rate  
IFS   International Financial Statistics 
ILR  interbank lending rate 
xiii 
 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
LCR  liquidity coverage ratio 
LG  loan growth 
LIX   liquidity index  
LMI  liquidity mismatch index 
LSDV   least square dummy variable 
MLMI  modified liquidity mismatch index 
NLD  net liquidity demand 
NPL   non-performing loans  
NSFR  net stable funding ratio  
OMO   open market operations 
RE   random effects 
REM  random effects model 
ROA   return on assets  
ROE  return on equity 
SABOR  South African benchmark overnight rate  
SARB  South African Reserve Bank  
SD  standard deviation  
SLRI   systemic liquidity risk index  
STBS   SABOR–Treasury bill spread 
STR   smooth transition regression 
TBill  treasury bill  
VaR  value at risk 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 Introduction and background  
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis confirmed the need for effective systemic risk 
measurement and regulation (Andrievskaya, 2012). The turmoil revealed that if prices are 
pushed away from their fundamental values due to some temporary liquidity problems, 
they do not necessarily correct immediately. This demonstrated the need to rethink the 
role of liquidity risk in financial models since the traditional models have proved to be 
inadequate. Indeed, classic financial market theories (such as capital asset pricing model 
and Black–Scholes model) were created on the basis of frictionless markets. However, 
this assumption seems not to be consistent in all markets and different market conditions 
(Cetin, Jarrow, & Protter, 2004). Hence, market frictions, the absence of the price-taking 
assumption and competitive markets are the norm rather than the exception. This has 
been the status quo over the past six decades since Markowitz’s (1952) seminal article 
on portfolio selection. Financial theories and models assume markets are frictionless; 
thus, in traditional asset pricing models, liquidity plays no role at all because it is assumed 
away. The assumption of frictionless markets and perfectly efficient markets is not 
practical and is an oversimplification of reality (Grossman, 1976; Grossman & Stiglitz, 
1980; Malkiel, 1999). 
The literature on liquidity and asset pricing instead argues that liquidity is indeed priced 
and contains both theoretical models and empirical findings detailing how the liquidity of 
an asset affects expected returns (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Pástor & Stambaugh, 
2003). However, much of this literature utilises an assets-only approach and is focused 
on equities, a relatively liquid asset class (Adler, 2014). Other scholars such as Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) report that 
liquidity co-moves with returns and therefore can forecast future returns. 
Since the financial crisis, illiquidity and other financial frictions have become critical to 
financial markets and the overall economy (Brunnermeier, Gorton, & Krishnamurthy, 
2012; Bai, Krishnamurthy, & Weymuller, 2013; Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2013). Adler (2012) 
observes that the little academic literature and few models on the financial fragility and 
the possibility of a liquidity crisis were developed years before the actual global financial 
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crisis. The Adler (2014) further observes that most of the studies on liquidity are 
conceptual and lack testable predictions, and others have strong empirical results, but 
lack developed theory. The traditional measures of liquidity are believed to be basic and 
inadequate and they do not provide relevant information about the financial sector and its 
linkages to the real economy (Brunnermeier, Gorton, & Krishnamurthy, 2012). The current 
study undertook to develop, validate and test the liquidity mismatch index (LMI) 
developed by Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy, (2012). The liquidity mismatch 
indices in form of bank liquidity mismatch index (BLMI) and aggregate liquidity mismatch 
index (ALMI) were developed and were contrasted with the Basel III liquidity measures 
and traditional liquidity measures.  
Furthermore, Brunnermeier at al. (2012) and Adler (2012) indicate that liquidity is not 
properly defined and neither is there a proper measure of liquidity. The aim of the present 
research was to provide some insights into the measurement of liquidity risk in the context 
of asset–liability management (ALM) in an attempt to offer some rationality on the bank’s 
optimal liquidity requirement, adding to what Bai et al. (2013) and Stein (2013) have 
already done. 
The ALM has its beginnings in the duration analysis proposed by Macaulay (1938). 
Duration analysis involves profiling the maturity of bonds as the present value of 
payments to be received. The payments consist of both the face value and the coupon 
payments. Therefore, this theory could be used to analyse both funding and asset liquidity 
depending on the position of the bank. In recent years, ALM has become a tool of 
integrated analysis of assets and liabilities to value not only the interest rate risk but the 
solvency risk, firm strategies and asset allocation liquidity risk as well (Giandomenico, 
2011). Viewing liquidity risk in the light of asset–liability mismatches is of vital importance 
since each asset and each liability contribute to the liquidity position of the bank (Bai et 
al., 2013). An earlier study by Brunnermeier (2008) laid the foundation to the 
understanding of systemic risk and liquidity spillover effects. Brunnermeier (2012) gave 
one basis for modelling the key response indicator of the spillover effects, the liquidity 
mismatch index (LMI).  
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Many measurements of liquidity risk are discussed in literature (e.g. by Ahmed, Ahmed, 
& Naqvi, 2011; Horvàth, Seidler, & Weill, 2012; Vodová 2013a). The present research 
builds on the measurement proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2012b), the LMI. The 
measurement captures the most important attributes of bank liquidity, namely the overall 
funding liquidity and the market liquidity of its assets. Brunnermeier, Gorton, and 
Krishnamurthy (2013) observe that it is not the level of gearing that is important, but rather 
the proportion of debt comprising short-term demandable deposits. Thus, as banks hold 
illiquid assets financed by short-term debt, which if bank-run behaviour emerges, may in 
turn result in increased systemic risk. Since the standard measures, such as leverage, 
are unable to pick up these aspects of liquidity in a bank environment precisely, it is 
imperative for us to model a liquidity measure that will incorporate information from both 
the asset side of the balance sheet and the liability side, funding liquidity and market 
liquidity.  
The pioneering work by Berger and Bouwman (2009) on LMI incorporates an important 
aspect of time-varying liquidity weights, as the variation of these liquidity weights is 
important in capturing liquidity stress during a financial crisis (Bai et al., 2013). Although 
Bai et al. (2013) propose a new way of measuring liquidity weights taking into 
consideration the repurchase agreements on the asset side and looking at maturity and 
contract contingency on the liability side, the present research tested their methodology 
further empirically using a different data set.  
Since measurement is the essence of science, Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy 
(2011) point out that measurement forms the basis of macro-prudential regulation and of 
the risk management systems of organisations. Finding a correct measure of liquidity risk 
will help to oversee the build-up of systemic risk (Brunnermeier, Gorton, & Krishnamurthy, 
2013). The measurement of liquidity risk and systemic risk has of late attracted the 
interest of academic researchers, financial market analysts, bank management and bank 
monitors.  
In finance and economic literature, liquidity is not clearly defined. Liquidity has been 
viewed in different contexts that relate to a number of transactional properties of the 
markets and its measurement has included direct trading costs, such as quoted or 
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effective bid–ask spreads, and indirect trading costs, such as price impact of trades 
(Loebnitz, 2006). We now have a new breed of researchers who have a different opinion 
on the definitions of liquidity (see Ippolito, Peydró, Polo, & Sette, 2016; Krishnamurthy, 
Bai, & Weymuller, 2016). They find the existing definitions limiting since these do not 
capture the multidimensional aspects of liquidity risk (Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2013). Most 
financial institutions are heavily geared. Thus, when they trade, they buy securities and 
use the same securities as collateral when they borrow. The difference between the 
security price and the collateral value must be financed by the traders’ own capital. When 
we look at liquidity from the perspective of the asset and liability, then it becomes a 
complex phenomenon that should be considered from two angles: the ease with which 
an asset is traded (market liquidity) affects and is affected by the ease with which traders 
can obtain funds (funding liquidity) (Drehmann, & Nikolaou, 2013).  
1.2 Research problem 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis has underscored the significance of comprehensive 
bank liquidity management. In response, the Basel III framework, released in December 
2010, proposed new liquidity standards for banks with the aim of making the financial 
system more stable and resilient (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010b). 
There is much literature (e.g. Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Acharya & Schnabl, 2010; 
Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010) that attests to the fact that liquidity played a central role in 
the dynamics of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. Brunnermeier et al. (2012b) note 
that the recent global financial crisis showed similarities with the recession of the 1930s 
when relevant information about the financial sector and its nexus to the economy was 
missing (see Benmelech, Frydman, & Papanikolaou, 2017).  
The standard macro-economic models, such as the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models (see Miao, Wang, & Xu, 2015), assume away financial 
frictions (Adler, 2012). In addition, the DSGE models have no special role for the financial 
sector. These models are also based on representative agents who are assumed to invest 
directly and not through financial intermediaries. The standard models were unable to 
predict the extent to which the financial sector played a central role in the financial crisis 
(Rajan, Seru, & Vig, 2015). The models even failed to predict how the real economy was 
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to be affected. According to Brunnermeier et al. (2012b), the problem could be that macro-
economic frame and build models based on available data, while in finance we lack the 
much-needed data to build macro-finance models. 
There are other general equilibrium macro models that attempted to account for financial 
frictions, such as those by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Geanakoplos (2003). These authors only 
show how a small shock could be magnified into persistent fluctuations in the larger 
economy through the financial accelerator. Although this literature forms the basis of 
liquidity spirals, systemic and endogenous risk financial intermediaries are still not 
amenable to general equilibrium models.  
Moreover, the systemic liquidity measure remains ambiguous and further research is 
required. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) admit that the systemic liquidity measures 
proposed so far are not very useful since they cannot be estimated empirically. They 
contend that for risk measures to be useful, the inputs into the risk measure must be 
measurable in a timely fashion, which has so far proved to be challenging. Bai et al. (2013) 
also acknowledge the limitations of their LMI measure as they admit to ‘thumb sucking’ 
regarding the liquidity weights used in the computation of the LMI. This alone can justify 
the need for further research as liquidity weights play a crucial role in the dynamics of the 
LMI. Bai et al. (2013) further indicate the need for more empirical work to improve the 
liquidity weights and hence the liquidity measure.  
Given that academic liquidity literature developed several models of financial fragility and 
liquidity before the actual crisis (see Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Cohen, Black, & 
Scholes, 1972; Fama, & French, 1996;), the present research investigated the unsettled 
debate of the correct definition and measure of liquidity further (Brunnermeier et al., 
2013). In line with more recent macro-friction models that give financial intermediaries a 
central role, the present research attempted to analyse and test the new measure of 
liquidity empirically. Very few studies have looked at the measure of liquidity risk in the 
context of asset and liability mismatches (see Brunnermeier et al., 2012a; Berger, & 
Bouwman, 2017) and so far, there is no study of which is known, which comprehensively 
and adequately tested the LMI empirically.  
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The liquidity measures that were tested in the present study allowed us to assess the 
interactions of market liquidity and funding liquidity risk in the context of asset and 
liabilities mismatches. This has been investigated theoretically by Bai, Krishnamurthy, 
and Weymuller (2014), Stein (2013), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), whose 
outcomes were persuasive. Since the footprints of the nexus between funding liquidity 
and market liquidity are clear in the recent financial crisis (see Lou & Sadka, 2011; 
Berrospide, 2013), there is need for empirical testing of the measures proposed. 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) show that there are strong negative interrelationships 
between funding liquidity risk and a measure for market liquidity. This is an indication that 
market liquidity is dependent on funding liquidity where higher funding liquidity risk implies 
lower market liquidity. However, a single measure that shows the interaction between the 
liquidity conditions is still lacking, perhaps because we lack a universally accepted 
definition of these variables.  
The present study developed, validated and tested the liquidity mismatch index (LMI) 
developed by Brunnermeier, Krishnamurthy and Gorton (2012) empirically. Building on 
the work of these prior studies, the study undertook to develop a measure of liquidity that 
integrates both market liquidity and funding liquidity within a context of asset liability 
management. Liquidity mismatch indices were developed and then tested empirically to 
validate them by regressing them against the known determinants of liquidity. 
Unlike other liquidity measures, the BLMI and the ALMI can be used to evaluate a bank’s 
liquidity condition as well as market wide liquidity respectively under liquidity stress 
events. The new liquidity indices were scaled by theoretically motivated and empirically 
supported elasticities.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
Although some new liquidity measures have been proposed, there is still no clear-cut 
measure and definition of liquidity that can be used to provide a macro-prudential liquidity 
parameter. This fact is recognised by many researchers (for example Brunnermeier & 
Oehmke, 2012; Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2013; Bai et al., 2014) as they mention the 
obscurity in the new field of liquidity. However, discussions in this thesis show that 
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quantification of liquidity has been hindered by the lack of appropriate data, rather than 
by model considerations. The focus of this research was on both funding liquidity and 
market liquidity, since the easier one can trade a security the easier it is to get funds to 
trade securities. Ideally, market liquidity and funding liquidity are complementary. Most 
articles (see Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1990; Berger & Bouwman, 
2009) were written on the sources of liquidity risk and on how markets should be designed 
and regulated to cope with the effects of illiquidity.  
There is thus a need for the appropriate measure of liquidity, which is based on empirical 
studies that can form part of the risk management systems of financial institutions and 
also inform macro-economic policies accordingly. Failure to do so would leave most 
financial institutions exposed to significant systemic risk. This study attempted to integrate 
the concept of market liquidity into the broader framework of funding liquidity. It was 
necessary to do this research because of late, central banks have recognised that existing 
measurement systems are inadequate and have begun to think about revisions and 
additions (Eichner, Kohn, & Palumbo, 2013).  
The broad aim of this study was to investigate empirically the liquidity risk embedded in 
asset–liability mismatches by banks. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 prompted 
banks to realise the significance of liquidity risk management. Although liquidity risk may 
cause bank failures, Davis (2008) indicates that banks can protect themselves against 
liquidity risk. On the asset side, banks can hold a significant proportion of liquid assets. 
Banks can use cash immediately to settle current obligations or liquidity needs, while 
high-quality assets, e.g. treasury bills and government bonds, can be used readily as 
collateral when the banks borrow. On the liability side, banks need to have diverse 
sources of finance to minimise the effect of liquidity risk. Inasmuch as a bank can dispose 
of its current assets to obtain cash, just having a significant portion of current assets 
reduces the liquidity risk of a bank.  
An understanding of liquidity risk is achieved through examination of determinants of 
liquidity. The determinants of liquidity are tested on how and to what extent they influence 
Basel III liquidity measures, other traditional liquidity measures and the new liquidity 
measure (the modified liquidity mismatch index). In an analysis of the modified LMI, the 
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Basel III liquidity measures and selected traditional liquidity measures are done at both 
bank-specific level and at macro level. This is done in a bid to compare and contrast the 
newly constructed bank liquidity mismatch index (BLMI) and the aggregate liquidity 
mismatch index (ALMI) with traditional measures of liquidity and Basel III measures of 
liquidity. 
The LMI indices used in this study were modified ones based on the LMI measurement 
proposed by Brunnermeier, Krishnamurthy, and Gorton (2012). This measurement 
captures the most important attributes of bank liquidity that include the overall funding 
liquidity and the market liquidity of its assets. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) observe that it is 
not the level of gearing that is important, but rather the proportion of debt comprising 
short-term demandable deposits. Thus, as banks hold illiquid assets financed by short-
term debt, which if a bank-run behaviour emerges, may in turn result in increased 
systemic risk. Since the standard and traditional measures of liquidity, such as leverage, 
are unable to pick up these aspects of liquidity in a bank environment precisely it was 
imperative for this study to model a liquidity measure that incorporated information from 
both the asset side of the balance sheet and the liability side, i.e. the market liquidity and 
funding liquidity respectively.  
Most empirical studies so far investigated market liquidity and funding liquidity separately. 
It is only recently that researchers started paying attention to asset–liability mismatches 
and they are trying to build models that can capture this important aspect. Liquidity 
standard measures failed to capture banking sector important characteristic of liquidity 
spirals (Bai et al., 2013; Berger & Bouwman, 2009). The empirical findings of this study 
highlight the determinants of liquidity and the importance of measuring bank liquidity in 
the context of asset–liability mismatches. Policy implications for selected banks and the 
South African economy are drawn. Additionally, banks should revisit their liquidity 
measures and customise them to capture liquidity spirals and this will inevitably improve 
their liquidity risk management models.  
Specifically, this study therefore wished to: 
 build modified liquidity mismatch indices in the form of BLMI and ALMI;  
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 examine the key determinants of the modified liquidity mismatch indices in selected 
South African banks;  
 examine the determinants of Basel III liquidity measures and other standard 
traditional liquidity measures; and 
 analyse the BLMI and ALMI as determinants of bank performance. 
1.4 Exegesis of banking and liquidity in South Africa 
The South African banking system has developed significantly in terms of the regulatory 
system and technological advancement. However, Kumbirai and Webb (2010) argue that 
the banking sector in South African suffered from increased regulatory, competition and 
technology related costs. The sector also witnessed a huge influx of foreign banks since 
the country attained democracy in 1994. The dynamics in the banking sector underscored 
bank performance especially during and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
There is a plethora of studies (see Oberholzer & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Okeahalam, 
2006; Erasmus & Makina, 2014) on bank performance and efficiency in South Africa. 
However, very few studies (e.g. Visser, 2013; Visser & Van Vuuren, 2014) investigated 
the pertinent issue of bank liquidity in South Africa. However, Visser and Van Vuuren 
(2014) built liquidity stress testing model but did not examine the main determinants of 
liquidity risk. Moreover, their model was not tested within a context of other liquidity stress 
testing measures like the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR). Figure 1.1 show how the aggregate assets and liabilities of South African banks 
grew over the years.  
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Figure 1.1: Total assets and liabilities 
Source: Author’s computation  
Data source: SARB – Banks BA900 Returns  
https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Banking%20sec
tor%20data/Pages/Banks-BA900-Returns.aspx  
 
There was a general increase in assets and liabilities over the period. Total assets 
increased by 333% over the period from 2005 to 2016, which is on average 30.27% 
increase per annum. While, total liabilities increased by 320% over the same period, 
which is on average 29% increase per annum. However, some developments during the 
crisis resulted in a highly volatile asset base and a slight decrease of 3.23% in the value 
of assets. Liquidity spirals could best explain this fall in the value of assets. Brunnermeier 
and Oehmke (2012) argue that during crisis, first, there was a loss of spiral that was 
triggered by the decrease in asset prices, which led to forced selling resulting in the 
erosion of capital. The second liquidity spiral was the margin spiral, which mainly 
pertained to the liability side of the balance sheet. From Figure 1.1, it is clear that liabilities 
continued with the upward trend even during periods of economic recession. The increase 
in liabilities during the crisis is an indication that some of the banks could have failed to 
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honour their obligations and rolled over their liabilities. Liquidity spirals could explain this. 
As volatility increased, margins and haircuts increased, thereby increasing bank liabilities.  
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 was synonymous with a liquidity crisis. Liquidity 
plays a central role in the operations of a financial institution. A shortage of liquidity causes 
havoc in the overall economy. López-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2012) 
note that short-term funding (funding liquidity) is the most important determinant of the 
contribution of a bank to global systemic risk. Liquidity risk in South Africa deserves 
greater scrutiny. The present study was motivated by the fact that the recent crisis did not 
spare the South African economy, as the crisis induced the economic slowdown in 2009 
(Baxter, 2008). The South African economy slowed down in the fourth quarter of 2008 
and officially entered into a recession in the first quarter of 2009 (Baxter, 2008). Figure 
1.2 shows the development of bank liquidity over the period of the study.  
 
Figure 1.2: Liquid assets (R million) 
Source: Author’s computation 
Data source: SARB – Banks BA900 Returns  
https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Banking%20sec
tor%20data/Pages/Banks-BA900-Returns.aspx 
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Focusing on the period under investigation, Figure 1.2 shows that South African banks 
on aggregate increased their liquid assets from 2005 until the end of 2008. In 2009, we 
witnessed a decrease in liquid asset holdings by banks due to the adverse effects of the 
global financial crisis. In response to the liquidity crisis, banks in South Africa began to 
hold considerable liquid assets as exhibited by an increase in liquid assets by the end of 
2010. Marozva (2012) indicates that, in periods of turmoil, the strength and resilience of 
the banking sector should be measured in terms of how liquid the bank is, instead of its 
balance sheet or profitability.  
During periods of economic stability, banks could afford to profit significantly from asset–
liability mismatches. Banks increased their loan portfolios during calm times which 
changed during the recent financial crisis (Barua, Battaglia, Jagannathan, Mendis, & 
Onorato, 2010). During the financial crisis, the need for liquidity became fundamentally 
inherent to the financial sector. The Basel lll framework, also calls for significant changes 
in liquidity requirements. The framework introduced more stringent liquidity requirements, 
which are being phased in over a number of years. Despite the introduction of the net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR) and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), banks consider it wise 
to maintain higher-than-recommended liquid asset buffers in their possession. What 
motivates banks to hold higher buffers than the required liquidity buffers, warrants further 
investigation.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 1: Background and introduction  
Chapter 1 gives an introductory background to the research study. The objectives, 
outputs and benefits of the study were discussed, and the structure of the rest of the 
thesis was summarised.  
Chapter 2: Bank liquidity: Theories and empirical issues  
This chapter clarifies the relevant terms and concepts including the delimitation of the 
topic. General operations of a commercial bank in the context of asset–liability 
management (ALM) are discussed. In the greater portion of the chapter discusses the 
theoretical issues and empirical evidence of bank liquidity in general. It was found out that 
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banks have diverse reasons to hold a significant proportion of total assets as liquid assets. 
Moreover, these factors depend on bank-specific, industry-specific and macro-economic 
factors. 
 
Chapter 3: Market liquidity, funding liquidity and liquidity spirals  
This chapter gives more insight into the composition of bank liquidity since it is split into 
funding and market liquidity. Theoretical and empirical issues of funding and market 
liquidity are discussed and unresolved empirical issues were put into context. In the last 
sections of the chapter, the important issue of liquidity spirals, i.e. the interaction between 
market liquidity and funding liquidity is highlighted. The main conclusion is that bank 
liquidity is a multidimensional phenomenon that is inclusive of both market liquidity and 
funding liquidity.  
Chapter 4: The research question and hypothesis development  
The research problem is set out as a logical consequence of the debate in Chapters 2 
and 3. This research problem as developed into precise measurable hypotheses that 
were tested empirically, is stated in this chapter. In addition, this section gives more detail 
of the three main objectives of the study, as it was found that there was need to develop 
the LMI further and then to validate it empirically by regressing it against known 
determinants of liquidity. The section also highlights the nexus between liquidity and bank 
profitability. 
Chapter 5: Methodology: research design and econometric methods  
This chapter presents the methodologies that are applied in addressing the research 
objectives and the hypothesis developed. General methodological issues and problems 
pertaining to this particular research vis-à-vis other similar empirical studies are 
discussed. The pros and cons of different research designs and econometric methods 
are discussed for applicability for the study. This process led to the selection of the 
generalised method of moment (GMM) model as the preferred method for testing 
hypotheses.  
Chapter 6: Data analysis and discussion  
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Econometric test results of different approaches are presented and analysed. 
Confounding problems and probable resolutions are discussed. In this chapter, the 
research techniques discussed in Chapter 5 were employed to empirically test the liquidity 
measures against their determinants. The constructed liquidity mismatch indices are 
subsequently tested empirically by regressing them against the bank-specific factors as 
well as macro-economic factors. Other conventional liquidity measures and Basel III 
liquidity measures are also tested in a bid to validate the bank liquidity mismatch index 
(BLMI) and the aggregate liquidity mismatch index (ALMI).  
Chapter 7: Summary of conclusions and directions for future research  
In this chapter, the findings are summarised through provision of concluding remarks on 
theoretical and empirical findings of this research. Furthermore, a summary of the 
contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge on liquidity risk in light of 
asset–liability mismatches is provided. Finally, the chapter highlights some shortcomings 
of this study, and provides directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: BANK LIQUIDITY: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
2 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical evidence and empirical evidence of bank liquidity. 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) suggest that, as a result of the liquidity crisis of 2007–
2009, illiquidity and other financial frictions have become critical to financial markets and 
the overall economy. Adler (2012) observes that there are few academic literature and 
models on the financial fragility. Moreover, Adler (2012) points out that the models 
designed to predict the possibility of a liquidity crisis were developed years before the 
actual global liquidity crisis. Similarly, most financial prediction, valuation and pricing 
models assume away liquidity as markets are deemed to be frictionless. The traditional 
measures of liquidity are believed to be basic, inadequate and do not provide relevant 
information about the financial sector and its linkages to the real economy (Brunnermeier 
et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy, Bai, & Weymuller, 2016). 
2.1 Definition and types of liquidity 
 
In this section, the relevant terms and concepts including the delimitation of the topic are 
clarified. Stange and Kaserer (2009) show that liquidity in general can have different 
meanings depending on the setup. First, liquidity can mean solvency if it is to be viewed 
from the perspective of a firm. From the corporate perspective, liquidity measures the 
ability of a firm to settle its obligations with the existing assets. The ability to fund 
obligations as they fall due is driven by the liability side and is referred to as funding 
liquidity (Andrievskaya, 2012). On the other side, the ease with which a firm can liquidate 
its assets is commonly known as market liquidity in finance literature, but also can be 
called asset liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Scholars naturally tend to use 
the term market liquidity to mean assets liquidity or vice versa, though in reality their 
usage should reflect whether the researcher is focusing on the balance sheet or whether 
the market is the focus (Fontaine, Garcia, & Gungor, 2015). A focus on the balance sheet 
requires the use of asset liquidity and a focus on the market requires the use of market 
liquidity. Secondly, liquidity can mean the marketability of a financial instrument from an 
investor's perspective, thus partially indicating the ease of trading a particular financial 
instrument. Lastly, liquidity can be viewed in line with the macro-economy that is a 
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monetary perspective where M1, M2 and M3 can be used to measure different degrees 
of liquidity in an economy. This study focused mainly on two types of liquidity: market 
liquidity and funding liquidity.  
Liquidity, although not a new phenomenon in finance literature, has no universally 
accepted definition. Adler (2012) asserts that the lack of an agreed-upon definition 
emanates from the fact that the concept of liquidity arises from different economic 
perspectives. Liquidity can be defined in the context of how easily a security can be traded 
and in the context of how easily one can obtain funding to trade a security. Therefore, the 
focus of this research will be on both the funding liquidity and market liquidity, since the 
easier the security can be traded means the easier it is to get funds to trade securities, 
thus market liquidity and funding liquidity are complementary. Most research (e.g. 
Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1990; Berger & Bouwman, 2009) was 
done on the sources of liquidity risk and on how markets should be designed and 
regulated to cope with the effects of illiquidity. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also indicate that liquidity is a multidimensional 
phenomenon that is comprised of mainly two elements: funding liquidity and market 
liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) further provide a model that links the funding 
liquidity (i.e., the ease with which financial institutions can obtain funding) and the market 
(i.e. the easy at which a financial asset is traded). Therefore, financial market players (e.g. 
dealers, traders and finance houses) provide market liquidity, and their ability to provide 
liquidity depends on the availability of funding. A more detailed literature review on 
funding and market liquidity is done in Chapter 3. The next section discusses issues 
surrounding bank liquidity in general, systemic risk and the global financial crises of 2007–
2009.  
2.2 Liquidity, systemic risk and 2007–2009 global final crisis 
 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2009), systemic risk is 
described as “the risk of disruption to financial services that results from impairment of all 
or part of the financial system and that has a potential to have negative consequences to 
the real economy”. Liquidity is certainly one of the main drivers of systemic risk as Adler 
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(2012) indicates, although systemic risk is much broader than liquidity risk. The drying up 
of liquidity is a key aspect of market-wide contagion. Though liquidity is the basis of 
systemic risk, measuring the threat of systemic risk is a challenge. Before the crisis, 
financial risk measures such as value at risk (VaR) were used, but they had limitations in 
the sense that risk was not measured in the context of the overall system (Adler, 2012). 
Instead, the measure was isolated within an individual institution. Therefore, these 
measures did not capture the instability of the financial system that resulted from failures 
of individual financial institutions. Ideally, systemic risk should depend primarily on the 
endogenous response of market participants (Brunnermeier, & Oehmke 2013). 
Therefore, there is need for adequate micro- and macro-prudential regulations that can 
account for bank level and market wide liquidity conditions (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). 
 
Due to the limitation of VaR, there has been a new breed of researchers that have 
proposed new measures assumed theoretically to capture systemic risks. Brunnermeier, 
Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) identify liquidity 
as a key response indicator, so that aggregate liquidity measures are important to detect 
a build-up of systemic risk. Ideally, systemic risk should be measured examining and 
taking into account the inter-bank market. This confirmed earlier studies by Sheldon and 
Maurer (1998) who provide an empirical investigation and Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) 
who took a theoretical approach. Systemic risk is believed to have resulted in the 2007–
2009 global financial crisis. 
The global financial crisis is synonymous with a liquidity crisis. Since liquidity crunch is 
advocated as the trigger for, as well as the catalyst of, the problem that systemically 
devastated the global financial sector and eventually led to a global recession during the 
period from 2007 to 2009. The crisis emphasised the need for effective measurement of 
liquidity and liquidity risk management. De Haan and Van den End (2013) point out that 
liquidity problems was a result of drop in confidence of the sustainability of the global 
financial sector as most institutions were highly geared and had significant maturity 
mismatches. Financial institutions were heavily exposed to on-balance sheet and off-
balance sheet asset and liability maturity mismatches. The exposure has built up for a 
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long period. Banks in United States of America (US) were highly leveraged during a period 
of low interest rate regime with their main source of funding being repurchase agreements 
(repos) (Brunnermeier, 2008).  
Mishkin (2010) gives a detailed chronological analysis of events that led to the global 
financial crisis. The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 is deemed to have been the first phase 
that involved mainly the US financial system during the period August 2007 to August 
2008. The problem emanated from non-performing subprime residential mortgages. 
Many economists and other finance professionals (e.g. Calem & LaCour-Little, 2004; 
Purnanandam, 2010) thought it a mild problem that could not end in a crisis. It was after 
the second phase of the crisis that they revised their forecasts from slow-down to eminent 
recession. Mishkin (2010) indicates that in mid-September 2008 the financial crisis 
entered a very critical phase by illustrating how a significant portion of large financial 
institutions (e.g. Investment Bank of Lehman Brothers, AIG Insurance Company) 
collapsed. This was the beginning of the crisis. However, the question still remains what 
triggered this catastrophic event. It was maturity mismatches.  
Most of the long-term loans were funded with short-term wholesale deposits and when 
the wholesale deposits dried up, these led to a substantial increase in maturity 
mismatches (Acharya & Skeie, 2011). Maturity mismatches are enshrined within the 
major role of financial intermediation of maturity transformation. Financial intermediaries 
play the major role of repackaging mostly cheap liquid liabilities into profitable illiquid 
assets, as described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The maturity transformation 
phenomenon can be viewed as liquidity management since this can be contextualised as 
a process of obtaining funding (funding liquidity) to trade a security. The ease of 
converting the assets into cash is referred to as ‘market liquidity’. 
According to Brunnermeier (2008), the financial market turmoil that started in 2007 
resulted in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. This was manifested by 
the extent to which the real economy was damaged. Brunnermeier (2008) further 
observes that the main trigger of the crisis emanated from the housing bubble that burst, 
forcing banks to write down several loans. Concurrently, there was a severe dip in stock 
prices of many financial institutions.  
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Macro-economic fundamentals played a pivotal role in what led to the housing bubble. 
The US Federal Reserve adopted a lax interest rate regime in 2005, which led to large 
capital inflows from abroad especially from European countries (White, 2009). During the 
same time, the traditional banking model, in which banks would lend money and wait for 
the repayment of the interest and capital, was replaced by asset securitisation, where 
loans were pooled into tranches and then resold. This innovation further allowed US 
financial institutions access to more capital from abroad as securitisation was deemed to 
stabilise the banking sector by transferring risk to those most able to manage it 
(Guttmann, 2008). Banks could fund their long-term assets with short-term maturity 
instruments, a change that exposed banks to a dry-up in funding liquidity. Furthermore, 
most financial intermediaries gradually moved towards the markets and this dynamic shift 
created complex risks that were difficult to comprehend (Ahmed, 2009) 
Analysing the causes of the financial crisis, Brunnermeier (2008) proposes four important 
mechanisms through which the mortgage crisis was amplified:  
 borrowers’ balance sheet effects; 
 the lending channel; 
 runs on financial institutions, and  
 the network effect.  
The borrowers’ balance sheet effect is viewed in the context of assets and liabilities 
resulting in liquidity spirals. Faced with liquidity problems, asset prices will fall and erode 
the capital of the banks. At the same time, funding of liabilities becomes difficult as 
borrowing standards tightens. The lending channels will dry up as banks take a cautious 
stance in case they may want to fulfil some obligations in the future and may fail. Hoarding 
of funds becomes the order of the day. This will subsequently lead to runs on banks, 
further worsening the position of the banks, liquidity wise as well as capital wise. During 
the crisis, the lack of funding liquidity pushed the banks into buffering of liquid assets to 
protect themselves from maturity and roll-over risks of short-term interbank borrowing. 
This was done in a bid to minimise the risk of maturity mismatches. Allen and Gale (2007) 
observe that investors generally prefer assets with shorter maturities which allow them to 
liquidate their positions at short notice. The network effect arises when the financial 
20 
 
institution acts as an intermediary between the surplus units and the deficit units, thereby 
acting as a lender and a borrower at the same time. Thus, a gridlock can occur when 
offsetting between trading parties fail as institutions become concerned with counterparty 
risk. For contingency sake, banks end up holding excess liquidity in case some of their 
obligations are not netted out.  
2.3 Theory of bank liquidity 
 
Before discussing different theories of liquidity, it is important to understand how banks 
operate within the context of ALM. Banks in general collect deposits from individuals and 
corporates (surplus units). Some of these deposits may be fixed, while some are 
withdrawable on demand. Fixed deposits are easy to price, and it is easy to model or 
measure the liquidity risk, while demand deposits have an undefined maturity which 
creates specific problems of pricing and measuring liquidity risk. Other sources of funds 
include subordinated bonds and equity. These are long-term in nature. On the asset side, 
banks buy fixed assets, hold some reserves at the central bank and advance the surplus 
as loans to corporates and individuals (deficit units).  
The maturities of these assets are grossly different from those of the liabilities. Therefore, 
the mismatches between the maturities of assets and liabilities can create liquidity risk. 
Liquidity risk refers to the shortage of cash resulting from both the liabilities and the asset 
demands. Shortage may originate from unexpected increase in loan demand, a sudden 
increase in demand deposit withdrawals or margin calls on trading transactions (see Kusy 
& Ziemba, 1986; Zenios & Ziemba, 2007). 
2.3.1 A neoclassical model of the banking firm and the separation theorem  
 
The neoclassical model of the banking firm was developed by Klein (1971) and Monti 
(1972). Their theory indicates that the asset side of the balance sheet consists of the 
reserves deposited to the central bank (R), purchased government bonds (B), and loans 
(L). Whereas the funding side consists of equity (Equity) and deposits (D). The simplified 
balance sheet is shown in Table 2.1: 
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Table 2.1: Simplified balance sheet 
Assets Liabilities and shareholders’ equity 
 
Reserves 
Loans 
Bonds  
 
Equity 
Deposits  
Source: Zenios and Ziemba (2007) 
 
The required reserves are calculated as a percentage of deposits and yield no interest. 
The loans are issued at a price p and the demand for them is a decreasing function of the 
price. Government bonds yield an interest rate b and are considered to be perfectly elastic 
in a competitive market. Equity is the shareholder contribution whose required return is 
measured in terms of its opportunity cost, the exogenous government bond. In Klein’s 
(1971) model, parameters are known with certainty as the maturities of assets and 
deposits are theoretically assumed to be the same and all operating expenses, although 
linked to these deposits, are ignored. Banks are assumed to be rational and hence need 
to maximise economic profits (EP) by choosing low cost deposits and advance them as 
loans at a margin (Santomero, 1984).  
𝐸𝑃 = (𝑝 × 𝐿 + 𝑏 × 𝐵 − 𝑑 × 𝐷) − 𝑏 × 𝐸             2.1 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒: 𝑅 + 𝐿 + 𝐵 = 𝐷 + 𝐸 if we substitute the balance sheet constraint into the objective 
function, we end up with the following function: 
𝐸𝑃 = [(𝑝 − 𝑏) × 𝐿] + [(𝑏 × (1 − 𝑟) − 𝑑) × 𝐷]            2.2 
Monti (1972) argues that the end-period economic profit is given by income from loan net 
opportunity cost (the government bond rate, b), and income on deposits invested in 
securities with the returns reduced by the central bank’s required reserve ratio, r. This 
became the basis of separation theorem in banking, which alludes to the fact that loans 
and deposits should be priced independently, with reference to the market rate (the 
government bonds or interbank rate) (Keister, & McAndrews, 2009). The first derivatives 
for deposit and loans were developed as follows: 
22 
 
𝜕 𝐸𝑃
𝜕𝑑
= (𝑏 × (1 − 𝑟) − 𝑑) × 𝐷′ − 𝐷 = 0          2.3 
𝜕 𝐸𝑃
𝜕𝑝
= (𝑝 − 𝑏) × 𝐿′ + 𝐿 = 0            2.4 
Where 𝐷′ is the first derivative of D with respect to 
𝜕 𝐸𝑃
𝜕𝑑
 and 𝐿′ is the first derivative of L 
with respect to 
𝜕 𝐸𝑃
𝜕𝑝
 . Taking ŋ𝐷 and ŋ𝐿 to represent interest elasticity and deposit elasticity 
respectively, the following equation is obtained: 
𝑑 = 𝑏 × (1 − 𝑟) × (1 + ŋ𝐷
−1)−1, 𝑝 = 𝑏 × (1 + ŋ𝐿
−1)−1         2.5 
The required reserve ratio is set to zero for a comprehensive and graphical illustration of 
the separation theorem and this is represented in Figure. 2.1. The following graph shows 
the interaction between the marginal cost of loans and market rate as well as the 
association between the marginal cost and the market rate. 
     Marginal income     Marginal cost 
      on loans     of deposits  
  
 
 
          b = market rate 
     
 
 
           
           
Figure 2.1: Optimal loans or deposit volume 
Source: Zenios and Ziemba (2007) 
 
Fig 2.1 shows that the optimal volume of deposits is reached when the marginal cost of 
deposits is equal to the market rate, b. The optimal loan volume is achieved when the 
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marginal revenue from loans is equal to marginal investment rate, the market rate, b. This 
clearly proves the separation theorem as funding and lending decisions are done 
separately. When the difference between the optimal borrowing and lending volumes is 
positive it is an indication that the bank is a net lender in the market. However, this is not 
always the case as the bank can sometimes be a net borrower.  
This is, however, an over-simplification of reality as the model is based on unrealistic 
assumptions and more so, the failure of the theory to acknowledge that banks are 
complex organisations that are engaged in many different types of activities. Banks are 
involved in deposit taking, underwriting, trading, provision of loans, extension of 
brokerage services, providing fiduciary services, giving corporate finance advice, offering 
mutual funds, and the list goes on (Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2002). Besides the obvious 
limitations of the separation theorem, there were factors that were recognised that 
destabilised the theory. A joint-revenue function or joint-cost function breaks the 
equilibrium. This can be a situation where the volume of deposits received is linked to the 
volume of loans approved.  
Due to 2007/9 liquidity crisis, joint maximisation of profits became particularly of 
paramount importance. Under the separation theory, banks were regarded as insurers. 
One type of insurance rendered by banks was liquidity insurance, whereby depositors 
and borrowers were able to withdraw money on demand. Therefore, banks were required 
to have enough liquidity to cover to their daily payments made on the central bank system. 
This liquidity, according to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), consists of the required reserves 
with the central bank, borrowings from other banks, a discount window from the central 
bank, and expected income flows from other banks. What then determined the liquidity 
level was based on the nature of assets and the ability of the bank to access cash from 
the central bank, or alternatively through interbank or money market transactions 
(Bianchi, & Bigio, 2014). It becomes apparent that one main reason banks exist is to 
provide liquidity and there is a price for liquidity. Portfolio management theory (see Kusy, 
& Ziemba,1986).) is one theory that accounts for the significance of liquidity spirals 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). 
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The confidence of investors in financial markets hinges on the fact that they can always 
transact at a fair market price as quickly as possible. Liquidity is central to a well-
functioning financial system (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012). The growing importance of liquidity 
management, particularly in the increasingly integrated global market, is emphasised by 
the sequence of huge bank failures and economic distresses that have been initiated by 
liquidity risk mismanagement and model failure (Freixas, Parigi, & Rochet, 2000; 
Rosengren, 2008). This makes liquidity a very important aspect of well-functioning 
financial markets as investors are allowed to complete their transactions quickly and 
without significant price movement.  
The determinants of liquidity are a debatable issue even though there is a general 
consensus on certain aspects of liquidity. An asset is considered liquid if it can be traded 
quickly (speed of transaction) at a low risk (resilience of the market/greater market 
depth/low price impact/low cost/information is readily available) and has a short maturity 
(Tsuchida, Watanabe, & Yoshiba, 2016). Examples of liquid assets for banks include 
cash, the reserves banks hold for contingency purposes other than those required by law, 
short-term securities (e.g. treasury bills, commercial paper), and inter-bank loans with 
very short maturity ranging from one day to a year (Tobin, 1982).  
According to Cucinelli (2013) and Moussa (2015), the liquid asset level for banks depends 
on an array of factors including the behaviour of bank managers, aggregate market 
conditions, bank custodians’ risk preferences, macro-economic events and, even the 
behaviour of investors in which the bank operates. The determinants of liquidity risk are 
deemed multi-faceted and driven by the complex factors that define the flow of 
information. In the banking sector, these factors influence how banks manage liquidity. 
Therefore, it is essential to determine the factors that influence banks to keep certain 
levels of liquid assets to determine crucially the optimal stability and efficiency of banks 
and the financial system as a whole. 
Having understood how banks operate in terms of ALM and the importance of liquidity to 
banks, institutional and individual investors, we can move on to review theories on 
liquidity. Specifically, the focus is on the theories that provide an understanding of what 
determines the levels of liquid assets of banks.  
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There are models that show directly or indirectly how banks determine their levels of liquid 
assets. About five main categories of theories are distinguished and reviewed in this 
regard. In the first one, the demand for money and the liquidity preference theories that 
were extensively developed in the 1950s by Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and Friedman 
(1959). In their approach, economic agents primarily demand cash for precautionary, 
speculative, and transaction purposes. Interest rates are the main determinant for 
speculative and precautionary motives for holding/demanding cash and there is an 
inverse relationship. The theory according to Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) showed 
that there are important economies of scale associated with holding significant cash 
balances. This first approach forms the basis of all the other theories that followed.  
The second theory to be reviewed is the portfolio management theory developed in the 
1950s and 1960s. In the portfolio management approach, the level of liquid assets chosen 
by a bank is primarily determined by the bank manager’s risk averseness. This is in 
contrast to the theories that follow which assume that bank managers are risk neutral, 
and therefore that the level of risk does not matter in the determination of the liquid asset 
level of banks.  
The third category of theories interrogates the determinants of credit supply and deposit 
demand. This theory has its roots in the 1960s (e.g. Brunner & Meltzer, 1964) and since 
then this has been the main focal point for the determinants of liquidity in banks. The 
theory dictates that liquid assets are the residual, between (on the one hand) the equity 
and liabilities of the bank, and (on the other hand) the loan portfolio (Arestis & Howells, 
1999).  
The first three categories of theories do not explicitly account for liquidity spirals and the 
unpredictability of deposit withdrawals and unpaid loans. As previously discussed, 
liquidity is the main characteristic of a well-functioning financial system. Thus, banks that 
aim to stay in business wish to keep a good reputation concerning meeting its obligations 
as they fall due. Consequently, banks may want to keep liquid assets in order to be able 
to meet the large uncertainty regarding the amount of withdrawals of deposits or the 
renewal of rolled-over inter-bank loans.  
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The fourth category is the theory of moral hazard. This model specifies the strategic 
interactions between the central bank and banks. Repullo (2003) indicates that the 
presence of the central bank support window may affect the choice of a bank with regard 
to the share of liquid assets/pledgeable income (according to Holmström & Tirole, 1997) 
in its portfolio. The objective of the central bank is to strike a balance between the fiscal 
cost of lending to the bank and the cost of the failure of the bank. If banks know that they 
have access to liquidity from the central bank at a concessionary rate, banks may be 
reluctant to hold buffer liquid assets as they know they will always be assisted by the 
central bank.  
The last category is the theory of financial frictions and the business cycle. This approach 
indicates that banks may keep some liquid assets in order to be in a better position to 
take advantage of opportunities as they arise (Keynes, 1936). Information asymmetry is 
the major reason cited for market imperfections in this theory. Business cycles and the 
nature of markets (in the form of how easy it is to raise funds) play a central role in how 
banks manage liquidity. The buffer of liquid assets that banks have depends on how easily 
they can raise funds through interbank borrowing. The better the ability of a bank to 
borrow, the lower the level of liquid assets it holds.  
2.3.2 Demand for money theory and liquidity preference theory  
The theory of demand for money was first used by Baumol (1952) and then further 
developed by Tobin (1956). Supplementary theoretical and empirical tests were carried 
out by Friedman (1959). In this theory of demand for money, much emphasis has been 
put on different motives for holding money. Economic agents are deemed to have 
different reasons for holding cash balances. Money is demanded primarily for transaction 
purposes, for speculative purposes, and for precautionary motives (Friedman, 1959). 
The transactions motive implies that economic agents demand money to meet their day-
to-day activities (Acharya & Merrouche, 2013). Therefore, it resembles a quasi-
mechanical relationship between cash balances and the flow of payments. The economic 
agents that hold cash balances for transaction motive are controlled by the need to 
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minimise the cost (Baumol, 1954). The cost of cash balances was modelled by Whitin 
(1953) in the theory of inventory management. In the model, 𝐶 = √
𝑏𝑇
2𝑖
  
where – 
 C represents cash balances  
 T is the dollar value of transactions at a constant price level  
 b is the transaction cost  
 i the interest rate.  
The higher the transaction cost, the higher the cash balance, and similarly the higher the 
dollar value of the transaction, the higher the cash balances to be held. Latane (1954) 
show that cash balances are inversely related to interest rate. However, Meltzer (1963) 
later indicated that, although interest rates influence the demand for money, the 
relationship is more complex than previously assumed. Interest rate on financial assets 
and the yield on private capital were indicated to be the main determinants of cash 
balances of firms. In situations where money is held as part of a portfolio of assets, the 
amount of money in the portfolio is dependent on the amount of wealth one has as well 
as the yields of a variety of alternative assets (Tobin, 1961). The first approximation 
function is indicated as follows: 𝑀 = 𝑓(𝑟, 𝑊)  
where  
 M is money held as part of the portfolio that is the sum of currency and demand 
deposits of the public  
 r is the interest rate  
 W is the net wealth of the public. 
According to Keynes (1936), money held for precautionary purpose, is kept to provide for 
emergencies that require unexpected expenditure and for unanticipated prospects of 
beneficial acquisitions, and also to meet the obligations of the firm as they fall due. Mainly 
precautionary balances are dependent on the probability of unplanned expenditures but 
the unpredictability of expected receipts also plays a significant role (Whalen, 1966). 
Firms are found wanting if they fail to meet unplanned disbursements or when expected 
receipts are not realised (Hui, Genberg, & Chung, 2011).  
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Whalen (1966) elaborates how the precautionary motive of holding money is driven by 
need to meet a subsequent liability giving an example of demand deposits of banks, 
where the timing of withdrawals is unpredictable. In situations where the repayment date 
of the liability is known in advance in case of fixed term deposits, the cash held to meet 
this obligation as it falls due, is appropriately explained by the transaction motive cash 
balances (Tobin, 1956). If, however, the pattern of deposits and withdrawals of the bank 
is not known with certainty, banks are required to retain a certain portion of deposits as 
cash in vaults to meet the possibility of an excess of disbursements over receipts 
(Whalen, 1966; Frenkel, & Jovanovic, 1980). Whalen (1966) further argues that the main 
challenge that most banks face is the determination of the optimal quantity of 
precautionary cash balances. 
When determining the optimal cash balances for precautionary purposes, banks need to 
understand the factors that matter. There are three factors that affect the optimal size of 
precautionary cash balances according to Whalen (1966), namely the cost of liquidity 
(illiquidity), the opportunity cost of holding cash balances instead of loaning it out, and 
lastly, the average volume and variability of deposits and withdrawals.  
The cost of illiquidity can be viewed from the funding perspective (funding liquidity risk) or 
failure to exit a particular position in assets due to lack of liquidity in the market (market 
liquidity risk) (Rogers, & Singh, 2010). Therefore, the cost of liquidity arises when an 
economic agent or bank underestimates cash needs for given payments in a particular 
period. The cost of illiquidity may be even trickier as it may drive banks into bankruptcy in 
some situations. Illiquidity cost is dependent on the availability of credit in the market and 
also on the nature of the portfolio of assets the bank possesses. If they are readily 
convertible to cash, the cost of illiquidity will be the implicit and explicit cost of a transfer 
transaction making this conversion (Domowitz, Glen, & Madhavan, 2001).  
A firm incurs an opportunity cost when it holds its deposits as cash instead of creating 
loans or purchasing income earning instruments (Bryant, 1980). Moreover, Whalen 
(1966) earlier indicated that the opportunity cost of holding precautionary cash balances 
is very similar to the opportunity cost of holding transactions cash balances as cash 
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balances do not earn any interest. As precautionary cash balances increase, opportunity 
costs increase.  
The extent to which the average volume of deposits and withdrawals varies is another 
fundamental factor that determines the level of precautionary balances. At any given time, 
banks expect to receive a particular amount of deposits as well as an expected amount 
of disbursements (Diamond, & Rajan, 2001). The expected withdrawals less the expected 
deposits define a probability distribution of expected net cash flow. The probability 
distribution of expected net cash flows is assumed to have a mean of zero and variance, 
which is determined by the degree of uncertainty attached to the pattern of expected 
deposits and withdrawals (Alger, & Alger, 1999). Moreover, Alger and Alger (1999) argue 
that the variance increases with an increase in average volume of deposits and 
disbursements; variance will tend to increase as potential divergences between receipts 
and drawings increase. As the relationship between the average volume of receipts and 
disbursements and the standard deviation of net disbursements depends on the type of 
probability distribution that is assumed, the increase in variance of net cash outflow will 
be compensated by an increase in precautionary cash balances in order to maintain a 
given probability against insufficient cash in hand (Whalen, 1966).  
The total cost of illiquidity is simply modelled as the sum of opportunity cost of holding 
cash balances and the cost of illiquidity: 𝐸 = (𝑀 × 𝑟) + (𝑝 × 𝑐)  
where  
 E is the total cost of precautionary cash management  
 𝑀 × 𝑟 is the opportunity cost of holding cash balances where M is the average 
precautionary balances 
 r is the opportunity cost rate,  
 𝑝 × 𝑐 is the expected cost of illiquidity where p stands for the probability that net 
disbursements will be greater than precautionary cash balances, and c represents 
the cost per occurrence of insufficient cash (Alger, & Alger, 1999).  
The speculative demand for cash balances pertains to cash balances that are set aside 
to take advantage of movement in interest rates and therefore, like precautionary demand 
for cash, are dependent upon the rate of interest (Keynes, 1936; Rezende, 2015). Interest 
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becomes the reward for not spending but the reward for hoarding. Keynes (1936) further 
elaborates that, in a bond market, the bids and asks are balanced by the rate of interest. 
The market interest rate will force the bids and asks to be in equilibrium, which shows 
that banks are successful in adjusting their portfolios to what they consider an optimum 
allocation over bonds and cash holdings. Thus, in a flexprice bond market (Laidler, 1984), 
there is no difference between the loanable funds theory (Patinkin, 1958; Snippe, 1985) 
– in which the interest rate forces the supply and demand of bonds into equilibrium – and 
the liquidity preference theory (Tsiang, 1956), where interest rate links the supply and 
demand for money (Bibow, 2010; Lavoie, 2014). 
2.3.3 The portfolio management theory 
 
In the portfolio management theory, unlike the separation theorem discussed earlier 
(Alger, & Alger, 1999), the assets and liabilities of a bank are all viewed as securities, 
meaning that the whole bank is considered a portfolio of securities (Pyle, 1971; Hart & 
Jaffee, 1974). The adoption of this notion implies that the management of bank assets 
and liabilities can be modelled according to Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory. The 
simple model adapted from Freixas and Rochet (1997:236) elaborates on the theory.  
The assumption behind the portfolio management theory is that there is only one risky 
financial security (loans) with a return of ?̃?𝐿, and one risk-free security that is highly liquid 
and with a return of 𝑟 (Freixas and Rochet, 1997:236). Beginning with the initial 
obligations of equity and deposits that are deemed to be exogenously determined here, 
the bank manager then has to decide what should be invested in risky assets and how 
much in the risk-free asset, i.e. the liquid asset. A positive amount reflects an asset side 
of the balance sheet, and a negative amount depicts a liability side. Assuming that the 
interest rate on deposits is zero, the random payoff is equal to: 𝜋 ̃ = r(E + D) + (?̃?𝐿 − 𝑟)𝑥𝐿 
(Alger, & Alger, 1999). Where: 𝜋 ̃is the random payoff and 𝑥𝐿 is the loan amount.  
In these circumstances, the manager is assumed to be risk-averse, and hence have 
mean-variance preferences: 𝑈(𝐸(𝜋 ̃)), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜋 ̃) with utility (U) increasing in the expected 
profit, and decreasing in the variance (Zarruk & Madura,1992). Under these assumptions, 
the following outcome is achieved: if the expected returns are in the manner that ?̃?𝐿 > 𝑟 >
0, then 𝑥𝐿 > 0. On the other hand, as investors are different, their need for liquidity varies 
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(variation in ). Investors with low illiquidity costs or low probabilities of needing liquidity 
require a lower absolute return illiquidity premium from Asset than investors with high 
illiquidity costs or a high probability of needing liquidity (Hughes & Mester, 1998). In the 
case of a risk neutral investor, the absolute return premium needed to make the investor 
indifferent between liquid and illiquid assets becomes a function of anticipated illiquidity 
costs, the probability of a liquidity shock, and the relationship between these costs and 
probabilities and the market return (Alger & Alger, 1999). 
Risk becomes the most important driver of assets invested in liquid assets, 𝐸 + 𝐷 − 𝑥𝐿. 
In this regard, risk is assumed from the willingness of the banker to take risk as well as 
the risk associated with the returns on risky assets (loans) (Diamond, & Dybvig, 1983). 
The proportion of assets invested in the liquid asset increases with the manager’s level 
of risk averseness (see Diamond, 1997). The position can be even negative for managers 
who are risk-loving, i.e. he or she has a low level of risk aversion. This implies that banks 
with relatively more liquid assets have managers who are more risk-averse. For any given 
utility function of excess returns (?̃?𝐿 − 𝑟), the amount invested in liquid assets is increasing 
with variance in ?̃?𝐿 keeping 𝑟𝐿 constant (Alger & Alger, 1999). An empirical implication is 
that, when the volatility of interest rates increases, banks should decrease the amount of 
loans, and increase the holdings of liquid assets (Diamond & Rajan, 2001). 
Alger and Alger (1999) moreover argue that one other aspect worth noting is that, if 
deposits and equity in the portfolio management theory are endogenised, then the size 
of the bank cannot be specified. This means that for any multiple of the portfolio, which is 
deemed optimal for a given level of equity and deposits, is also considered to be optimal. 
Consequently, size becomes a random variable, and the proportion of liquid assets (risk-
free asset) relative to total assets is not determined by size (Kishan & Opiela, 2000). 
Liquidity in the context of portfolio management was further expounded by Kinlaw, 
Kritzman, and Turkington (2013) who explained the determinants of liquidity level as 
analogous to benefits of liquidity. The benefits indicated are –  
 the ability to exercise market timing;  
 portfolio rebalancing;  
 portfolio reallocation by taking advantage of new opportunities;  
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 meeting capital calls;  
 exiting from unprofitable positions; and  
 responding to shifts in risk tolerance.  
Market timing is a strategy that bank managers or investors employ when buying or selling 
securities based on the anticipated future intrinsic value of the asset (Chang & Lewellen, 
1984). The strategy is based on both technical and fundamental analysis. Since other 
investors are more skilled in anticipating assets return and risks of a portfolio, the theory 
postulates that the expected return and risk of market timing is incorporated into a shadow 
asset that forms part of the liquid portion of the portfolio (Pyle, 1971). The strategy forms 
part of the liquid asset because this improves the expected utility beyond the initially 
expected utility of the portfolio.  
Rebalancing is one of the most common and important activities in portfolio management 
processes (Woodside-Oriakhi, Lucas, & Beasley, 2013). Investors always have what they 
regard as the ‘optimal portfolios’ given their views and attitudes toward risk and return 
(Statman, 2014). Once they establish these optimal portfolios, they want to keep the asset 
allocation in these proportions over time. However, over time, asset prices change and 
hence the proportions of assets thereby make the portfolios suboptimal (Yu, Chiou, & Liu, 
2017). In essence, if the portfolio constituted all liquid asset, it would be very easy for the 
manager to rebalance the portfolio, though not without a cost. Depending on the extent 
to which portfolios contain liquid assets, rebalancing may not be executed fully and hence 
portfolios remain suboptimal (Kinlaw, Kritzman & Turkington, 2013; Ang, Papanikolaou, 
& Westerfield, 2014). In this case, the theory proposes a shadow liability (Kinlaw et al., 
2013) to be attached to the illiquid assets, because their immobility is assumed to reduce 
expected utility. The cost of the shadow liability becomes the difference between certainty 
equivalent of the optimal portfolio and that which is suboptimal (Begenau, Bigio, & 
Majerovitz, 2016).  
Investors periodically may want to liquidate part of their existing portfolios. Pension funds, 
for example, may want to make unpredicted benefit payments. Individual investors may 
want to meet their day-to-day transactions or once-off transactions using proceeds from 
liquidating part of their portfolios. These liquidations may render the portfolio suboptimal. 
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To the extent that part of the portfolio is allocated to illiquid assets, the portfolios may fail 
to restore optimality (Campanale, Fugazza, & Gomes, 2015). Thus, a shadow liability is 
attached to illiquid assets and, as with rebalancing, the measure of certainty equivalent 
between optimal portfolios and suboptimal portfolios is determined (Kinlaw et al., 2013). 
Over time, investors may want to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise. 
These may be in the form of new strategies, new managers, or better ways to manage 
existing portfolios. Liquidity makes the reconfiguration easy; therefore, a shadow asset 
(Kinlaw et al., 2013) is attached. On the other hand, investors may wish to exit existing 
positions they think are not going to perform as initially anticipated. In this case, a shadow 
liability will be attached to illiquid assets that cannot be removed from the portfolio easily. 
Over time, investors’ risk tolerance will change as a result of changes in circumstances. 
As the tolerance shifts, there is a need to rebalance the portfolio to reflect the investor’s 
increase or reduction in risk averseness. A shadow liability is attached to illiquid assets 
as it limits the extent to which the investor can rebalance the portfolio to reflect the new 
risk appetite. On occasion, investors may fail to liquidate their positions and end up 
borrowing to meet their obligations. Kinlaw et al. (2013) further shows that a further 
shadow liability is attached to the illiquid asset to reflect the cost and uncertainty of 
borrowing. It should be noted that thus far, the theory implicitly identified liquidity and 
illiquidity as binary attributes (Alger & Alger, 1999). 
2.3.4 Moral hazard incentives 
 
It has been demonstrated that banks ensure themselves against liquidity shocks through 
keeping a buffer of liquid assets in their individual portfolios and also by borrowing from 
the central bank. The theory of moral hazard (Repullo, 2004) was built on the premise of 
the ability of a bank to utilise the opportunity to borrow from the central bank. The 
pioneering work by Repullo (2004) revealed a model that shows some linkages and 
interactions between the banks and the central bank. The theory of moral hazard shows 
that the presence of the central bank as the lender of last resort influences the behaviour 
of banks, which may affect the bank’s choice with regard to the volume of the liquid assets 
buffer. While the main objective of banks is to maximise shareholder value (Sharfman, 
2014), the main objective of the central bank is to trade off the fiscal cost of lending to the 
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bank and the cost of the bank’s failure (Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard, & Cottarelli, 
2009). Given this, the model tries to show what banks will do to optimise their positions 
in the context of what they are privy to regarding the function of the central bank as a 
lender of last resort.  
Repullo (2004) found that banks’ choice of risk assets is not dependent on the presence 
of the central bank as the lender of last resort. However, the presence of the central bank 
as lender of last resort dictates the level of the optimal buffer of liquid assets a bank can 
hold. In essence, the shares of safe assets in the bank’s portfolio were found to decrease 
with the introduction of a central bank as a lender of last resort in the model. Eiras (2003)’s 
findings are in line with Repullo (2004)’s findings. Eiras examined Argentinean banks, 
and found that the introduction of the lender of last resort resulted in a reduction of 
approximately 6.7% in liquidity holdings of banks.  
2.3.5 Financial frictions and the business cycle  
 
Firms keep a buffer of liquid assets to take advantage of profitable projects as 
opportunities arise (Keynes, 1936). The buffer of liquidity assets is heavily dependent 
upon external funding (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998). When holding liquid assets in their 
balance sheets, banks or any other economic agent are said to be dependent upon the 
extent to which firms have ready access to external funding (Schmaltz, 2009). Allen, 
Hryckiewicz, Kowalewski, and Tümer-Alkan (2014) indicates that the external funding is 
another conduit by which banks could access liquidity, namely interbank borrowing. This 
means that instead of relying on a liquid asset buffer or central bank borrowing to finance 
their assets, banks could access money through a money market (Bonner, Van Lelyveld, 
& Zymek, 2015). Failure by banks to access funds in the money market brings us to the 
issue of financial frictions (Fernández & Gulan, 2015).  
Bank liquidity holding is perceived to be linked to business cycles as interbank funding is 
constrained during bad business days, that is, banks may not always access enough 
funding easily (Borio, 2014). Ideally, banks are believed to hold liquid assets during 
periods of economic downturn as a contingent against limited interbank fund access. The 
lending opportunities may not be as good at such times, and banks run down liquidity 
buffers during economic expansions when lending opportunities may have picked up. 
35 
 
During periods of downturn, the central bank through the expansionary monetary policy 
may decide to stimulate the economy by increasing money supply. However, banks are 
perceived to hoard the increase in the overall liquidity (Iyer, Peydró, Da-Rocha-Lopes & 
Schoar, 2014). This raises the questions of the effect of macro-economic variables on the 
liquidity buffers of banks. Financial friction induces a counter-cyclical behaviour of liquidity 
buffers, such that liquidity is low in periods of economic upturn and when the policy rate 
is high, while liquidity buffers are high in periods of economic downturn and when the 
policy interest rate is low (Iyer et al., 2014).  
During periods of economic downturn, corporate finance theory (Vernimmen, Quiry, 
Dallocchio, Le Fur, & Salvi, 2014) suggests that in the presence of financial frictions, cash 
flows form thriving projects are hoarded. The level of liquidity reserves varies amongst 
firms. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) indicate that constrained firms have tight 
liquidity management programmes as they set aside funds for future investment 
opportunities unlike unconstrained firms that have readily available internal sources of 
liquidity. This proposal raises a powerful test for the presence of financing constraints, 
that is when cash flow affects liquidity buffers. The theory by Modigliani-Miller (1958), 
which states that the structure of funding is irrelevant, is put into perspective, as the 
availability of internal funds is relevant in the theory of corporate finance. 
The ability of a constrained firm to raise internal funds is subject to the restriction of the 
availability of pledgeable underlying asset, whose liquidation value is verifiable. However, 
for an unconstrained firm, the amount pledgeable underlying assets is not important as 
the amount of cash held between any two periods is irrelevant (Adler, 2012). Aspachs et 
al. (2005) also indicate that the link between liquidity holdings and current cash flows is 
weak and non-existent in most cases. On the contrary, firms that are experiencing 
financial constraints, unlike the unconstrained firms, may not be able to attain the optimal 
level of investment as a result of failing to raise enough liquidity. For these firms, there 
may be a benefit in managing liquidity in order to increase their ability to finance future 
projects as they arise (Brunnermeier et al., 2012a). When a bank increases its liquidity 
buffers, this represents an opportunity cost of not investing the same funds in a more 
profitable investment.  
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Therefore, firms must carefully manage the trade-off between the ability to take 
advantage of new opportunities as well as the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets. 
Theoretically and practically this will increase the liquidity buffers of firms in their quest to 
keep positive cash flows for speculative purposes. Almeida et al. (2004) found a positive 
and significant relationship between liquidity and cash flows. Consistent with their model, 
Almeida et al. (2004) believe their findings are in line with the theory of financially 
constrained firms (see Livdan, Sapriza, & Zhang, 2009).  
Banks liquidity buffers are related to bank capital level. Kochubey and Kowalczyk (2014) 
propose that liquidity and capital are interconnected as they found that a decline in bank 
capital ratios is associated with increase in bank liquidity levels. Other scholars, such as 
Repullo (2005) and Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi (2013) also found a positive significant 
relationship between bank capital levels and liquidity buffers held by banks. Asset 
securitisation has played an important role in improving liquidity, thus the liquidity levels 
kept by banks are linked to securitisation. In their investigation of determinants of liquidity, 
loutskina (2011) and Kochubey and Kowalczyk (2014) found that banks with higher 
involvement in securitisation have lower liquidity buffers. In the analysis of liquidity and 
demand deposits, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1998) found that expected deposit 
withdrawal is proportional to the total amount of deposits. Banks with relatively more 
demand deposits are postulated to hold relatively more liquid assets. 
2.3.6 Liquid assets as a residual: the role of supply and demand 
 
In the portfolio management theory of banking (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), bank 
managers play a central role as they are assumed to be risk-averse. This assumption can 
only be true in small banks that are manager-owned; therefore, risk neutrality is more 
realistic for large banks that are highly diversified and a lot of shareholders. Given that 
holding liquid assets is costly from the perspective of rendering an opportunity cost, inform 
of forgone return. Why should a bank hold liquid assets?  
The theory of liquid asset as a residual (Alger & Alger, 1999) asserts that liquid assets 
comprise the difference between deposits plus equity and loans/credits. Taking into 
account that equity is given, the theorists then applied the classical macro-economic 
analysis in a bid to understand the determinants of deposits and of loans in terms of 
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supply and demand. This is different from the theory of portfolio management as that 
assumes demand and supply to be perfectly elastic (Alger & Alger, 1999). 
According to the theory of liquid asset as a residual, banks are taken to sell credit based 
on the deposits they raised (Diamond, & Rajan, 2001). It is indicated that raising deposits 
and issuing out credit are costly. Given that the demand for credit and supply of deposits 
is exogenously determined, the profit-maximising quantity of credit and deposits found 
when the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). The 
determined point of equilibrium is heavily dependent on the cost structure of the bank. 
Although outsiders may be able to understand the market structure in which the bank 
operates, they are not privy to individual bank cost structures, and this imposes some 
challenges when it comes to understanding empirical implication (Maksimovic, 1990). 
So far, the theory of liquid asset as a residual is silent on the effect of default risk on credit 
extension. Default risk is one of the main determinants of credit supply (Saretto & Tookes, 
2013). Due to adverse selection, credit rationing may set in because there is no market 
clearing interest rate (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). If interest rates increase, this will attract 
most risk borrowers, which will result in an undefinable credit supply function resulting in 
disequilibrium (Keynes, 2016). When credit demand and credit supply curves do not 
intersect, this leads to credit rationing (Diamond & Dybvig, 1986). This implies that the 
propensity of banks to lend diminishes and hence there is an increase in cash held in 
liquid assets. In summary, if banks perceive their borrowing clientele to be more risk they 
hold back the deposits and automatically keep the funds in liquid assets. 
2.3.7 Liquid assets and liabilities: the role of market imperfections 
 
The discussion on theories on liquid so far has focused explicitly on the asset side and 
implicitly on the liability side through the penalty rate. The penalty rate is assumed to be 
exogenously determined and independent of the needed amount, meaning that the cost 
of increasing liabilities is assumed exogenous. Thus, theories previously discussed do 
not explicitly model the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet as a liquidity source is not 
restricted. 
After realising that liabilities are a significant source of liquidity, Poole (1968) includes 
interbank borrowings in a classical inventory model applied to banking. Like the portfolio 
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theory (Pyle, 1971; Hart & Jaffee, 1974), the classical inventory theory considers the 
supply of funds on the interbank market to be perfectly elastic (Bacchetta, & Benhima, 
2015). The approach though seeks to explain why banks may only have limited access 
to liabilities. 
Information asymmetry is the major reason for market imperfections. In the model 
suggested by Holmström and Tirole (1998), managers are assumed to be inefficient due 
to moral hazard, i.e. they misallocate resources unless given proper incentives. ‘Moral 
hazard’ refers to a situation where bank managers do not endure the consequences of 
bad behaviour if they are not motivated (Holmström & Tirole, 1998). This therefore means 
that banks cannot in any way pledge all of the returns from their investments to the 
investors.  
The approach considers a risk-neutral banker with an investment opportunity that is worth 
𝑍1to him or her, but only and this is worth 𝑍0 to none investors where 𝑍0 < 𝑍1. The 
investor’s initial investment I satisfies 𝑍1 > 𝐼 > 𝑍0. The investment has a positive net 
present value, 𝑍1 > 𝐼, but it is not self-financing, because the most that investors can be 
promised is less than the investment 𝑍0 < 𝐼. The shortfall, 𝐼 − 𝑍0 > 0, must be paid by the 
entrepreneur or covered by claims on the market value of the firm’s other existing assets 
(Holmström & Tirole, 1998). 
In this theory, Holmström and Tirole (2011) show that the project is eternally financed 
hence not self-financing, 𝐼 − 𝑍0 > 0; thus, the investment will require a positive 
contribution from the entrepreneur. Let 𝐴 be the maximum amount of capital that the 
entrepreneur can commit to the project either personally or through the firm. The project 
can only proceed if the pledgeable income exceeds the project’s net financing need 𝐼 −
𝐴.  
The reason why firms demand liquidity is the need to finance future needs (Drehmann & 
Nikolaou, 2013). It is cheaper to get financing now, and firms realise that there is a risk 
that financing will not be available if the firm waits until the need for funding arises. The 
approach observes that banks have to guard against liquidity shortages. To do so, banks 
should set up a financing mechanism in advance that utilises both the asset and the 
liability sides of their balance sheets. The contingent plan is critical as banks make a long-
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term investment, which may need extra funding at an interim stage due to a liquidity shock 
Gilje, Loutskina & Strahan, 2016). On the asset side, banks may have inventory of liquid 
assets in the form of Treasury bills and other less risky short-term assets that can be sold 
easily when need arises. On the liability side, banks may take out credit lines or issue 
securities that give them flexibility in their management of cash, such as long-term debt, 
preferred equity and straight equity (Holmström & Tirole. 2011). 
2.3.8 The ladder approach 
 
The ladder approach is explained by Chaplin, Emblow, and Michael (2000) in the context 
of both the funding liquidity and the market liquidity. They indicate that funding and market 
liquidity theory are hand in glove. Although they seem to be separate phenomena, the 
two are inter-related dimensions to a bank’s liquidity. Banks need to be well positioned to 
meet their short-term obligation as they fall due. Banks may meet these needs through 
borrowing in the money market, alternatively by selling highly liquid assets (Banti & 
Phylaktis, 2015). Chaplin et al. (2000) further indicate that liquidity management in the 
financial sector is dependent mainly on the balance sheet structure of banks. This may, 
however, vary from bank to bank as their business mixes and structure of balance sheets 
differ. Some banks may be in the business of taking deposits from the public, others are 
providers of loan facilities, while yet others provide payment and settlement services for 
customers and other banks. The list is endless.  
The ladder approach is considered to be pivotal in liquidity management. The ladder 
approach theory postulates that banks must match their liabilities and assets (De Haan & 
van den End, 2013). The matching is done by comparing cash inflows and cash outflows 
at particular time horizons. What matters most is the behavioural maturity rather than 
actual maturity. While demand deposits may be withdrawn at any given time, they may 
have a considerable long-term maturity (Fall & Viviani, 2016). Banks therefore need to 
assess, based on experience and current and prospective market conditions, both the 
expected behavioural maturity of their liability and asset positions, and the risk of 
unexpected liquidity needs. 
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2.3.9 The risk absorption hypothesis and the financial fragility/crowding-out 
hypothesis 
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) assert that there are two theories that describe the nexus 
between bank liquidity creation and capital ratio. Firstly, the risk absorption theory (Berger 
& Bouwman, 2009; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011) shows that banks with 
higher capital have higher capacity and propensity to create liquidity. The reason is that 
banks are primarily there to transform risk through accepting short-term deposits and then 
issue out loans that are risky and long term in nature. Thus, banks in their role in 
transforming risk, may encounter some losses because of this function (Allen & Gale, 
2004). Bank capital is therefore, used to reduce the effect of liquidity risk (Repullo, 2004).  
Secondly, the financial fragility theory (Diamond & Rajan, 1999) proposes that banks with 
higher levels of capital are not motivated to create liquidity. Fungáčová, Weill, and Zhou 
(2010) argue that as banks increase capital, this squeezes out any form of short-term 
borrowings and deposits and consequently hampers bank liquidity creation. This is 
confirmed by Diamond and Rajan (2001a) who contend that financial fragility is 
trademarked by capital deficits and therefore, banks respond by creating liquidity to 
repress the risk.  
2.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter discussed the theories that attempt to expound why banks keep liquidity 
buffers as part of their balance sheets. Many theories discussed here can be generalised 
to all banks. However, as indicated in this chapter, liquidity is a multifaceted phenomenon. 
The theories discussed so far does not fragment liquidity to give a more comprehensive 
and conclusive elaboration of it. The nearest to this is the portfolio management theory, 
which looks at the bank as a portfolio that constitutes both assets and liabilities. The next 
chapter provides a more detailed analysis of bank liquidity as identified from the funding 
side of the bank and the asset side of the bank. The liquidity spirals are also put into 
perspective. 
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CHAPTER 3: MARKET LIQUIDITY, FUNDING LIQUIDITY AND LIQUIDITY SPIRALS 
3 Introduction  
 
Most of the financial crises in the past three decades have been simply liquidity crises 
(Stange & Kaserer, 2009; Chen & Lu, 2016). The Russian financial crisis of 1998, and the 
recent 2007–2009 financial crisis were typical examples of liquidity crises. During these 
periods, financial institutions held significant positions in assets that could not be 
liquidated without significant price repercussions. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 
saw most of the big financial institutions facing liquidity problems, who were forced to sell 
assets to reduce their exposure to liquidity risk. This led to a substantial decrease in stock 
prices as many funds were forced to sell their positions in shares to settle their obligations 
as they fell due and to settle margin calls (Bai et al., 2014). A comprehensive discussion 
on the general theories on bank liquidity was done in the preceding chapter. Since 
Chapter 2 provided general theories on liquidity, in the current chapter, liquidity is split 
into funding liquidity and market liquidity as banks primarily operates within the context of 
ALM.  
3.1 Market liquidity  
 
Regardless of the reality of market liquidity risk, most financial theories and models 
assume that financial markets are efficient and frictionless; hence, the prices of assets do 
not deviate significantly from their equilibrium values and financial instruments can be 
traded without any impediment (Markowitz, 1952; Fama, 1965). This is despite the fact 
that a BIS survey among banks showed that market liquidity remains the single 
uncaptured risk factor across all asset classes due to its elusiveness (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision [BCBS], 2008). Nevertheless, financial crises have revealed that, 
in reality, markets have frictions and these frictions limit the liquidity offered by markets 
(Vayanos & Wang, 2012).  
This section discusses the properties of market liquidity, which are the lack of liquidity 
due to underlying market imperfections such as funding constraints, information 
asymmetry, and different forms of trading costs (Fontaine, Garcia & Gungor, 2015). The 
study also expands on how imperfections affect expected returns of financial asset. The 
theoretical literature and empirical literature on market liquidity are also surveyed and 
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expounded. This section begins by defining market liquidity followed by theoretical issues 
on market liquidity, then a discussion on the measurement of market liquidity and lastly, 
an elaboration of the determinants of market liquidity. 
 
3.1.1 Definition of market liquidity  
 
Finance professionals (e.g. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986b; Amihud & Mendelson, 1991) 
have debated the definition of liquidity for over two decades but there is still no consensus. 
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006) state that market liquidity is not directly 
observable and has several dimensions; thus, it cannot be apprehended by a single 
measure. What most scholars agree upon is the fact that liquidity is an indescribable 
phenomenon, which is easy to recognise but hard to describe. Unambiguously, Crockett 
(2008) defines market liquidity as the speed with which an asset can be converted into 
cash or how a bank can use this asset to access external funding. The bank can sell the 
assets at market price for cash or alternatively, banks can use the value of the asset to 
get funding from the external market.  
Regardless of how a bank gets the value of its financial asset, this value should be as 
close as possible to the intrinsic or equilibrium value of the asset. If the realised value of 
the asset is significantly different from its equilibrium price, then the market is deemed 
illiquid (Moinas, Nguyen & Valente, 2016). Thus, the market is said to be liquid if banks 
and other market participants can buy and sell financial instruments without necessarily 
affecting the prices of these assets negatively (Fontaine et al., 2015). Adler (2012) 
indicates that market liquidity is multidimensional and involves cost and quantity as well 
as speed. The comprehensive definition should capture all the three dimensions, namely: 
 Market depth, which is the ability of an institution to trade considerably huge asset 
volumes without adversely affecting the market prices of this asset (Moinas et al., 
2016). This can only be accomplished in a perfect market structure where there 
are a large number of buyers and sellers, which act as catalyst in providing a 
sudden return to market price (Adler, 2012). In the presence of many buyers and 
sellers, the price of an asset does not deviate significantly; therefore, the 
movement is very small and economically immaterial (Vayanos & Wang, 2012). 
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Grossman and Miller (1988) capture this phenomenon as they state that liquidity 
is determined by demand and supply.  
 Market tightness measures the bid–ask spread of an asset, that is the difference 
between the bid price and the offer price (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986a). 
Specifically, the bid–ask spread is the difference between the price that market 
participants are willing to buy the financial instrument and the price at which they 
are willing to sell the same asset (Holden, 2009). Furthermore, Holden (2009) 
argues that an asset that is considered liquid should be associated with very tight 
bid–ask spread, which is an indication of low transaction costs, while a wider bid–
ask spread means higher transaction costs. Sarr and Lybek (2002) argue that the 
transaction costs in quote-driven markets include both explicit costs as measures 
by bid–ask spread and implicit costs for example the opportunity cost of not 
trading.  
 Market resilience measures the speed at which the asset price adjusts back to 
its original equilibrium price after some disturbances (Adler, 2012). If the market 
is liquid, after disturbances, the asset price will quickly adjust back to equilibrium 
price. A liquid market is characterised by assets that have transparent features. 
As the perception on asset price by market participants changes, the price of a 
liquid asset under normal circumstances should swiftly adjust and vice versa 
(Loebnitz, 2006). 
In short, the illiquidity of financial instruments could emanate from various sources. The 
diverse elements in theoretical literature on market microstructure that accentuates the 
high transaction costs, asymmetric information, order imbalances, and opportunity cost, 
which include the cost of finding the buyer or the seller of the assets in question as the 
primary reasons for the lack of liquidity (Vayanos & Wang, 2012). Put in simple terms by 
Stange and Kaserer (2009), market liquidity is the ease with which market participants 
can trade in assets. The current study, liquidity is measured by the BLMI and ALMI, these 
measures account for the assets/ market liquidity as the assets side liquidity weights were 
calculated using stock market spreads and trading volumes.  
44 
 
3.1.2 Theory of market liquidity  
 
Market liquidity is defined as the cost of trading a financial instrument in relation to its 
equilibrium price or fair price (Dowd, 2001, p. 187; Buhl, 2004; Amihud & Mendelson, 
2006). Earlier, Amihud and Mendelson (1986a) argued that when market participants buy 
illiquid assets they later discover that there are transaction costs and demand to be 
compensated for them. Thus, the fair market value is the mid-price, according to Stange 
and Kaserer (2009). The mid-price is the price at the middle of the bid–ask spread. This 
is a more objective liquidity measure but lacks some intuition as in reality market prices 
are highly volatile and may not be represented by a single price (Holden, 2009). To 
capture the three dimensions of liquidity, the cost of liquidity 𝐿𝑡(𝑞) at time t with order 
quantity of q is shown as follows: 
𝐿𝑡(𝑞) = 𝑇(𝑞) + 𝑃𝐼𝑡(𝑞) + 𝐷𝑡(𝑞)             3.1 
Where 𝑇(𝑞) represents the explicit cost of trading, 𝑃𝐼𝑡(𝑞) measures the market breadth 
and the 𝐷𝑡(𝑞) captures the implicity trading costs. The explicit trading costs include 
brokerage commissions, exchange fees and transaction taxes (Adler, 2012). Thus, the 
explicit cost are the direct transaction costs of buying and selling securities. These costs 
are known in advance and do not change through time; therefore, they are deterministic 
(Loebnitz, 2006, p. 18). The 𝑃𝐼𝑡(𝑞) measures the price effects of trading larger volumes 
(Moinas et al., 2016). Specifically, the price impact is calculated as the difference between 
the actual transaction price and the mid-price (Amihud & Mendelson, 2006). Demsetz 
(1968) indicates that market impact is a measure of value and the institution is prepared 
to lose an asset in exchange for immediacy. The market impact is therefore closely 
associated with 𝐷𝑡(𝑞) for example the delay cost as a result of failing to trade a certain 
quantity immediately (Domowitz, Glen & Madhavan, 2001). The implicit cost is delay cost 
(Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003). Their definition does not explicitly show the essence 
of the trading quantity, an addition that can be seen in Amihud and Mendelson’s (2006) 
explanation. The direct trading costs are easy to identify but market impact and delay cost 
are highly subjective (Domowitz et al., 2001). Price impact and delay cost are assumed 
to result from imperfectly elastic demand and supply curves of a financial instrument at a 
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given point in time (Hou & Moskowitz, 2005); thus, this causes the market impact and 
delay costs to increase proportionally with the quantity being traded. 
Stange and Kaserer (2009) state that the increase in liquidity cost and the result of trading 
larger quantities, emanate as a result of two reasons. Firstly, each investor is assumed 
to have capital restrictions and unique expectations regarding the intrinsic value of an 
asset. Therefore, investors are only willing to buy or sell a limited volume at their own 
uniquely specified price (Stange and Kaserer, 2009). When trading a small volume, a 
trader can easily find another trader who is willing to exchange the same quantity at or 
close to the trader's expected fair price (Roll, 1984). The larger the volume to be traded, 
ideally, the more counterparties have to be found (Hou & Moskowitz, 2005). Inevitably, 
the resultant transaction price declines and will be lower than the trader’s expected fair 
price. 
Secondly, as indicated earlier (Demsetz, 1968), the liquidity cost is the price for 
immediacy. Chacko, Jurek, and Stafford (2008) point out that the ability of a trader to 
transact immediately at a given price is fundamentally an American option with the other 
counterparty being the exchange itself. An option part involves the right to get a certain 
amount of assets when the order is executed and the prevailing market price is the 
exercise price. This option has an inherent value, which is dependent on underlying asset 
price volatility and the actual volume of the transaction as compared to the expected 
volume (Chacko et al., 2008), as this is deemed to determine the future liquidity position 
from the perspective of a buyer. In summary, these two elements are crucial in 
understanding market impact as the impact costs are expected to increase with the 
volume of the order. 
Delay costs comprise the costs for searching a counterparty and the cost imposed on the 
investor due to bearing risk, because prices and price impact cost might change during 
the delay for many assets (Hou & Moskowitz, 2005). Moreover, most stocks and bonds 
traded on the stock and bond exchange respectively, search costs are insignificantly 
trivial; however, the costs of supplementary risk during delay can remain extensive. Since 
liquidity risk is a function of volume traded, the trader is faced with a choice in this regard, 
i.e. the price impact cost or the delay costs. The trader can reduce price impact cost by 
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conveniently delaying trading some portions of the transaction. Nevertheless, the part of 
the transaction that is not immediately traded suffers from delay costs (Hou & Moskowitz, 
2005). Therefore, deliberate delay can only be perceived optimally if the delay costs are 
lower than the price impact costs. As a result, there are two types of delay, forced and 
deliberate.  
It is quite clear from the discussion above that there are costs associated with trading 
illiquid assets. However, most prominent finance models and theories are built on the 
basis of the assumption that there no implicit costs for trading relatively illiquid assets. 
Therefore, investors need not to be compensated for this cost (Markowitz, 1952; Treynor, 
1961; Sharpe, 1964; Fama, 1965; Linter, 1965; Mossin, 1966). In practice, the cost of 
liquidity is apparent, but academic research deliberately overlooked this cost as relaxing 
the assumption of frictionless markets destabilises most of the models and theoretical 
framework upon which these models were built (Adler, 2012).  
Few studies are no longer assuming that markets are frictionless. The first scholars to 
challenge the status quo were Amihud and Mendelson (1986a), who developed a pricing 
model that took into account the effect of liquidity. This became one of the seminal works 
in liquidity and asset pricing research. In their study, Amihud and Mendelson (1986a) 
realised that there is cost of liquidity, and this is a price for immediate execution. The 
liquidity cost is therefore captured by the bid–ask spread, which is the difference between 
what a financial institution is prepared to buy at bid price and to sell at ask price of a 
particular financial instrument. In comparison to the price of a liquid asset, the price of 
illiquid assets should be lower as their future cash flows should be discounted by a higher 
discount rate representing a higher spread. The greater the liquidity, the smaller the 
spread and the smaller the before-cost expected return. Thus, the price of a highly liquid 
financial instrument is higher than that of an illiquid security (Chordia et al., 2001). 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986b) also realised that investors with long time horizons who 
are in no need of immediate trading are prepared to wait, and they can earn these returns. 
Thus, there are clientele effects when it comes to liquidity. Huang, Sun, Yao, and Yu 
(2013) indicate that due to various possible investment horizons, some clients may 
require less compensation for holding illiquid securities as these clients choose to hold 
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more illiquid securities at the same level of compensation, while other clients may prefer 
the opposite. When illiquid securities principally appeal to clients with low liquidity 
preference, the liquidity premium on these investment assets may be diminished. Another 
idea that Amihud and Mendelson (1986b) brought was that the expected return of a 
financial instrument does not necessarily depend on just risk as it also depends on the 
asset’s level of liquidity and on the reward for the transaction costs involved. However, 
Constantinides (1986) asserts that transaction costs in asset pricing have a second-order 
effect. Despite the second-order effect’s strong theoretical predictions, Huang et al. 
(2013) point out that so far, there is minute straightforward empirical evidence on the 
existence of liquidity clientele and its effect on asset pricing.  
Before Amihud and Mendelson (1986b) and Constantinides (1986) explored this 
phenomenon of liquidity, Ibbotson, Diermeier, and Siegel (1984) argued that over and 
above the risk captured in the conversional capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the non-
risk-specific features of a security, such as information costs, taxation and marketability 
affect expected return and, therefore its price. In their argument, ‘marketability’ included 
the notion of liquidity (Ibbotson et al.,1984). A study by Silber (1991) on restricted stock 
shows empirically how liquidity affects equity pricing. Comparing restricted stock with non-
restricted stock of the same company, Silber (1991) found that the restricted stock of 
creditworthy companies typically sells at more than 30% discount compared to non-
restricted stock. This demonstrates the effect of liquidity on stock prices. The biggest 
achievement in the area of liquidity research came from Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2000), who indicate that liquidity has a commonality with market-wide 
features that go beyond the characteristics of the level of liquidity of an individual asset. 
This means that liquidity of an asset cannot be viewed in isolation of what is happening 
in the market as liquidity risk amongst assets is highly correlated, affecting all securities. 
Spreads change in line with changes in the market. If the market is bullish, bid–ask 
spreads are narrow, and when the market is bearish, the spreads are wide (Chordia, Roll 
& Subrahmanyam, 2001). However, trades increase under both conditions. Since liquidity 
is market-wide, it is one of the risks that the investor should be compensated for as it 
cannot be diversified away (Duchin, 2010). This characteristic of liquidity implies that 
regardless of keeping highly liquid securities, an institution can still be stuck with its liquid 
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assets. Adler (2012) indicates that the elasticity of financial assets in terms of market-
wide changes is not the same, as some assets are more responsive to the changes in 
the market, while others are less sensitive. Thus, investors expect high expected return 
from those securities which are sensitive to changes in the market (Fama & French, 
1996). Ideally, this qualifies liquid as a risk factor that should be considered when 
determining the required return of an asset. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) captured this 
sensitivity as liquidity beta. They define liquidity beta as sensitivity of the equities to 
aggregate liquidity shocks.  
Literature has shown that asset pricing models should account for the exposure of stock 
to changes in aggregate liquidity (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Watanabe & Watanabe, 
2008; Lou & Sadka, 2011). According to Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), stocks 
associated with high liquidity betas tend to exhibit higher average returns relative to 
stocks with low liquidity betas. However, their model was criticised by Holden (2009) who 
opined that the research was a statistical exercise rather than a conventional economic 
model. Holden (2009) also had problems with the measure of liquidity that was used to 
empirically drew results. Even so, Pástor and Stambaugh’s (2003) article became the 
premise for a more formal model comprising the two potentially different but connected 
aspects of liquidity, both of which are assumed to be priced, namely liquidity as a cost 
and liquidity as a risk.  
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose liquidity-adjusted CAPM, when they modelled the 
outcome of market liquidity on the prices of equity. Instead of adapting the CAPM based 
on the assumption of efficient and frictionless markets, they relaxed the assumption and 
accounted for liquidity frictions. They begin by building their model based on the standard 
CAPM, which they then supplemented with liquidity as a cost and liquidity as a risk. 
Furthermore, they dissected liquidity risk into three distinct elements and proposed three 
liquidity betas. These are the additional risks, which were presumed to affect expected 
returns.  
 The first beta, βL1, measures the covariance of the asset liquidity with the market 
liquidity. This beta is based on the fact that investors need greater compensation 
for securities that become less liquid when the market is illiquid and vice versa.  
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 The second beta, βL2, measures how the equity security return changes with 
changes in market liquidity. This beta is expected to be negative as expected 
returns of a security that does well when the market is illiquid, are low.  
 The third beta, βL3, is the covariance between the liquidity of a security and market 
returns. This beta is also expected to be negative since investors will need high 
returns for assets that are sensitive in terms of their liquidity when the market is 
bearish.  
In summary, the liquidity-adjusted CAPM shows that the required return of an asset is a 
function of the cost of liquidity and liquidity risk as measured by the four betas, i.e. the 
standard market beta and the three liquidity betas multiplied by the risk premium (Minović 
& Živković, 2014). 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) empirically tested the liquidity-adjusted CAPM on the 25 
equity portfolios which they constructed in order of liquidity. They found that the most 
illiquid portfolios performed better that highly liquid portfolios. The annualised return 
difference between the most liquid and the least liquid portfolio was 4.6%, where 1.1% 
related to liquidity as a risk and the difference to liquidity as a cost. After their analysis, 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) concluded that liquidity-adjusted CAPM gives a more 
integrated view of actual evidence of liquidity and liquidity risk and, therefore, it expounds 
returns of equity better than standard CAPM. In a different set-up that included global 
markets, Lee (2011) empirically tested the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, and found that 
liquidity is a risk that is priced.  
Liquidity risk was more prominent with other global financial markets, namely American 
markets. Lou and Sadka (2011) also investigated the issue of liquidity and stock returns, 
and showed the difference between liquidity as a characteristic and liquidity risk. The 
former refers to the asset level of liquidity and the latter, to the responsiveness of the 
security to changes in market-wide liquidity. Their research focused on the US stock 
market, particularly during the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, and found that stocks 
that were arranged in order of liquidity level showed no cross-sectional return difference 
during the period of their study (Lou & Sadka, 2011). This means that liquidity as a 
characteristic did not have any bearing on the performance of stock markets. On the 
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contrary, equity securities had high elasticity to market-wide liquidity, i.e. securities with 
high liquidity risk underperformed as compared to low liquidity risk stocks during the 
period of crisis (Cao & Petrasek, 2014).  
The interesting finding, however, was that liquidity risk is not ordinarily correlated with 
cost of illiquidity. Lou and Sadka’s (2011) findings bring uncertainty to the soundness of 
Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) conclusion that equity securities with high liquidity costs 
also have high liquidity risk. Thus, liquidity as a cost is highly correlated with liquidity as 
a risk because clients have a tendency of skewing their portfolios towards more liquid 
assets when markets are bearish (Bali, Peng, Shen & Tang, 2013). The only explanation 
of Lou and Sadka’s (2011) finding is that in times of problems, managers of investments 
are likely to get rid of liquid assets first, in a bid to minimise price impact, while holding on 
to more profitable illiquid assets. Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) argue that the pricing 
of liquidity risk should not be static but needs to be dynamic as liquidity risk is time-varying 
and not static. Using a regime-shifting model, Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) found that 
under ‘normal’ conditions, liquidity risk is not priced. However, liquidity risk is presumed 
to be priced in rare situations with 10% probability of happening.  
3.1.3 Measurements of market liquidity  
 
We have demonstrated that there is no single measure of liquidity upon which scholars 
universally agree. Moreover, there is no single measure that incorporates all three 
elements of liquidity, namely the cost of liquidity, the price or market impact as a result of 
trading a huge volume, and the speed of executing a transaction (Leal, Napoletano, 
Roventini, & Fagiolo, 2016). Furthermore, researchers tend to employ their proxies using 
measures constructed from low-frequency data, which are based on weekly or monthly 
trades instead of using high-frequency data, i.e. intraday trades. Adler (2012) points out 
that the reason for academic research focusing on low-frequency data is because of the 
lack of complete intraday trading data. Therefore, low-frequency measures are used as 
proxies for rating high-frequency liquidity measures. The low-frequency liquidity 
measures are divided into two categories, namely liquidity cost measures (spread) and 
price impact measures (market impact) (Cont, Kukanov & Stoikov, 2013). However, the 
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low-frequency measure of liquidity fails to capture one of the important elements of 
liquidity, which is the speed of executing a transaction.  
Roll (1984) proposes the effective spread as a better measure of the cost of liquidity in a 
low-frequency data set-up. His argument is that traders do not necessarily execute their 
trades at the actual bid or ask prices; in fact, most of the transactions are executed 
between the quotes where the buyer buys at a price lower than the ask price and the 
selling client sells at price above the bid price. The effective spread is derived under the 
assumptions that the market is efficient and the probability distribution of changes in 
security price is stationary, in other words the security price fluctuates randomly. Roll’s 
(1984) estimation of effective spread is given by 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2√−𝑐𝑜𝑣., where cov is the 
first-order serial covariance of changes in security price. The intuitive reasoning behind 
this measure is that in an efficient market, security price movements are random; 
therefore, trading costs induce negative serial dependence on sequentially detected 
changes in security price (Roll, 1984). Furthermore, Roll (1984) shows that as security 
prices trade between bid and ask prices, a negative return auto-covariance is resultant.  
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) point out that Roll’s (1984) spread had a major 
estimation problem as the calculated security auto-covariance using full-year security 
returns data was found to be more often positive, resulting in the measure being 
incalculable. To correct this problem, Lesmond et al. (1999) showed that Harris’s (1990) 
approach was more appropriate because all positive auto-covariances are converted to 
negative. Another the shortcoming of the effective spread was shown by Petersen and 
Fialkowski (1994), whose empirical results indicated that the quoted spread was bigger 
than the effective spread.  
Lesmond et al. (1999) propose a proportional bid–ask spread measure as a more 
appropriate estimate of liquidity cost. Their measure of the cost of liquidity is estimated 
from the occurrence of zero return days, where the zero return days include the zero 
volume days and this represents a good proxy for illiquidity. This is a better estimation in 
the sense that zero return days represent the period where there is no price movement 
on the stock indicating a lack of liquidity (Mazza, 2015). The liquidity costs are not only 
captured by the bid–ask spread but it also involves the opportunity cost of not being able 
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to trade immediately. It is interesting to note that their measure could be estimated without 
the actual bid–ask spreads (Rinne & Suominen, 2016).  
Holden (2009) proposes the effective tick as a correct proxy for the effective spread based 
on price clustering (Harris, 1991). His focus was on how much prices tend to occur closely 
together, which is the opposite of penny increments (Ikenberry & Weston, 2008). The 
more the clustering, the higher the transaction costs (Chung, Van Ness & Van Ness, 
2004). Holden (2009) created another measure of liquidity that combined Roll’s (1984) 
effective spread and the effective tick. By combining these spreads, Holden came up with 
what he called “Holden measure” (Holden, 2009). The resultant measure became a 
mixture of clustering and correlation methodologies (Goyenko et al., 2009).  
None of the liquidity measures discussed so far – even though they acknowledge the 
need to capture price impact – is a good proxy for price impact. The price impact 
measures try to account for the cost of liquidity resulting from price changes emanating 
from how orders flow (Cont et al., 2013). Ideally, if a trader buys or sells a significant 
volume, the price tends to change accordingly. Amihud (2002) points out that the price 
impact is measured by the level of volume one can trade without moving the price. Amihud 
(2002) proposes a measure he calls “ILLIQ” (Amihud, 2002:1), which measures the price 
response as related to one-dollar volume on a daily basis. His liquidity measure (ILLIQ) 
can be shown as  
 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 =  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 [
|𝑅|
(𝑃 ×𝑉𝑂𝐿)
]  =  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 [
|𝑅|
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
],          3.2 
where – 
 R represents the daily return;  
 P is the closing daily price; and  
 VOL shows the volume of securities traded during a particular day.  
In their model, Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) consider liquidity to be an elusive concept 
that attempts to capture an agent’s ability to trade large quantities immediately at 
considerably low cost and with little price impact. To measure the price impact, they used 
a measure they referred to as “gamma” (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003). This measure is 
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associated with return reversal in order flow after a volume shock. Typically, illiquid stocks 
are associated with greater reversals (Martınez, Nieto, Rubio & Tapia, 2005). Pástor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) focus was on liquidity as measured from short-lived price changes 
induced by the order flow. The liquidity of a stock in a particular month was measured by 
capturing the within-month daily returns and volume (Marshall, Nguyen & Visaltanachoti, 
2013). This represented the average effects that a given quantity on a particular day had 
on the returns of the following trading day when the quantity was given the same sign as 
the return in the previous trading day. Essentially, highly liquid assets corresponded to 
weaker volume-related return reversal.  
Due to unavailability of data, scholars have used low-frequency price data to compute 
their measures of liquidity. Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) therefore tested the 
appropriateness of these liquidity measures. The low-frequency liquidity measures were 
tested against benchmarks of the same liquidity proxies from high-frequency data. The 
benchmarks (Goyenko et al., 2009) used were the bid–ask spread, the effective bid–ask 
spread, and the price impact measures (Marshall, Nguyen & Visaltanachoti, 2013). These 
were then compared using data from two different high-frequency datasets. The results 
showed that most of the traditional and standard low-frequency liquidity measures in fact 
are appropriate proxies of liquidity. Holden’s (2009) effective tick and “Holden measure” 
measures of liquidity were better liquidity measures among the low-frequency spread 
measures. Moreover, Lesmond et al. (1999) confirm that Holden measure and effective 
tick were also outstanding measure of illiquidity. However, Goyenko et al. (2009) found 
that the price impact measures from low-frequency data do not consistently capture the 
magnitude of high-frequency price impact though they are reasonably correlated with low-
frequency price impact. Overall, Pástor and Stambaugh’s (2003) measure was dominated 
by other measures considered and Holden’s measures stood out. In conclusion, Adler 
(2014) points out that scholars should be cautious when applying low-frequency 
measures as this is a new and developing research area. 
Most of the liquidity measures were empirically tested using equity securities. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) investigated liquidity effects on the expected returns of fixed-income 
securities. They realised that liquidity also affects the expected returns of assets that are 
generally considered liquid, such as government treasury bonds. In their investigation of 
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US Treasury bond yields with the same maturity and same default risk, the only difference 
was the level of liquidity. Furthermore, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) found that the off-
the-run treasury bonds (Cornell & Shapiro, 1989) on average had a bid–ask spread of 
about 0.003% while the on-the-run treasuries had a bid–ask spread of 0.001%. Thus, the 
off-the-run treasury bonds exhibited a higher average return of 0.430% signifying a 
compensation of the liquidity.  
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) argue that returns on corporate bonds are too high to 
be explained by credit risk alone. Therefore, the only explanation for these higher yields 
can be the existence of liquidity risk (Amihud, Mendelson & Pedersen, 2006). The 
determination of what influences bond returns is not as straightforward and easy as for 
equities since the yield of corporate bonds is driven by many external/exogenous factors. 
In a study carried out by Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), liquidity was found to be related 
to corporate bond yield. In another study by Longstaff et al. (2005), liquidity was 
distinguished from credit risk when looking at bonds spreads by using credit default swaps 
in attempting to price the default risk. In their conclusion, Longstaff et al. (2005) indicate 
that most of the yield spread of corporate bonds is explained by default risk, and the 
remainder was found to be highly correlated with liquidity. Their results confirm the point 
that there is market liquidity risk in corporate bonds spreads (De Jong & Driessen, 2005; 
Chen et al., 2007). Likewise, Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005) examined European 
corporate bonds in an attempt to see whether liquidity was priced. In addition to default 
risk, Houweling et al. (2005) controlled for interest rate risks, and bond-specific 
characteristics such as duration and rating. These scholars used a couple of proxies for 
liquidity, which included the length of maturity, the age of the security, the coupon rate, 
yield volatility and dispersion in yield. They show that a better proxy for corporate bond 
liquidity is the age of a security, as new bonds trade more frequently than older bonds. 
Overall, their results showed that liquidity is priced indeed.  
In summary, the concept of market liquidity risk is subject to ongoing research. There is 
still much inconsistency in the methods used to calculate proxies for the measures of 
liquidity (Adler, 2014). Despite the understanding of the fact that liquidity as a cost or as 
a risk is included in the expected return of a security, there remain two questions: What 
is liquidity risk and what determines market liquidity?  
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3.1.4 Determinants of market liquidity  
 
According to Keating, Hatchett, Smith, Walton, & Zhao, 2016), the easy by which an asset 
can be converted into cash or cash equivalent is primarily driven by three factors:  
 market infrastructure;  
 market macro structure; and  
 asset type  
If markets were efficient this would lead to narrower bid–ask spread and hence lower 
transaction costs. In perfectly competitive financial markets, we have many buyers and 
many sellers, meaning that any order imbalance can be matched resulting in a small 
movement in the price of the asset being traded. An asset, such as a Treasury bill, is 
theoretically deemed to be default-free and it is short term in nature; therefore, perceived 
by the market to be highly liquid and of high quality. Any change in perception of the 
Treasury bill is quickly captured in the change of price. An asset that is perceived to be 
of high quality and highly liquid is significantly demanded by banking institutions. 
Nevertheless, an asset which is deemed illiquid will not be demanded due to a lack of 
liquidity (Diamond and Rajan, 2001).  
Keating et al. (2016), however, have the view that the three factors stated above, although 
important in determining the liquidity of an assets, can only effectively do so when markets 
are normal. In period of crisis, human behaviour takes a centre stage in determining the 
liquidity of an asset. Primarily, financial institutions are there to trade and make margins 
from both assets and liabilities; thus, they are concerned with the conditions in which they 
have to trade or use assets to obtain funding. Market participants, although strategically 
concerned with long-term value addition, are also concerned about the short-term losses 
they can suffer after selling an asset quickly under unfavourable conditions. For Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986b), the cost of liquidity is enshrined in the behaviour of investors. 
When investors anticipate that the market will not be liquid, they demand discounts in the 
primary markets (Banks, 2014).  
Other scholars, such as Gârleanu and Pedersen (2004), concur with the view that 
investors’ behaviour in anticipation of illiquidity may affect the cost of liquidity. However, 
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Gârleanu and Pedersen (2004) indicate that the costs of liquidity may be overstated if 
one fails to understand that more often than not investors trade strategically and hence 
manage to reduce trading costs. In their illustration, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2004) show 
that if there is a liquidity shock, investors may decide to hold on to their position instead 
of risking losing the capital. Alternatively, if the holding costs are high relative to price cut, 
they may be left with no alternative but to liquidate their positions.  
The liquidity of an asset, according to Goodhart (2009), is dependent of firm-specific 
characteristics as exhibited in the credit rating given to an organisation by the rating 
agencies. Before the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, the asset-backed commercial 
paper (Stone & Zissu, 2012) was perceived to be one of the most liquid financial assets. 
It was regarded as liquid to the point that most issuing banks demanded very little for the 
liquidity enrichment structures they presented (Acharya, Afonso & Kovner, 2017). The 
asset-backed securities were considered liquid because the originators were highly 
creditworthy, and their collateral was deemed of high quality and regarded as such by 
rating agencies as revealed by the rating scores (Covitz, Liang, & Suarez, 2013).  
During the crisis, the liquidity of assets changed significantly as the firm-specific 
characteristics changed (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). Market participants later realised 
that some of these financial instruments were worth less than their face value and 
discount was hard to determine. Most of the investors were in a panic and wanted to get 
rid of these assets. The selling pressure outweighed demand and hence liquidity 
problems were eminent (Longstaff, 2010). The credit risk met with the liquidity risk as 
most of these assets lost part of their intrinsic value and investors were not able to convert 
these assets swiftly into cash. Failure to liquidate one’s position was exacerbated by 
resistance from the potential purchasers as they had imperfect information on the 
characteristics of assets. The purchasers were not in a position to buy from the sellers at 
the lowest price the sellers were willing to accept. Consequently, there was collective 
unwillingness to trade on these securities. Additionally, given that there were very few 
players that were prepared to trade, meant that the liquidity of these assets drastically 
decreased, which affected their values negatively (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). 
These were some of the behavioural finance aspects at play.  
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In 2007, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Charles Prince-CITI group said it is natural 
for people to dance when music is playing (as cited by Argandona, 2012). Thus, during 
the global financial crisis, financial institutions were more of reactionary than in periods of 
stability. The extent to which the situation was no longer bearable eventually led to a 
liquidity crunch. The causes of this liquidity crunch were deemed both external and 
internal. In terms of the external causes, possibly a result of geo-political which is driven 
purely by macro-economic fundamental. Possibly internal/endogenous in the sense that 
the banks and other financial institutions’ internal dynamics ended up resulting in grievous 
consequences. As banks and other financial institutions saw a slump in prices of financial 
instruments, they realised that their capital margins were being reduced automatically 
(Gârleanu & Pedersen, 2011). Therefore, most of the market participants sought to 
protect their liquidity by reducing loan books.  
The level of asset liquidity banks hold is to a large extent determined by the bank 
regulators. These regulators have always been at the centre of trying to prevent a crisis 
and also solving problems as they arise. According to Claessens and Kodres (2014), 
banking institutions are required to maintain minimum prescribed capital and liquidity 
buffers in order to boost public confidence in the financial sector, even in times of trouble. 
However, the level of liquidity or capital that banks finally reserve for this directive is 
dependent on the extent to which these assets are eroded in crisis times when prices fall. 
Take for example a particular bank which wants to have a certain number of liquid assets. 
As the crisis pushes down asset prices and exacerbates the liquidity pressures, the bank 
ends up selling some of its assets to maintain this level (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009).  
Claessens and Kodres (2014) recommend that in future, regulatory agents should require 
banks to keep sufficient levels of capital and liquidity during normal times, such that a 
deterioration of capital and liquidity ratios can be accommodated during a crisis without 
requiring a banking institution resort to selling assets in a depressed market. When the 
tide turns and banks find themselves in trouble, they can resort to accumulated buffers of 
capital and liquidity without having to run down balance sheets precipitately or liquidate 
assets in unfavourable market conditions (Delechat, Arbelaez, Muthoora, & Vtyurina, 
2012). Delechat et al. (2012) noted that regulators play a significant role in determining 
the level of liquidity buffers banks should keep but this has to be viewed in light of the 
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power of market expectation by the banks. In a world of diverse financial instruments – 
most of which are non-standard– pricing becomes extremely difficult in times of turmoil 
(Martınez et al., 2005; Vrontos, Vrontos, & Giamouridis, 2008). Different prices will arise 
for the same assets. Such uncertainty can be reduced by standardising financial 
instruments and some improvements in the rating system. Rossi (2007) indicates that 
standardised products will facilitate in the removal of information asymmetries.  
For many years, financial institutions were required to keep a minimum level of prescribed 
capital (Hassan, Unsal, & Tamer, 2016). The measurement of capital included marking 
to market (de Souza, 2016). As a result, it is difficult to separate capital adequacy and 
liquidity. Furthermore, Rossi (2007) showed that one eminent feature of liquidity is that it 
is determined by the level of capital the banking institution has. The level of capital may 
not be appropriate proxy for liquidity though, because of the importance of off-balance 
sheet exposures, especially for big banks as compared to their total capital (Tran, Lin & 
Nguyen, 2016). There are also some conflicting goals, inasmuch as the level of capital 
seems to be directly related to bank solvency. If too high, it may have counter effects, as 
capital requirements that are too stringent would reduce the profitability of banks, and 
banks may decide to avoid it. On the issue of capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, 
Goodhart (2009) metaphorically points out that it is like a tired traveller who gets to the 
train station late in the night. The traveller sees a taxi that could take him to his destination 
– only to be told that the taxi driver cannot take him because local bylaws demand that at 
all times, there must be one taxi standing ready at the station. In like manner, in times of 
crisis banks may fail not understand why they should keep the given level of liquidity and 
capital level.  
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a) confirm market uncertainty as one of the major 
determinants of market liquidity. They give an example of children and musical chairs. If 
chairs are one short and the kids are confused about the rules, they may start grabbing 
chairs before the music comes to an end fearing that they may not get the chair. In the 
same way, in a period of uncertainty market players make decisions based on worst-case 
scenarios. Those that have huge liquid assets buffers deliberately stay out of markets or 
trade passively. Most of the market players may protect their liquid positions in case a 
worst-case scenario occurs, which in reality may never happen. Financial markets need 
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participants and their liquidity to function efficiently. In times when other players withdraw 
due to uncertainty, this negatively affects the operations of the banking sector. The 
financial markets become illiquid as those who need liquidity are unable to get it because 
those with liquidity conveniently withdraw their participation.  
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) show the importance of the central bank in 
determining the level of market liquidity, since the main mandate of the bank is to bring 
stability to the financial markets and the economy in general. Looking at the entirety of 
the financial market, the far-fetched scenarios that guide the behaviour of each market 
player cannot happen concurrently. Take for example the shock that was induced into the 
US market. It was small initially, but it was exacerbated by the action of some market 
participants who panicked. To avoid the natural move by banks of flight-to-quality (Beber, 
Brandt, & Kavajecz, 2008) the central bank should convincingly promise some significant 
liquidity injections.  
3.1.5 Conclusion on market liquidity  
 
The definition of market liquidity as expounded in Section 3.1.1 focuses on the security 
(asset) at the expense of the bank’s exposure in terms of bank obligations (liabilities). 
From this perspective, therefore, the definition of market liquidity can be quite limiting as 
it fails to capture the multidimensional aspects involved when trading financial 
instruments. In reality, for banks to be able to trade, they have to have capital. When a 
bank buys a financial asset, it can borrow a fraction of the amount against the value of 
this asset, that is, it can use the asset as a collateral. Therefore, the difference between 
the borrowed amount and the pledged collateral has to be funded by the capital. Moinas, 
Nguyen, and Valente (2016) indicate that, if this reality of borrowing and pledging 
collateral whose value is more than the extended amount is considered, then liquidity 
ceases to be a complicated concept but should be understood from two perspectives, 
namely the market liquidity perspective and the funding liquidity perspective.  
3.2 Funding liquidity 
 
Funding liquidity risk is one of the most critical financial risks that triggered and 
perpetuated most financial crisis (Cornett et al., 2011). The 2009–2010 global financial 
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crisis had all the traits of funding liquidity as central banks around the world had to rescue 
several financial institutions that were on the brink of collapsing (Taylor, 
2009). Regardless of how precarious funding liquidity is, there remains a huge gap in 
literature on the definition, measurement and determinants of funding liquidity (Drehmann 
& Nikolaou, 2013). Evaluation of what derives funding liquidity is almost impossible if we 
cannot clearly define what funding liquidity is, and more so if we do not understand how 
it can be estimated or measured. 
3.2.1 Definition of funding liquidity  
 
Funding liquidity is accurately defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the 
ability of a solvent institution to honour its obligations timely as they are due (IMF, 2008, 
p. xi). The IMF definition captures two important aspects of funding liquidity, namely the 
ability to pay what you owe, and the need to pay timeously. On the other hand, Strahan 
(2008) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) define funding liquidity as the ability of an 
institution to raise funds in a timely fashion either through disposing of some liquid assets 
or through open market operations where these institutions have to borrow new funds. 
This latter definition brings in another important dimension of funding liquidity, that is the 
methods by which a solvent institution can raise funds. Furthermore, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) also show how market liquidity is part of funding liquidity. 
Funding liquidity is defined by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) in line with the IMF 
definition as the ability of an institution to pay what it owes with immediacy. Furthermore, 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) distinguish between funding liquidity and funding liquidity 
risk. They argue that funding liquidity risk can be defined as the failure by a financial 
institution to settle the amount it owes individuals and other institutions as they fall due 
with immediacy over a given time period. The definition of funding liquidity in this regard 
brought some important properties to the fore. Risk is measured at a point in time and is 
clear on the issue to what extent the financial institution can default, that is, funding 
liquidity risk is explained as a binary concept as a financial institution can honour and pay 
what it owes or fail to settle its obligations. Earlier, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) gave 
more specifics on the definition as they indicated that funding liquidity risk is forward-
looking, and the magnitude of risk can take any value to reflect this. These authors also 
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expounded on their definition by linking the ability of a bank to settle its obligations as 
they are due with central bank money at a given point in time. The amount of money 
needed by a bank from a central bank for it to remain afloat is a random variable as it 
depends upon two factors that are perceived to be random, i.e. the volume of funding 
required and the price of getting the funds. Therefore, the measure of liquidity risk in this 
definition takes into account the stochastic nature of the volume of funding and the price 
of pricing as the availability of liquidity varies.  
In this study, funding liquidity is defined as the ability of an institution to settle its 
obligations timeously as they fall due, by liquidation its assets or borrowing from the 
interbank market. This definition is therefore similar to the IMF definition. However, the 
study takes other definitions to illustrate the question of ability and how. Thus, institutions 
have the ability to settle what they owe timeously if they can sell their liquid assets and/or 
raise funds in the open market at short notice. The BCBS also captures an important 
aspect of the cost of liquidity. The BCBS (2008) argues that within the IMF definition, 
there is an assumption that institutions will meet their obligations at a reasonable cost. 
Again, this study did not take this as an extension of the definition but rather as further 
elaboration on the ability of an institution to settle what it owes. Despite the fact that there 
seems to be consensus on the definition of funding liquidity, Drehmann and Nikolaou 
(2009) argue that a solid measure of funding liquidity risk remains ambiguous.  
 
3.2.2 Measurements of funding liquidity  
 
There are several references to measures of funding liquidity risk in literature. Scholars 
(for example Banks, 2005; Matz & Neu, 2007) propose the use of a particular banking 
institution’s own funding liquidity risk measurement. These measures include stress 
testing (Van Den End, 2009; Visser & Van Vuuren, 2014) and gap analysis (Matz & Neu, 
2006). Since the liquidity measure requires use of proprietary information, it is difficult if 
not impossible to validate these liquidity measures empirically. The IMF (2008) measured 
funding liquidity risk in aggregate terms. This was estimated by the difference between 
market interest rates and the risk-free rate. The spread between the interbank market rate 
and the risk-free rate is considered the average price for accessing funds in the interbank 
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market (IMF, 2008). Therefore, the IMF’s estimation reveals an important element of 
funding liquidity risk. Yet, this spread measure is affected by other risk factors than the 
funding liquidity risk (Michaud & Upper, 2008). During the recent financial crisis, 
Gyntelberg and Wooldrige (2008) also noted that the interbank market rate was not a 
good estimator of actual liquidity risk. During the crisis, there was an increase in credit 
spreads due to increased insecurity, which meant that spread misrepresented the funding 
liquidity risk.  
In an attempt to circumvent the constraint of confidential information, Drehmann and 
Nikolaou (2009) propose the usage of data from the central bank. In their argument, they 
state that this is publicly accessible from the central banks after an open market operation. 
They therefore believe their measure permits for a regular and timely calculation of 
funding liquidity risk in a situation branded by restricted data. Drehmann and Nikolaou 
(2009) developed a funding liquidity risk measure, which they developed further in 2013. 
This measure is built on the assumption that funding liquidity risk is a random variable 
that can take any value depending on the funding status of the institution under 
consideration. Like any other risk, funding liquidity risk is deemed to be forward-looking 
and it is evaluated over a given period. Drehmann and Nikolaou’s (2009) liquidity risk 
measure attempts to quantify funding liquidity by estimating the distribution that 
summarises the stochastic nature of the essential risk fundamentals.  
This measure is more accurate as compared to other estimates; however, due to the 
confidential nature of data used these distributions are difficult to estimate. It is against 
this limitation that the cost of getting funding from the central bank became the nearest 
proxy to this measure. Thus, the funding liquidity risk is represented by the costs of 
securing liquidity from the central bank. Under normal circumstances, if a bank places a 
bid above the marginal rate, i.e. the equilibrium rate (the market clearing rate), the bank 
is most likely to get the funding (Davidson, 1986). There is therefore, a trade-off that banks 
should consider, namely to get funding from other markets or the central bank. The 
underlying trade-off at the central bank auction is whether to obtain liquidity from the 
central bank directly or to rely on other markets for liquidity. Despite the fact that this 
measure is intuitive, it can be theoretically apparent that agents are prepared to pay 
higher interest rates when they have liquidity problems (Välimäki, 2006). According to 
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Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004), under normal conditions, markets have frictions and 
therefore banks with higher funding liquidity risk will be willing to pay a higher rate. In 
practice, a bank’s bid shows how desperate it is to secure liquidity. 
According to Drehmann and Nikolaou (2010) the banking sector’s aggregate funding 
liquidity risk can be estimated by the sum of the premium banks are willing to pay above 
the expected market clearing rate multiplied by the volume tendered, normalised by the 
expected amount of money supplied by the central bank. This measure, according to 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013), can be interpreted as the proportional insurance 
premium against risk funding liquidity. This is a huge improvement from the commonly 
used money market spreads (Chordia, Sarkar & Subrahmanyam, 2004). The premium 
banks are willing to pay to secure funding from the central bank is much less than 
standard spread measures. This is so, because money market spreads are affected by a 
host of other risk factors (Gyntelberg & Wooldridge, 2008). However, Matz and Neu, 2007 
point out that the aggregated funding premium also has its own restrictions as the 
measure relies on bank privileged information and therefore may be biased.  
More specifically, to estimate funding liquidity risk, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) as well 
as Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) took into consideration information that accounted for 
the price of liquidity, which was the spread between the interest rate, for which bank i is 
bidding minus the market clearing policy rate, and the amount of funds that are allotted, 
normalised by the total quantity of liquidity provided (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡). The bids are 
normalised to remove any variations brought about by changes in the monetary policy 
and also resulting from a host of auction sizes. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) further 
argue that dividing the bids by total allotment eliminates frontloading practices, especially 
during the period of crisis. The measure of funding liquidity is therefore summarised in 
the following formula:  
𝐴𝐵𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑏,𝑖,𝑡∗𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
                        3.3 
where – 
 𝐴𝐵𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 is the Adjusted bid spread;  
 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the price tendered by bank i to access liquidity from the central bank; 
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 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the rate which is set every month by the governing council and 
represents the minimum bid rate; and  
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 is the bid quantity of bank i, submitted from bid b (from 1 to B) at time 
(auction) t.  
Using the adjusted bid spread of individual banks, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) then 
estimated the aggregate measure of funding liquidity risk by adding all the normalised 
bids of all banks. Their first liquidity proxy (LRP) was given as follows: 
𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
𝐵
𝑏=1
𝑁
𝑖=1                3.4   
where – 
 b are the bids of the bank i for each time t.  
In a frictionless market, all banks should demand liquidity at the marginal rate. However, 
reality calls for two types of bidders: those that bid at marginal rate, and those who bid 
above the marginal. Since one is not sure to which extent the first group pays a premium 
to access funding, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) proposed the second proxy for funding 
liquidity risk that captures the margin above the marginal rate. The policy rate was 
replaced by marginal rate. Therefore, the adjusted bid spread over the marginal rate 
(AB_M) is: 
𝐴𝐵_𝑀𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑏,𝑖,𝑡−𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑏,𝑖,𝑡∗𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
            3.5 
              
Finally, the aggregate funding liquidity over the marginal rate (LRP_M) is represented by:  
𝐿𝑅𝑃_𝑀𝑡 = ∑ (𝐴𝐵_𝑀𝑏,𝑖,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                         3.6 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) argue that their two aggregate funding liquidity risk 
measures have an uncommon practical advantage. They assert that both measures can 
be estimated using data available in the public domain.  
 
3.2.3 Theory of funding liquidity 
 
65 
 
The capital of banks comprises of the equity capital and the long-term debt minus 
operation assets including non-tangible assets (Diamond & Rajan, 2006). This can be 
further reduced by uncollateralised loans extended by the bank to others (Kusy, & 
Ziemba, 1986). Banking institutions borrow money against some of the assets they hold 
on their balance sheet, such as commercial paper, promissory notes and demand 
deposits (Saunders & Cornett, 2014). This is short-term funding and it may be very volatile 
in nature and therefore cannot be relied upon, especially during market turmoil (Diamond 
& Dybvig, 1983). Since this form of funding is erratic, it is often excluded in the estimation 
of bank capital. According to Brunnermeier (2009), banks fund their operations mainly 
through collateralised borrowing. When banks borrow against a particular collateral, the 
lending institution will require some margins, which are financed from the bank’s capital 
and thus will signify the funding constraint (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009).  
In addition to the capital needed by banks for daily operations, they also have to meet 
minimum capital requirements as directed by the regulatory authorities. Worldwide, most 
commercial banks are required to abide by Basel II and Basel III of the Basel Accord. 
These are commercial banking laws and regulations, which are issued by the BCBS. 
Basel II was first published in June 2004 and subsequently the Basel III was officially 
agreed upon in 2010 (BCBS, 2010a). The Basel III was introduced to supersede the Basel 
II as it was envisioned to underpin bank capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity 
and reducing bank leverage (Hong, Huang & Wu 2014). 
According to Drehmann, Elliot, and Kapadia (2007), funding liquidity is related to flows. 
These scholars indicate that the theoretical framework on funding liquidity can be shown 
as a flow constraint. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) indicate that the bank, which is liquid, 
is able to meet its obligations. The bank can only be liquid if the cash inflows outweigh 
cash outflows. The stock flow constraint can be presented as follows:  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡  ≤  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡  +  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑡            3.7 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) provided a more details on the inflows and the outflows, 
they elaborated that the liquidity provided by the central bank was significant clearance 
asset for all components. The stock of money in (3.7) represents central bank money. In 
an attempt to measure funding liquidity risk, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) looked at the 
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net volume of liquidity needed in order to meet all their obligations. Thus, Drehmann and 
Nikolaou (2009) introduced a new variable, which they called the net-liquidity demand 
(NLD). The NLD is then mapped into the stock flow constraint as follows:  
𝑁𝐿𝐷𝑡 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡 − (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑑𝑢𝑒) − 𝑀𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑡
𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝐷 + 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 + 𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐵𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 
                 3.8  
𝑁𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the stock of money i.e. the net amount of the central bank money, which the bank 
requires to continue being liquid (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2009). They also show that if 
the outflows outweigh the inflows plus the stock of money, this results in a deficit. The 
inequality indicates that the deficit has to be financed and the new funds can be accessed 
from new deposits (𝐿𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝐷 ), from the interbank market (𝐿𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 ), selling assets (𝐴𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑡) or 
borrowing from the central bank (𝐶𝐵𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡). What needs special attention is that all these 
funds are accessed at different prices (p). If the bank fails to raise new funds, then it will 
default on its obligations.  
The 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the funding liquidity constraint, which a particular bank faces at any given 
time. Since funding liquidity risk is forward-looking, the 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝑡 should be looked at from the 
perspective of forthcoming developments, namely when funding liquidity risk is assessed 
on the distribution of 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝑡+1. This liquidity risk measure shows that funding liquidity risk 
is determined by the volumes and prices of elements considered in equation (3.8).  
The arbitrary variables associated with NLD are the most important elements to be 
considered when estimating funding liquidity risk. Despite the fact that the outflows and 
the inflows are contractual, the possibility of default remains random. Furthermore, Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2016) point out that access to liquidity other than that on the balance 
sheet of the bank can be indeterminate and therefore very unpredictable. Another 
important aspect worth noting is that cash outflows are mainly endogenously determined 
as they are contractual in nature. The assets side of the balance sheet can be determined 
mainly exogenously as the bank can decide to cut on extending loans and/or buying non-
current assets (Gyntelberg and Wooldrige, 2008). However, for banks to protect their 
market share, they can only cut loans to new and unnecessary clients, otherwise they 
lose established clients to competitors. In summary, some cash outflows and cash inflows 
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are both endogenously and exogenously determined, but the magnitude is dependent on 
whether the cash flow is contractual or not.  
Another crucial variable in the determination of funding liquidity risk is the randomness of 
cost of liquidity (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005). By forecasting, the cost of accessing liquidity 
from outside sources are highly unpredictable. The prices of money on either the 
interbank markets or from the central bank are driven by the level of liquidity in the market 
at that specific time and hence the unidentified shocks. Likewise, if a bank intends to sell 
its assets on the market to raise liquidity, its prices are also uncertain especially in times 
of crisis. Still, some of the cost, as previously discussed, is endogenously determined 
(e.g. customer deposits) and therefore can be known with certainty. The cost of funds 
obtained from the central bank through the marginal facility is known in advance 
(Christensen, Lopez & Rudebusch, 2009). The prices for obtaining money from the 
central bank via the marginal facilities are also given.  
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) elaborated on the fact that funding liquidity risk is highly 
dependent on the bidding behaviours of banks on open market operations. They initially 
indicated that the cost of liquidity can be measured by analysing the spread between bid 
submitted by a bank and the minimum bid rate. This was concluded on the premise that 
there are no frictions in the market and hence a bank can obtain liquidity in the interbank 
market or from the central bank without hindrances. Earlier, Poole (1968) analysed the 
bidding behaviour of banks through an understanding of a stylised time line paying 
particular attention to the two common sources of external funding, i.e. the central bank 
and the interbank market. In line with Poole, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) then came 
up with a simple stylised time line in Figure 3.1:  
  
68 
 
  
Period 1     Primary market: Auction conducted by central bank 
 
Liquidity shocks 
 
Period 2     Secondary market: Trading in the interbank market 
 
Period 3  Final settlement: banks can access marginal facilities at the central bank 
Figure 3.1: Stylised time line 
Source: Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) 
 
In the first period, the banks obtain liquidity from the auction performed by the central 
bank. After acquisition of funding from the central bank, a liquidity shock is assumed to 
take place. The liquidity shock is random by nature, and the uncertainty of this shock is 
cascaded to the cost of funding as well as the prices of assets (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 
2009). Therefore, in the second period, the time line captures the trading that happens in 
the interbank market. Finally, in period three, all obligations are settled. In period three, 
the aggregate liquidity position in the market may be in a deficit or surplus, and banks can 
also access funding to square off the deficit from the central bank through the marginal 
facility. The marginal facility interest rates are known in advance as they are set by the 
central bank and therefore endogenously determined. The marginal facility rate should 
be between the highest and lowest rate in the interbank as those banks with enough 
collateral can finally settle their position by borrowing through this arrangement. 
Ordinarily, the marginal lending facility rate is a couple of basis points above the interbank 
minimum lending rate. Thus, markets frictions play an important role in the determination 
of the marginal lending rate as the market rate becomes the basis for this price.  
In a frictionless market, scholars such as Välimäki (2002) and Ayuso and Repullo (2003) 
assert that banks can only optimise by bidding at a minimum rate resulting in a zero 
spread. This is in line with most theoretical models that are based on the assumption that 
Ti
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e
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markets are frictionless and therefore the facility rate of the central bank is accurate as it 
does not make any mistake. In addition, we should note that a frictionless market is not 
associated with a short or a long position as the central bank will provide enough funding 
at the facility rate (Curdia & Woodford, 2011). Thus, in a frictionless market the interbank 
interest rates should equate the interest rate of the open market operations, i.e. the 
interbank market rate equals the central bank policy rate, which also equals the minimum 
bid rate. Theoretically, markets are frictionless. In these markets, Allen and Gale (2000) 
indicate that liquidity risk is eliminated as interbank markets are fully connected.  
However, the global financial crises of 2007–2009 point otherwise. Markets have friction 
and thus banks are prone to some liquidity risk as a result of liquidity shocks (Adler, 2014). 
There is a plethora of literature that confirms the existence of market frictions (Flannery, 
1996; Allen & Gale, 2000; Holmström & Tirole, 2001; Rochet & Vives, 2004). These 
anomalies of market frictions are assumed to result in or lead to liquidity risk. On liquidity 
risk and market frictions, Allen and Gale (2004) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) argue 
that whether markets are frictionless or not, liquidity shocks will result in some risk. 
Therefore, it is common that banks with more liquidity risk will bid more aggressively 
relative to their peers (Nyborg & Strebulaev, 2004). Banks that have a significant shortage 
have to pay a premium to cover their deficit. The premiums paid may be way beyond 
reach if the bank has excessive shortages (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1986; Fecht, Nyborg, & 
Rocholl, 2008). In a similar analysis, Välimäki (2006) looked at risk-averse banks, where 
it was shown that banks that had huge deficits in terms of their individual position and 
relative to what they could access from the central bank showed a tendency to bid 
aggressively on the interbank market as they knew that obtaining large quantities from 
the central bank would only happen at a penalty rate. Moreover, these banks might not 
even have been able to access the funding from the central bank had the central bank 
decided to ration the money.  
Ausubel (2004) indicate that the bidding behaviour of banks is driven by the winner’s 
curse phenomenon (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2007) also known as the 
champion’s plague (Ausubel, 2004). In this model, Milgrom and Weber (1982) shows that 
the bank that is more optimistic about the rate more often than not pays a higher rate 
relative to the equilibrium rate and thus will naturally win the auction. Empirically, the 
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winner’s curse problem was found to be non-existent in the euro area as no individual 
banks showed to have had insider information about the direction of interest rates after 
the auction (Bindseil, Weller, & Wuertz, 2003; Bindseil, Nyborg, & Strebulaev, 2009). 
Banks’ bidding behaviour discussed so far excluded other sources of funds than the 
interbank and the open market operation. In practice, banks can get most of their liquidity 
from individual and institution deposits as well as from disposing of both current and non-
current assets (Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, 2002). Demand or term deposits neutralise the 
liquidity risk that emanates from granting loans and giving out some lines of credit (Gatev 
& Strahan, 2006). However, Gondat-Larralde and Nier (2004) argue that this may have 
its challenges because demand deposits can be very erratic in nature. 
In conclusion, markets have frictions, and this is crucial in finance theory (Dellas, Diba, & 
Loisel, 2015). Allen and Gale (2007) found that during the period when there is a shock 
in the market, there is an aggregate shortage in market liquidity. This implies that 
interbank interest rates will be higher and asset prices will be even lower than the intrinsic 
values because of pressure on the banks to dispose of these assets in an attempt to settle 
their obligations. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that a huge decrease in asset 
prices is dictated by additional constraints in trading resulting from high margin 
requirements. The sale of assets at a price lower that their fundamental value, is referred 
to as fire sale by Schleifer and Vishny (2011). Fire sale (Berger, & Bouwman, 2017) is 
common during financial crises as banks try to reduce the effect of the fragility in the 
financial system through getting rid of some of their balance sheet assets (Larrain, Muñoz 
& Tessada, 2017). Lower prices, according to Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007), are 
the result of a lower demand for an asset due to information asymmetry. Finally, frictions 
have been shown to result in liquidity spirals between market and funding liquidity 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). The downwards spirals between funding liquidity and 
market liquidity are discussed in Section 3.3.  
3.2.4 Determinants of funding liquidity  
 
Taking into consideration that market liquidity is part of funding liquidity, most of the 
scholars who investigated determinants of liquidity risk looked at this from the perspective 
of both market and funding liquidity (Bai et al., 2014; Berger, & Bouwman, 2017). The 
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study therefore discusses the determinants of funding liquidity in line with other scholars 
in this section. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) argue that, as long as the bank is solvent 
and operating within the confinements of a commercial bank, liquidity risk is inevitable. 
Liquidity is driven by many factors, according to Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009). 
Moreover, this risk is dependent upon the time under consideration and the funding status 
of a bank (Umar & Sun, 2016). They point out that the forecasted liquidity needs affect 
the current liquidity risk. The need to settle a significant debt in the near future and the 
need to raise cash through selling assets have direct impact on the liquidity risk. 
Liquidity buffers that banks keep are influenced by the anticipated liquidity position of the 
bank as well as the level of liquidity forecasted in the interbank market. The liquidity 
position is a function of bank-specific factors, sectorial factors and macro-economic 
variables (Vodová, 2013b). There is a plethora of evidence that corroborate the fact that 
bank liquidity buffers are dependent on the way a bank operates as complemented by the 
environment in which it operates (Ayuso & Repullo, 2003; Fielding & Shortland, 2005; 
Valla, Saes-Escorbiac, & Tiesset, 2008; Delechat, Arbelaez, Muthoora, & Vtyurina, 2012). 
Bank concentration has been found to be negatively related to the level of liquidity banks 
hold in their position as buffers (Horvath, Seidler, & Weill, 2016). A higher degree of bank 
concentration is assumed associated with greater systemic importance, as banks can 
access liquidity from other banks with ease. Due to Interconnections amongst banks, the 
increase in concentration increases the bank’s probability of accessing funds with ease, 
thereby limiting the effects of liquidity risk faced by any individual bank (Fungáčová et al., 
2017). As a result, banks in a sector with a high degree of bank concentration should hold 
relatively lower liquidity buffers. It has been indicated that the stronger the financial sector, 
the more banks feel safe and the more they tend to be aggressive in their lending. 
Consequently, banks end up with an illiquid balance sheet (Ayuso & Repullo, 2003). 
In line with Ayuso and Repullo (2003), Aspachs et al. (2005) found that banks have a 
tendency to hold fewer liquid assets if they feel safe in terms of having a safe haven in 
times of stress. Aspachs et al. (2005) investigated 57 United Kingdom banks, and argue 
that the level of liquidity buffers banks hold is dependent on the probability of accessing 
liquidity from the central bank through open market operations. In environments 
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associated with fewer liquidity requirements, banks hold very low levels of liquid assets 
as they have an implicitly implied assurance that in times of a liquidity crunch they can 
access liquidity from the central bank. Aspachs et al. (2005) also point out that the central 
bank also has a role in enhancing or reducing concentration and thus indirectly influences 
the level of liquidity holding of a bank. When there are liquidity regulations, banks are 
coerced to hold a significant level of liquid assets, which ordinarily without this directive 
banks would not keep these levels of liquidity especially in a setup of too big to fail (Farag, 
Harland, & Nixon, 2013). The regulatory liquidity requirement gives investors a form of 
confidence in the banking sector as they perceive requirements to resemble an efficient 
and stable banking environment. In a nutshell, although a high degree of bank 
concentration may bring about some kind of safety to the banks, and hence may lead to 
lower liquidity buffers, this is neutralised by the existence of liquidity regulations.  
Transparency in the banking sector is more often than not associated with market 
discipline (Bonner & Eijffinger, 2016). Balachandran and Faff (2015) argue that a market 
which has a high degree of disclosure practices allows banks to price institutional 
strategies accurately and therefore is not going to be exposed to more risk. On the other 
hand, if the banking sector has low transparency, banks find it more profitable to adopt 
risky strategies (Nier & Baumann, 2006). Similarly, Bonner and Eijffinger (2016) point out 
that a banking sector that is not subject to stringent disclosure requirements manage their 
liquidity risk recklessly. Therefore, they tend to hold fewer liquidity buffers.  
Likewise, the existence of deposit insurance tends to result in banks lowering the level of 
liquid assets in their balance sheets. The intuitive reason is similar to that of a regulated 
banking environment, as increasing deposit insurance coverage increases depositors’ 
safety as well as stability in the market (Fungáčová, Weill & Zhou, 2017). Hence, the net 
effect of deposit insurance is that it lowers the liquidity risk and therefore liquidity buffers, 
especially in environments where the government is responsible for this insurance. 
However, where banks pay part of the insurance, this reduces liquidity risks as banks 
increase their liquidity buffers due to increased market discipline (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002; Sharpe, 1978).  
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There is a plethora of literature that indicates that bank-specific variables have a bearing 
on the level of liquid assets that banks hold in their balance sheets. See in this regard, for 
instance Hackethal et al. (2010), Vodova (2011), Choon (2013) and Nigist (2015). Over 
the past two decades (i.e. 2005–2016), we have witnessed a newer generation of 
scholars (such as Czauderna, Riedel, & Wagner, 2015; Daka & Basu, 2016; Vo & Bui, 
2016) developing new models that attempt to explain liquidity demand behaviour of 
banks. Most of these models depend on some form of market imperfection (such as 
Liquidity-adjusted CAPM (L-CAPM) or liquidity value at risk (LVaR)) to elucidate why 
banks cannot access the needed amount of liquidity swiftly. Therefore, markets are 
deemed imperfect due to asymmetric information (Sen, Singh, & Mazumder, 2017). The 
imperfection can be the result of moral hazard, according to Holmström and Tirole (1998), 
or adverse selection, according to Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). Thus, banks that are 
constrained financially should hold higher levels of liquid assets as compared to their 
peers.  
According to Bonner and Eijffinger (2016), the size of the bank ideally should negatively 
affect the level of liquidity buffers the bank holds since larger banks can be expected to 
have more stable cash flows. With highly capitalised banks, any cash outflow can be 
easily offset by inflows in a short time since they have better access to diverse liquidity 
sources. Kashyap et al. (2002) surveyed a panel of banks in the US and found that there 
was a significant relationship between the size of the bank and the level of liquidity buffers 
held. While Delechat, Arbelaez, Muthoora & Vtyurina (2012) obtained similar results, they 
indicate that lowly capitalised banks have difficulties in accessing funds from the interbank 
market and therefore tend to keep higher liquidity buffers for precautionary purposes. 
However, Aspachs et al. (2005) did not find a significant effect of bank size on banks’ 
holdings of liquid assets.  
The loan granting behaviour of a bank determines the level of liquidity holdings of such 
bank. If a bank is more aggressive in issuing loans, this is signalled by a higher loan 
growth rate implying a move toward more illiquid assets (Delechat et al., 2012). In studies 
carried out by Vodova (2011; 2012; 2013a) and Aspachs et al. (2005), the relationship 
between loan growth rate and bank liquidity holding was found to be negative and 
significant.  
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Regarding bank profitability, the less profitable banks find it difficult to access liquidity and 
therefore are more liquidity-constrained. Delechat et al. (2012) found a negative 
relationship between the liquid asset holdings of a bank and the profitability of such bank. 
Aspachs et al. (2005) did not find any significant relationship between bank liquidity 
buffers and bank profitability. Delechat et al. (2012) further argue that profitable banks 
can more easily fund their positions in times of stress than smaller banks. Banks 
associated with high returns are less liquidity-constrained. This implies that larger banks 
can afford to carry out business with a limited level of liquidity (Cucinelli, 2013). A similar 
argument can be extended to the effects of bank capital on bank liquidity holdings. The 
higher the capital, the more solvent the bank most likely is, and naturally we expect such 
banks to raise funds easily from capital markets, even in times of crisis. Almeida et al. 
(2004) and Rochet and Vives (2004) show that there is a trade-off between opportunity 
costs of holding liquid assets and bank solvency. The opportunity costs of holding liquid 
assets arise in the sense that the same resources could have been invested in more 
profitable projects (Gatev & Strahan, 2006; Bräuning & Fecht, 2016). 
The dilemma on what could be the optimal liquidity level given the discussion on trade-
off in Section 3.2.3 can be viewed and expanded in light of macro-economic determinants 
of liquidity. Delechat et al. (2012) point out that the demand by banks for liquidity is highly 
dynamic and cyclical in nature. Thus, they claim that the liquidity holdings of a bank should 
be negatively related to the growth of the economy as measured by real growth in the 
gross domestic product (GDP), the credit cycle and policy interest rates. In practice, GDP 
growth has always been used as an indicator of business cycle (Ductor & Leiva-Leon, 
2016) and the short-term interest rate is used to capture the monetary policy effect 
(Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2016). Such counter-cyclicality as captured by interest rates 
would limit the effectiveness of monetary policy. That is, if central banks embark on an 
expansionary monetary policy by injecting liquidity into the market, the liquidity buffers 
would automatically upsurge but credit will not spontaneously follow suit (Gibson, 1970). 
This discussion is in line with Aspachs et al. (2005), Valla, Saes-Escorbiac, and Tiesset 
(2006), Dinger (2009) and Vodová (2011) who found that that there is a negative 
relationship between GDP and the liquidity holdings of banks. Findings by Agénor, 
Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2004) confirm other empirical studies (such as by Agénor et 
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al., 2004) who found that excess liquidity buffers are negatively related to the output gap. 
However, Bunda and Desquilbet (2008), Choon, Hooi, Murthi, Yi, and Shven (2013), and 
Moussa (2015), found a positive relationship between GDP and liquidity buffers of banks.  
The stronger the anticipated capital market frictions, the larger the precautionary liquidity 
buffers banks would hold (Acharya & Merrouche, 2013). This is supported by Delechat et 
al.’s (2012) findings, namely that there is a significant relationship between the level of 
liquidity holdings of a bank and the financial development in the country, and the quality 
of banks. Likewise, Almeida et al. (2004) argue that financial development is related to 
the liquidity buffers of bank. They indicate the banks that are financially constrained tend 
to have a high propensity to hold large liquidity buffers. Therefore, from this discussion, 
we can conclude that lower levels of financial development inflict financial constraints on 
banks, which apparently compel banks to increase their liquidity buffers. 
3.2.5 Conclusion on funding liquidity  
 
Funding liquidity risk was the centre force of many financial crises (Brunnermeier & 
Pedersen, 2008). Likewise, the 2007–2009 financial crisis was caused by funding liquidity 
risk (Chen & Lu, 2016). According to Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009), the 2007–2009 
financial crisis had the hallmarks of the funding liquidity risk as interbank markets 
collapsed and the governments had to inject a significant amount of liquidity through the 
central banks into liquidity constrained financial institutions in order to stabilise the 
banking sector. Nevertheless, there is a raging debate on the definition and measure of 
funding liquidity risk. See in this regard especially Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013), Bai et 
al. (2016) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2016). From the discussion in this section we see 
that the correct measure should capture the interactions between the market liquidity and 
funding liquidity risk. Many scholars have shown that market liquidity and funding liquidity 
are strongly correlated (Valente, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 2011; Fontaine, Garcia, & 
Gungor, 2015;). These scholars show that the moment there are liquidity constraints in 
the markets, the downward spirals of falling asset prices and higher funding liquidity risk 
surface. Although this theoretical proposition is comprehensive and clear, there is need 
to test it empirically (Bai, Krishnamurthy & Weymuller, 2016).  
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3.3 Liquidity spirals  
 
More recent studies such as those by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013), Bai et al. (2016) 
and Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) have emphasised that the correct definition and measure 
of liquidity should capture the multidimensional aspects of liquidity. Brunnermeier, Gorton, 
and Krishnamurthy (2013) point out that the accurate measure of liquidity of a given bank 
should be arrived at by using both data on the assets (market liquidity) and data on the 
liabilities (funding liquidity). The liquidity measure should also be able to change to reflect 
different stress levels. Bai et al. (2014) reveal that the reaction of banks to liquidity shocks 
hypothetically lead to negative feedback loops in the form of liquidity spirals.  
The idea that market liquidity and funding liquidity are interrelated is not new. From 
theoretical studies, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gârleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman 
(2009) point out that market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing and the 
relationship between the two is nonlinear. The reason behind the nonlinear relationship 
between these seems to be that different measures of liquidity can be elaborated by 
considering a banking sector with financial constrained banks. Take, for example, a bank 
that has a significantly large capital, where a negative shock to funding liquidity might not 
necessarily affect the asset liquidity. Nonetheless, in a bank with limited capital, a 
negative shock to funding liquidity would compel the bank in question to sell its securities, 
thus having a negative influence on the price of these asset (market liquidity). More 
clearly, in an attempt to understand liquidity spirals, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
model the interaction between the ability of the bank to get funding (funding liquidity) and 
the market liquidity when the assets are sold, especially when the bank is liquidity-
constrained. They indicate that banks need capital to trade in financial markets. Thus, 
when a bank buys and holds financial assets or non-financial assets, the bank could use 
these as collateral and therefore could access liquidity equivalent to a fraction of the asset 
values. The shortfall between what is borrowed and the market value of the assets must 
be financed from the bank’s capital.  
If we understand the concept of liquidity to mean interdependence between funding and 
market liquidity, then liquidity becomes an exclusive concept that should be measured 
and defined from the perception of duality (Brunnermeier et al., 2013). To be more 
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precise, the ease with which an asset can be bought or sold affects and is affected by the 
ease with which banks can raise funds (Bai et al, 2014). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point 
out that when investors withdraw funds from their investments, this could expand the 
negative shocks on financial assets. This is confirmed by Geanakoplos (2010) who 
proposes that the haircut on collateral (i.e. the difference between the market value of a 
security and the amount of loan extended by the bank for the same security) is derived 
endogenously. Since traders are assumed to face endogenously determined margin 
constraints, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) propose for its incorporation into the pricing 
models. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that market liquidity and funding 
liquidity are mutually reinforcing, and in certain conditions, margins can be disrupting, 
leading to cases of persistent liquidity spirals. Gârleanu and Pedersen (2009) point out 
that it is the conditions that surround funding liquidity that affect asset prices. They show 
that financial assets with similar expected cash flows but which have different margin 
requirements are traded at different prices. Therefore, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2009) 
conclude that funding liquidity conditions are crucial in the law of one price (Bahmani-
Oskooee, Chang, & Wu, 2014).  
The interaction between funding and market liquidity can be presented as follows: Berger 
and Bouwman (2009) indicate that a downward liquidity spiral could start with a bank that 
is liquidity-constrained and fails to access the shortage from the interbank market. By 
failing to raise the required funds from the market, the bank is forced to sell some of its 
assets to settle its obligations. In practice, markets a have frictions and thus selling a large 
volume of securities in the market induces negative pressure on the prices of these assets 
(Alfonsi, & Blanc, 2016). Lower asset prices imply that even if the bank wants to borrow 
against these assets instead of selling, they have to post higher margins in case of an 
already leveraged position. More margins are called, meaning even more cash outflows. 
For the bank to be able to meet its dues, it is forced to sell more securities. This will further 
depress market prices leading to further margin calls and the cycle continues. The liquidity 
spiral can also start with falling asset prices (Berger & Bouwman, 2009).  
The theoretical expositions and interactions of funding liquidity and market liquidity are 
modelled by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2010). Drehmann and Nikolaou (2010) argue that 
their model is empirically supported as they interrogated liquidity interactions by observing 
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the interrelationships between their liquidity risk premium (LRP) and an index of market 
liquidity used by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2008. They show a negative 
relationship between the market liquidity and the funding liquidity. During the period when 
markets are calm and liquidity is not a problem, empirical studies show that there is no 
significant relationship between the funding liquidity risk and market liquidity (Drehmann 
and Nikolaou, 2010; Bai et al., 2016). However, once there are liquidity shocks in the 
market especially during a crisis, a significant negative relationship surfaces 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). 
Valente (2010) proposes a model that captures the nonlinear relationship between market 
liquidity and funding liquidity in the form of smooth transition regression (STR). The model 
is an extension of models by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), and Teräsvirta (1994). An 
STR model is shown as follows: 
𝑀𝐿𝑡̂ = 𝛼1 + [𝛼2 + 𝛽𝐹𝐿?̂?]∅(𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇, 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑡            3.9  
where 𝑀𝐿𝑡̂ and 𝐹𝐿?̂? represent changes in market liquidity and funding liquidity in that order, 
while 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are constants, 𝛽 and ∅ are coefficients of funding liquidity and these are 
parameters through which the funding liquidity determine the market liquidity, and 𝜺𝒕 is 
the error term. The transition function ∅(𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇, 𝛾) captures the magnitude by which 
changes in funding liquidity affect the market liquidity, which is governed by the 
parameter 𝜸. This parameter captures the extent to which the funding liquidity influences 
the market liquidity, while the transition variable 𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇 is assumed to be the difference 
between the changes in funding liquidity at a given time t and a given threshold 𝜇. 
Thus, according to Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994), the transition 
function given by: 
∅(𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇, 𝛾)  =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝛾(𝐹𝐿?̂?−𝜇)] 
                      3.10 
where the transition function is bounded between zero and unity, i.e. ∅: ℜ → [0,1], has the 
properties ∅[0] = 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑥→±∞∅[𝑥] = 1 and takes the shape of an s. The transition 
parameter 𝛾 is the measure of the speed of transition between the two stressed periods, 
where lower absolute values of 𝛾 represent slower transition. The ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ 
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regimes are defined as the regimes corresponding to the two extreme values of the 
transition function, where ∅(. ) = 0 and ∅(. ) = 1 respectively. If banks are financially 
constrained, there is limit on the extent to which they carry out arbitrage. This implies that 
the lower regime relates to the situation where 𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇 = 0, and ∅(. ) = 0 thus 3.9 takes 
the form of:  
𝑀𝐿𝑡̂ = 𝛼1 + 𝜀𝑡+1              3.11 
For a given 𝛾, the upper regime corresponds to 𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝐹𝐿?̂?−𝜇)→±∞∅(𝐹𝐿?̂? − 𝜇, 𝛾), and the 
equation (3.9) becomes a linear regression that indicates that the market liquidity is 
determined by funding liquidity via the parameter 𝛽 > 0. 
𝑀𝐿𝑡̂ = (𝛼1 + 𝛼2) + 𝛽𝐹𝐿?̂? + 𝜀𝑡+1            3.12 
Valente (2010) argues that the model has several advantages. Firstly, the model takes 
into account the condition under which market liquidity changes are serially uncorrelated. 
Secondly, the model apprehends the interactions between the market liquidity and 
funding liquidity, which is assumed in theory.  
In a more simplified model, Adrian and Shin (2008) argue that if a security is in excess 
supply, there is downward pressure on the asset price. Lower asset prices mean a weaker 
balance sheet, which means to settle the same amount given lower prices of assets 
(DeAngelo & Stulz, 2015). The bank has to sell more assets, which in turn further 
depresses the price of the asset, leading to a further weakened balance sheet. Adrian 
and Shin (2008) show that gearing is pro-cyclical. Bank gearing tends to rise when there 
is growth in the balance sheets. Accordingly, Shin (2008) argues that leverage decreases 
when the size of the balance sheets shrinks. Therefore, bank gearing tracks the growth 
rate of the balance sheets in such a way that this can magnify the financial cycle. This 
model is summarised in Figure 3.2. 
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Target leverage      Target leverage 
 
 
  
Stronger    Increase B/S Weaker   Reduce B/S 
Balance sheets  Size   Balance sheet  Size 
 
 
 
 Asset price boom       Asset price decline 
Figure 3.2: Liquidity spiral  
Source: Adrian and Shin (2008) 
 
Liquidity spirals are categorised by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) into two effects 
that are said to exacerbate the initial credit problem. The first is the loss spiral, which is 
shown by the outer circle of Figure 3.3. This is triggered by the decrease in asset prices 
as a result of forced selling resulting in the erosion of capital. The second is the margin 
spiral, which is shown in the inner circle in Figure 3.3. The margin spiral is the result of 
increased volatility during a crisis (Lewis, Longstaff & Petrasek, 2017). Thus, as volatility 
increases, margins and haircuts increase, increasing the gearing ratio of the bank 
(Ranaldo, Rupprecht, & Wrampelmeyer, 2016). These liquidity spirals affect a significant 
portion of the portfolio of risky assets and can spill over across various investors, leading 
to liquidity risk (Adrian & Shin, 2008). Worse still, these two liquidity spirals fortify each 
other. The liquidity spirals during the financial crisis are shown in Figure 3.3, where the 
loss spiral is demonstrated in the outer circle and the margin spiral shown in the inner 
circle. 
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Figure 3.3: liquidity spiral II 
Source: Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)  
 
A very limited number of studies were specifically carried out to investigate appropriate 
measures of liquidity in the context of asset–liability mismatches (Brunnermeier & 
Pedersen, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2012). However, most of these studies if not all 
were theoretical in nature although their foundations were underpinned with empirical 
evidence gathered during the period of the financial crisis. To date, there has not been a 
thorough empirical analysis of liquidity measures that took into account the theory of 
liquidity spirals. The few notable exceptions are studies by Chordia et al. (2000), 
Hendershott, Moulton, and Seasholes (2007), Coffey Hrung and Sarkar (2009) and 
Mancini Griffoli, and Ranaldo (2009), Bai et al. (2014), Bai et al. (2016). However, their 
measures of liquidity are still under immense criticism as they do not comprehensively 
incorporate all the dynamics of market and funding liquidity (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016).  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that the near-accurate measure of liquidity 
should take into account the fact that funding liquidity depends on market liquidity and 
also that market liquidity can be a function of funding liquidity. This measure should 
unequivocally show that the funding needs of banks affect and is also affected by market 
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liquidity in a significant way (Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013). We noticed from the 
discussion in this section that when there is a funding liquidity shock, banks and other 
market participants are not keen to invest in large positions, especially in highly illiquid 
assets, as they are associated with high-margin securities (Aikman et al., 2009). This 
inevitably lowers market liquidity, which in turn lowers funding liquidity as the risk of 
financing increases due to increased margin calls (Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2010).  
Nowadays, financial institutions, especially banks, manage their assets and liability in a 
holistic way. Therefore, in this study we notice that there is a very thin line between market 
liquidity and funding liquidity and, besides, the different is becoming less relevant. In times 
of stress and liquidity shock, banks employ risk management techniques that look at 
asset–liability mismatches. A good liquidity measure should thus take into account the 
interactions of market liquidity and funding liquidity risk (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). 
In a theoretical article, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that higher funding 
liquidity risk implies lower market liquidity. Therefore, there is a strong negative 
interrelationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity.  
From another angle, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) show that the characteristics of 
funding liquidity are quite similar to those of market liquidity risk in that funding liquidity is 
persistent at low levels with sporadic spikes. The IMF (2011) consented that liquidity 
should be viewed from two realities, namely market liquidity and funding liquidity. The IMF 
defines market liquidity as the ability of an institution to sell its securities quickly without 
affecting their price negatively. The funding liquidity risk is defined as a situation where a 
banking organisation fails to meet its obligations as they fall due. In an attempt to build a 
measure that accounts for both market liquidity risk and funding risk, the IMF (2011) 
proposes three measures of systemic liquidity risk namely the systemic liquidity risk index 
(SLRI), systemic risk-adjusted liquidity (SRL) model, and macro stress-testing (ST) model 
with the prominent being the systemic liquidity risk index. The SLRI determines the joint 
probability of simultaneous liquidity shortfalls based on assessment of the NSFR 
proposed in Basel III (BIS, 2013).  
BCBS has so far proposed two minimum liquidity standards for commercial banks, the 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the NSFR. In the US, the Federal Reserve required 
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large banks, beginning 2012, to carry out liquidity stress tests which is a requirement 
under the comprehensive liquidity assessment and review (Borio, Drehmann & 
Tsatsaronis, 2014) in an attempt to augment the Basel III liquidity ratios. The proposed 
Basel III liquidity measures are computed to take into account both market liquidity and 
funding liquidity. However, Bai et al. (2016) argue that these liquidity measures have no 
strong theoretical underpinning as they have run ahead of academic research. Thus, the 
appropriate measure of liquidity provides a rich theme for scholars to investigate 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2013). Bai et al. (2016) indicate that there are no agreed-upon 
models to quantify bank-level liquidity and aggregate liquidity in the banking sector. A 
good liquidity measure must be useful for micro- as well as macro-prudential regulation, 
that is it should be able to measure liquidity at bank level as well as liquidity imbalances 
in the financial system (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). Since the financial system operation 
is different from other generic firms, the appropriate liquidity measure should account for 
both the asset side and the liability side of the balance sheet (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). 
Thus, it should capture the sophistication in the banking sector. As Allen (2014) and 
Diamond and Kashyap (2016) note, that there is little agreement on the measure of liquid.  
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) highlight that liquidity mismatch is the main determinant of 
systemic risk. They then propose a new measure of liquidity in the form of the LMI. The 
calculation of the LMI is deeply rooted in the premise that there is always a mismatch 
between assets and liabilities of a financial institution. In Brunnermeier et al.’s (2012) 
liquidity formula, assets and liabilities are given some liquidity weights to indicate the 
liquidity of the asset or the liability under consideration. The LMI is then calculated for 
different market conditions with different liquidity weights. The values generated are then 
assessed using the VaR technique (Linsmeier & Pearson 2000). Although it is the desired 
outcome of this measure to be able to come up with a market-wide systemic liquidity risk, 
Brunnermeier et al., 2013) admit that the proposed methodology is difficult to implement 
at such scale. They also points to the fact that different assets and different liabilities will 
require different weights, a task that seems impossible taking into account the variety of 
assets and the variety of liabilities that an institution could hold at any point in time. 
Moreover, the lack of empirical research in this regard is a major impediment. However, 
Brunnermeier et al.’ (2012) LMI is a better measure as compared to Drehmann and 
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Nikolaou’s (2013) liquidity measure. Drehmann and Nikolaou’s (2013) propose a 
theoretically sound and more practical measure of liquidity but the measure is not 
calculated from the perspective of asset and liability liquidity mismatches even though 
they acknowledge the interdependence between funding liquidity and market liquidity. In 
their calculation, they use the spread between the submitted bid and the minimum bid 
rate in the open market as a proxy for funding liquidity risk. The adjusted bid is then 
calculated as a function of this spread, and the aggregate proxy for liquidity risk is the 
sum of all the adjusted bids across banks (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2013). As highlighted 
earlier by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012), this methodology is not helpful when 
estimating the level of systemic funding liquidity risk and overlooks the fact that not all 
banks have easy access to central bank financing. Thus, the systemic nature of the 
funding liquidity risk is not fully taken into account as it does not emphasise endogenous 
responses by market participants (IMF, 2011). A more comprehensive measure of 
liquidity that accounts for asset–liability mismatches is still lacking, and further research 
is warrantied. 
3.4 Chapter summary and conclusion  
 
We have seen that there are different measures of liquidity risk that attempt to capture 
the pertinent issue of asset–liability mismatches. However, most of these measures have 
their weaknesses as mentioned in the literature. The study attempted to develop and 
validate the LMI as the new measure of liquidity in the context of asset–liability 
mismatches further. In line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2016), we intend to build on previous 
theoretical framework by Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), which 
is closely linked to Berger and Bouwman (2009) who took an empirical approach to 
measuring liquidity. More specifically, the present research adopted and built on 
Brunnermeier et al. (2013)’s LMI. The LMI captures the mismatch between the assets 
and liabilities of the bank’s balance sheet. The next chapter discusses the hypothesis 
development of this study.  
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4 Introduction 
 
Liquidity is the centrepiece in the financial crisis puzzle. Bai et al. (2016) show that liquidity 
plays a very important role in financial crises. In the theoretical model by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), the liquidity problems of banks emanate from the illiquidity of bank assets 
and the obligations the banks have as a result of bank liabilities. The IMF (2011) 
consented that liquidity should be viewed from two realities, namely market liquidity and 
funding liquidity. Thus, the financial literature distinguishes various types of liquidity, as 
they are defined and available by different actors in the financial system (Chordia et al., 
2000; Nikolaou, Drehmann, 2009; Adler, 2014). In fact, one can view liquidity from the 
perspective of the overall banking system (Brunnermeier et al., 2013), as detected from 
the central bank and the liquidity of the general market. In this chapter, the study develops 
the three main hypotheses of this study.  
4.1 Hypotheses 
In this section, the research hypotheses of this study are discussed. A research 
hypothesis involves the determination of a suitable anticipated outcome inform of 
inferential statistics based on theory and experience (Wolverton, 2009). In this study, the 
research hypotheses are developed in order to provide comprehensive theoretical and 
practical predictions of the expected outcomes. This provides a link between the literature 
review chapter and the methodology chapter. The broad aim of this study was to 
investigate empirically the liquidity risk embedded in asset–liability mismatches by banks. 
More specifically, this study therefore wishes to: 
 build modified liquidity mismatch indices in the form of BLMI and ALMI;  
 examine the key determinants of the modified liquidity mismatch indices in selected 
South African banks;  
 examine the key determinants of Basel III liquidity measures and other standard 
traditional liquidity measures; and 
 analyse the BLMI and ALMI as determinants of bank performance. 
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These objectives are further developed into hypothesis that are then empirically tested. 
Three broad hypotheses are developed and these include: (i) The liquidity mismatch 
index (LMI) is the appropriate measure of bank liquidity systemic risk, (ii) The BLMI and 
ALMI are a function of bank-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, and (iii) Bank 
profitability is influenced by its level of liquidity as measured by BLMI and the ALMI. 
 Hypothesis 1: The liquidity mismatch index (LMI) is the appropriate measure of 
bank systemic liquidity risk. 
Regarding liquidity measures, Becerra, Claeys, and Martnez (2016) outline that liquidity 
measures are based on different sources of information, which include the financial 
statements and market-based information. This information can then be used to measure 
bank liquidity risk for a specific bank and for the market-wide contagion effect 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009; Federico, 2012). From the financial statements, 
particularly the balance sheet, one can calculate – 
 the standard liquidity measures, such as the current ratio and the quick ratio; 
 the Basel III liquidity measures, such as the LCR and the NSFR; and  
 Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) LMI.  
The market-based liquidity measures comprise the measures such as return to volume 
ratios, bid–ask spread and liquidity premiums, such as in Bank of England (BoE) (2007) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) (2007).  
Irrespective of the fact that most scholars agree on the sources of liquidity risk as 
emanating from market liquidity and funding liquidity in general, there remains a raging 
debate on the measure of liquidity. Bai et al. (2016) indicate that there is a lack of an 
agreed-upon framework and instruments to implement liquidity regulations. There is a 
small number of researchers who have tried to address the issue of the correct liquidity 
measure, which incorporates both the assets and liability side (Holmström & Tirole, 1998, 
2001; Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2004; Brunnermeier et al., 2013; Bai et al., 2014; 
Becerra, Claeys, & Martínez, 2015; Bai et al., 2016; Diamond & Kashyap, 2016).  
In an attempt to build a measure that accounts for both market liquidity risk and funding 
risk, the IMF proposed a systemic liquidity risk index (SLRI) as a more appropriate 
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measure of systemic liquidity risk. This ratio determines the joint probability of 
simultaneous liquidity shortfalls based on assessment of the NSFR proposed in Basel III. 
The IMF (2011) argues that the SLRI is used to measure heightened funding and market 
liquidity risks, which are risks embedded in assets (e.g. equity) prices, the cost of funds 
and in their volatility. The SLRI has been used as a tool to stress test systemic liquidity 
risk through modelling of the funding and market liquidity risk using the behaviour 
observed during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. The stress testing of the systemic 
liquidity risk in this context also included capturing the common source of asset 
deterioration of the bank, including the liquidity spirals driven by pressure to sell assets 
quickly to settle obligations as they are required, the network effect and market-wide 
contagion.  
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) propose a more practical measure of liquidity. Although 
not calculated from the perspective of asset and liability liquidity mismatches, they 
acknowledge the interdependence between funding liquidity and market liquidity. They 
used the spread between the submitted bid and the minimum bid rate in the open market 
as a proxy for funding liquidity risk. The adjusted bid is then calculated as a function of 
this spread, and the aggregate proxy for liquidity risk is the sum of all the adjusted bids 
across banks. As highlighted earlier by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), this 
methodology is not helpful when estimating the level of systemic funding liquidity risk and 
overlooks the fact that not all banks have easy access to central bank financing. Thus, 
the systemic nature of the funding liquidity risk is not fully taken into account as it does 
not emphasise endogenous responses by market participants.  
BCBS proposed minimum liquidity standards that could help the banking system in terms 
of liquidity systemic risk. These include the LCR and the NSFR (IMF, 2011). The LCR is 
defined as the ratio of the bank’s high-quality liquid assets divided by the total net cash 
out flows over the subsequent days under extreme liquidity stress conditions (BCBS, 
2010). The NSFR is measured by dividing the available stable funding by the required 
stable funds (BCBS, 2010). The LCR and the NSFR were introduced to improve the 
liquidity management of banks within a context of asset–liability mismatches (IMF, 2011). 
However, Bai et al. (2016) point out that the Basel III liquidity measures although they try 
to solve the problem of systemic liquidity risk, these liquidity measures ran ahead of 
88 
 
research thereby lacking a proper theoretical underpinning. This raises the question 
whether these are correct measures of systemic liquidity risk. There is no consensus on 
the recognition and definition of liquidity risk (Allen, 2014; Bai et al., 2016; Diamond & 
Kashyap, 2016). Therefore, there is need for the development of a new liquidity measure 
that is able to capture all the sources of liquidity risk. The LMI introduced by Brunnermeier 
et al. (2013) is one liquidity measure that attempts to measure the asset–liability 
mismatches, that is the mismatch between the market liquidity (asset side of the balance 
sheet) and the funding liquidity (the liability side of the balance sheet.  
Brunnermeier et al. (2013) highlight that liquidity mismatch is the main determinant of 
systemic risk. These researchers then propose a new measure of liquidity in the form of 
the LMI. The LMI is so far – beside the Basel III liquidity measures – the liquidity measure 
that has attempted a more compelling and more precise way to measure systemic liquidity 
risk by focusing on important realities of liquidity risk namely market liquidity, funding 
liquidity and liquidity spirals. The calculation of the LMI is deep-rooted in the premise that 
there is always a mismatch between the assets and liabilities of a financial institution. In 
Brunnermeier et al.’s (2013) LMI calculation, assets and liabilities are given some liquidity 
weights to indicate the liquidity of the asset or the liability under consideration. The LMI 
is then calculated for different market conditions with different liquidity weights. The 
values generated are then assessed using the VaR technique (Linsmeier & Pearson, 
2000). Although it is the desired outcome of this measure to be able to come up with a 
market-wide systemic liquidity risk, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) however admit that 
the proposed methodology is difficult to implement at such scale. Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2016) points out that different assets and different liabilities will require different weights, 
a task that seems impossible taking into account the variety of assets and the variety of 
liabilities that an institution can hold at any given time. Moreover, the lack of 
comprehensive empirical research in this regard is a major impediment (Becerra, Claeys 
& Martínez, 2016). The present study built on few earlier theoretical and empirical work 
by Berger and Bouwman (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2013) and Bai et al. (2014).  
Although some new liquidity measures have been proposed, there is still a lack of clear-
cut measure and definition of liquidity that can be used to provide a macro-prudential 
liquidity parameter (Brunnermeier et al., 2013). This fact is recognised by many 
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researchers (for example Bai et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013; Drehmann & 
Nikolaou, 2013) who mention the obscurity in the new field of liquidity. However, 
discussions of this study show that quantification of liquidity has been hindered more by 
the lack of appropriate data than by model considerations (Duffie, 2011). Despite all these 
challenges, there is a severe need for an appropriate measure of liquidity, which is based 
on empirical studies that could form part of the risk management systems of financial 
institutions and which could also inform macro-economic policies accordingly. Failure to 
do so would leave most financial institutions exposed to significant systemic risk. The 
current study attempts to integrate the concept of market liquidity into the broader 
framework of funding liquidity. It is necessary to do this research because of late, central 
banks have recognised that existing measurement systems are inadequate and have 
begun to think about revisions and additions (Eichner et al., 2013; Bai et al, 2016).  
Theoretical or empirical finance literature has paid little attention to the development of a 
liquidity measure in the context of asset–liability mismatches. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) 
propose LMI as the new liquidity measure that integrates the divergence between assets 
and liabilities. The LMI is believed to improve the way we capture the risks that are crucial 
in the assessment of systemic risk significantly. Ideally, the new liquidity measure 
proposed will form part of new general equilibrium models. These models will help 
understand systemic risk and financial crisis. The aim is to develop the LMI further and to 
test it empirically to see whether we can get new insights other than those gained from 
the previous measures of liquidity. The following hypothesis will be tested in order to 
validate the newly developed liquidity mismatch indices. 
 Hypothesis 2: The BLMI and ALMI are a function of bank-specific factors, and 
macro-economic factors. 
In the financial market, the main role of banks is to create liquidity and transform risk 
(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1998; Diamond & Rajan, 2001b; Kashyap et al., 2002; Berger & 
Bouwman, 2009). This is in line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1990) who contend that the banking sector provides more liquidity than it 
consumes; thus, the banking sector creates liquidity. BCBS introduced new requirements 
for banks, both in terms of capital risk and liquidity risk. These requirements will have a 
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substantial influence on banks, as banks are now required to hold a level of capital and 
liquidity higher than in the past. This will inevitably also have an effect on the liquidity 
creation function performed by banks (Horvàth et al., 2012).  
As liquidity is one of the main components needed for the proper functioning of financial 
institutions, an understanding of the determinants of liquidity is needed; however, 
literature on this subject is relatively scarce. In general, liquidity risk is considered a 
determinant of other risks, such as credit risk (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick & Treepongkaruna, 
2011) or a determinant of bank performance (Bourke, 1989; Kosmidou, 2008; Arif & 
Anees, 2012). There are very few studies that comprehensively investigated the 
determinants of bank liquidity. In these few, there is substantial contradictory evidence. 
The differences may emanate from the various definitions and proxies used for liquidity, 
the period of study (before the crisis, during the crisis or after the crisis), and the 
methodology used. As shown earlier in this study (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), there 
are several definitions and measures of liquidity. Many liquidity measures reported in 
literature were used to investigate the determinants of bank liquidity, such as the liquidity 
gap, a plethora of liquidity ratios which could be assets only or multi-dimensional involving 
both assets and liabilities, the liquidity index and the financing gap. However, some of 
these liquidity measures have their own limitations. Take for example the liquidity gap, 
which is more data-intensive. There is also no standardised instrument to forecast bank 
inflows and bank outflows. According to Vodová (2013b), the liquidity ratios do not capture 
all liquidity risks of banks.  
There are two contradicting theories regarding the relationship between bank capital and 
bank liquidity. The hypothesis of financial fragility-crowding out of deposits suggests that 
there is a negative relationship between bank capital and bank liquidity (Al-Khouri, 2012). 
On the other hand, the risk absorption hypothesis shows that there is a positive 
relationship between capital and liquidity (Fungáčová et al., 2017). Horvàth et al. (2012), 
in a study involving Czech banks, found that capital positively affects the creation of bank 
liquidity. This is in line with earlier theoretical and empirical studies, such as studies by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Gorton and Winton (2000) and Berger and Bouwman 
(2009).  
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Nonperforming loans are loans that are outstanding (Rajha, 2016) and this is inclusive of 
both the interest component and the principal component. This is a good proxy for the 
quality of bank assets (Al-Khazali & Mirzaei, 2017). Typically, loans constitute the biggest 
portion of the total assets of the bank. The quality of the assets of the bank has a direct 
influence on liquidity (Barr, Killgo, Siems, & Zimmel, 1994). If banks have significant risk 
of default (failing to collect their money from loans as they mature), this implies a huge 
decline in the profitability of the banks and failure to collect loans may be interpreted to 
mean that the bank is struggling and therefore bank runs will be inevitable (Vodová, 
2013b). Given this, one should expect a negative relationship between the bank liquidity 
buffer and non-performing loans (Vodová, 2013a).  
Another relationship of interest within the context of bank run is bank profitability. Ideally, 
the higher the profitability of the bank – all other things being equal – the higher the bank 
liquidity (Dabiri & Yusof, 2017). When the bank is profitable, its ability to fund its 
obligations will be better and the higher the value of collateral in case the bank needs to 
raise funds to cover its short-term deficit (Goldmann, 2017). It is expected that banks, 
which are profitable, will also be stable and therefore will be able to access funds on the 
interbank market more easily than unprofitable banks. The general clientele base is 
confident with the bank and therefore tends to deposit more than the rate at which they 
withdraw these funds (Khan, Hussain, Rasheed, & Rizwan, 2016). 
Since the loan portfolio of banks is characteristically the principal business, the largest 
asset and the dominant source of revenue, this is one of the biggest sources of risk to the 
soundness and safety of the bank (Rostamkalaei & Freel, 2016). Loan portfolio naturally 
is not liquid (Berger, Bouwman, Kick, & Schaeck, 2016). An increase in the loan portfolio 
typically means a decrease in liquid assets and an increase in long-term illiquid assets 
(Berger at al., 2016). The amount of liquid assets held by banks is dependent on the level 
of loan demand, which is the premises on which the loan book grows (Pilbeam 2005:42). 
Theoretically, when the loan growth rate decreases, the bank naturally ends up holding 
more short-term liquid assets, whereas if the demand for loans increases, the banks will 
have to respond to this by issuing more loans thereby holding fewer short-term liquid 
assets. The switch from liquid assets to illiquid assets is part of the operations of a bank, 
as a bank is a profit-making organisation because loan portfolios provide higher returns 
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and are generally more profitable. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between 
bank liquidity and loan growth rate. In an empirical study carried out by Aspachs et al. 
(2005), there was a negative relationship between loan growth and bank liquidity holding.  
The size of a bank indicates its general capacity to undertake the intermediary function 
(Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016). Therefore, the size of a bank as measured by the 
total assets positively contributes to its liquidity levels through the implicit guarantee 
associated with bigger banks as compared to smaller banks. The larger the bank, the 
better its ability to mobilise funds in open market operations, and the lower the cost of 
funds as such bank is deemed to have higher creditworthiness (Berger et al, 2016). 
On the other hand, if the bank becomes too big, this can have a negative effect on its 
operations because of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon (Poghosyan, Werger, & De Haan, 
2016). This will require banks of this nature to hold more liquid assets compared to their 
counterparties (Vodová, 2013b). This further implies that the relationship between bank 
size and liquidity is non-linear as the relationship should show whether a bank is enjoying 
economies of scale or whether it is suffering from diseconomies of scale (Hasan & Soula, 
2017).  
Shen Chen, Kao, and Yeh (2009) found that there is a non-linear relationship between 
liquidity risk and the size of a bank. They realised that liquidity risk was indeed positively 
related to the size of a bank; however, above a certain level of bank size, the relationship 
was negative. Primarily, the relationship between bank size and the bank liquidity buffer 
is assumed to be negative because the bigger the bank the better its ability and capacity 
to venture into risky speculative adventures, and the more it can also invest in long-term 
risk assets (Shen et al., 2009). A bigger bank can get funding easily when it has a 
shortage because of a larger clientele base and huge branch networks in some cases 
(Hackethal et al., 2010). Since big banks have huge asset bases, they can use these 
assets as collateral to borrow more funds at lower cost in times of need (Delechat et al., 
2012). 
Empirical studies (e.g. Lucchetta, 2007; Bunda, & Desquilbet, 2008; Rauch, Hackethal, 
& Tyrell, 2009) found that the size of a bank had a negative relationship with liquidity 
buffers. Large banks have the capacity to hold proportionally fewer liquid assets than 
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small banks (Vodová, 2013a). Contrary to what many scholars found, Pasiouras, 
Gaganis, and Zopounidis (2006) and Tseganesh (2012) argue for a positive relationship 
between bank liquidity levels and bank size. Their argument is centred on the fact that, 
as the bank size increases, this is consequently followed by growth in branch networks. 
As branch network increases, the bank is required to hold a significant level of liquid 
assets in order to meet higher demand of loans and also unpredictable withdrawals. Thus, 
Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2008) show that the level of liquidity buffers of a bank is 
dependent on the scale and scope economies that are correlated to how a bank is 
competitive and efficient.  
The reliance of banks on external sources of funding – besides retail deposits or 
wholesale funding – has been shown (Yaacob, Rahman, & Karim, 2016). to have some 
implications for the probability of such bank facing liquidity risk. Shen et al. (2009) 
considered external funding dependence as one of the sources of liquidity risk when they 
used the ratio of external funding to total liabilities to represent this dependence. 
Saunders and Cornett (2006) also confirm that banks primarily rely on money market 
funding instead of demand deposits and long-term funding to fund their loans.  
Shen et al. (2009) found that, if a bank relies on wholesale funding and borrowing from 
open market operations instead of core deposits to fund its loan book and other day-to-
day operations, such bank has a higher probability of facing liquidity problems compared 
to banks that rely mainly on core deposits instead of wholesale funding and money market 
borrowings. Therefore, banks rely from wholesale funding and from borrowing money on 
markets operations may face liquidity problems in the short run and long run as these 
banks borrow a significant amount in the money market, and may therefore face high 
liquidity risk due to such reliance. External funding deposit (EFD) is expected to be 
negatively related to bank liquidity buffer (Hackethal et al., 2010). Viewing the relationship 
from another angle, it is thus obvious that EFD and bank liquidity risk are positively 
related.  
The ownership structure of banks could influence the extent to which a bank may be 
exposed to liquidity risk (Yaacob et al, 2016). Theoretically, banks with external affiliation 
have lower liquidity risk compared to local banks, as they are in a better position to 
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manage funding position because banks with external affiliation can call for help from 
their foreign affiliations and have easy access to foreign markets in times of difficulty, 
which may not be the same for local banks. One should expect a positive relationship 
between bank liquidity level and local ownership, but a negative relationship with non-
foreign owned banks. Thus, the extent to which a bank is exposed to liquidity risk is 
expected to differ significantly depending on the ownership structure of the bank, whether 
it is foreign-owned or locally owned (Berger ate al., 2016). 
The interbank lending rate signifies the opportunity cost of not keeping liquid assets to 
meet obligations as they are due and also issue out loans as they are demanded 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2001). Since the main reason why banks exist is to provide a link 
between deficit units and surplus units, the intermediation function is closely linked to 
maturity transformation as deposits can be withdrawn at any time at short notice and 
loans are usually long term (Berger & Sedunov, 2017). Therefore, banks are in the 
business of borrowing short term and lending long term, and this exposes them to liquidity 
risk (Chatterjee, 2015). Faced with liquidity risk, banks maintain a certain level of cash 
and cash equivalent (liquid assets) to meet their obligations of deposit withdrawals, 
investments liquidation and loan demand. This is confirmed by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), who indicate that financial institutions profit from their capability of pooling liquidity 
risk over a diverse clientele base. In times of instability, banks may choose to increase 
their liquid asset holding to lessen liquidity risk (Tran, Lin & Nguyen, 2016). If the bank 
invests a significant proportion in cash and cash equivalent assets, this will lessen the 
burden on depositors as liquidity risk is reduced.  
It will not be favourable for the portfolios of banks to be concentrated in highly liquid assets 
most of the time as this will represent an opportunity cost of the interest earning that could 
have been generated had the bank invested this money by issuing out profitable loans 
(Tran et al., 2016). This implies that the optimal level of liquid assets the bank must hold 
is dependent on the trade-off between risk of not meeting obligations as they fall due and 
higher returns by investing in loans and other long-term illiquid assets (Berger et al., 
2016). When investigating the relationship between liquidity and interest rates, Agénor et 
al. (2004) found that the level of a bank’s liquid assets buffer is positively related to the 
volatility of the interest rate. According to Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984), 
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the level of liquid assets kept by banks is said to dependent on what banks lose (the 
opportunity cost) by holding on to liquid assets. In a nutshell, interest rates measure the 
opportunity cost of holding liquid assets; therefore, interest rates have a negative 
relationship with liquidity. 
Lucchetta (2007) found that interest rates have a strong bearing on banks when making 
decisions on asset allocations. Results indicated that interest rates, as measured by 
interbank interest rate, were positively related to banks’ liquid asset buffers, and that the 
decision by banks to extend loans in the interbank market is dependent on the level of 
interest rates. This argument is based on the fact that lending or borrowing is based on 
the price of liquidity, which in turn depends on the demand and supply of loanable funds 
and the interbank borrowing rate (Berger & Bouwman, 2017). Using a monetary policy 
determined interest rate as proxy for interest rate Lucchetta (2007) found an opposite 
relationship to what was resulting from using interbank lending rate, as the relationship 
between interest rates and liquidity was negative. Rauch et al. (2010) came to the same 
conclusion, using an increase in interest rates as a proxy for tight monetary policy, and 
pointed out that bank liquidity is negatively related to interest rates.  
The GDP growth rate represents the overall economic progress of a country (Nyasha & 
Odhiambo, 2017). Ideally, when the economy is progressing, the GDP will be growing, 
and this leads to banks increasing their liquidity buffers, because during economic 
prosperity, the demand for loans tend to increase (Berger & Sedunov, 2017). The lending 
activity of banks tends to increase with growth in the GDP. This confirms a positive 
relationship between banks’ liquidity buffers and economic growth (Horváth, Seidler, & 
Weill, 2014). Moore (2010) conducted a study in Latin America and Caribbean countries 
and found that bank liquidity tends to be related positively to the business cycle. 
Nevertheless, the theory of bank fragility (Mazlan, Ahmad, & Jaafar, 2016). points to the 
contrary: banks tend to resort to safer havens during periods of depression and 
recessions (Fungacova, Turk, & Weill, 2015). Banks put most of their money in short-
term, highly liquid assets thereby reducing investment in illiquid long-term assets 
(Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014). This results in a negative relationship between economic 
growth and the level of liquid assets the bank keeps as buffer (Choon et al., 2013; Audo, 
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2014). The negative outcome means that the healthier the economy, the fewer the 
liquidity buffers kept by the banks. 
Inflation, according to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), is a general upward swing in prices 
of goods and services, over a given period of time, in a particular economy. When 
investigating the macro-economic determinants of bank liquidity, the general increase in 
prices of goods and services cannot be overlooked. Tseganesh (2012:49) assumes a 
transmission mechanism between bank liquidity and inflations. A general increase in 
prices of goods and services has a negative effect on the real returns of all investments, 
all other things being equal. A reduction in real return from investments increases 
uncertainty within the market (Borio, Gambacorta, & Hofmann, 2017). and this hampers 
the confidence of banks; hence, banks slow down on their main banking activities. When 
inflation increases, banks naturally switch to more liquid short-term assets. This is also in 
line with Audo’s (2014) findings, which indicated that an increase in the general level of 
prices leads to a reduction in real rate of return in both monetary and asset terms. This 
then results in increased credit risk and ultimately aggravating credit market frictions 
(Correa, Lee, Sapriza & Suarez, 2014). Market frictions consequently lead to reduction of 
loan issuance (Adler, 2014). The changes in price level are related to economic activity 
through a transmission mechanism. Increases in the prices of goods and services 
resulting from higher demand directly affect the cost of capital and, hence, the increase 
in demand for working capital by companies and individuals. 
Aspachs et al. (2005) point out that during periods of recession and depression, banks 
generally increase the proportion of liquid assets because of limited lending opportunities. 
Therefore, we expect that during an upswing in economic growth this will work for the 
good of banks as they can get higher interest returns from lending money at higher 
interest rates while receiving fewer investments from their clients over the same time 
(Vodová, 2014). Through economic growth, monetary and fiscal policies of the central 
bank, the money supply in a country is affected, and this will have varying effects on 
inflation, depending on the direction of the general price level, which will affect the 
behaviour of banks towards liquidity risk. Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras (2006), 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Kosmidou, Pasiouras, and Tsaklanganos (2007), and 
Rauch et al. (2010) corroborate on the fact that there is a negative relationship between 
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inflation and bank liquidity in that as inflation increase banks tend to reduce their liquidity 
buffers. Shen et al. (2009) also show that inflation is negatively related to the liquidity 
buffers of banks. However, Kosmidou (2008) argues that, during an inflationary period, 
banks have a tendency of holding on to liquid assets to mitigate themselves from the high 
cost of borrowing if they were to raise money on the money market to meet their financial 
obligations. According to this view, the change in inflation is positively related to bank 
liquidity buffers (Bonner, Van Lelyveld & Zymek, 2015). The present study thus expected 
to indicate a positive/negative effect of inflation on liquidity risk.  
Hackethal, Rauch, Steffen, and Tyrrel (2010) studied the determinants of liquidity risk, 
and found that the most important determinants are macro-economic variables and 
monetary policy, while not showing a significant relationship between liquidity creation 
and bank-specific variables, such as size and performance. Ahmed et al. (2011), in a 
study on a sample of six Pakistani banks, found that, at that stage, there was no significant 
relationship between liquidity risk, profitability and size, while underlining a significant 
relationship between liquidity risk and leverage and the measure of bank tangibility. 
Giannotti, Gibilaro, and Mattarocci (2011), in a study on Italian banks, also found that 
larger banks have lower liquidity exposure. Finally, Bunda and Desquilbet (2008), in their 
study on 1 107 commercial banks in 36 emerging economies, found that capitalisation, 
measured by the ratio between equity and total assets, has a significant and positive 
relationship with all liquidity measures considered in their study and a significant 
relationship with inflation rate and growth rate. 
From this discussion, one notices that there are a couple of factors that requires banks to 
hold significant level of liquid assets in their portfolios. These determinants were 
investigated using mainly the traditional liquidity measures. The present study took a step 
further by using the same factors discussed in this section to validate the LMI. Hence, the 
identified determinants were regressed against the LMI to establish whether the LMI is a 
good measure of liquidity.  
 Hypothesis 3: Bank profitability is influenced by its level of liquidity as 
measured by BLMI and the ALMI. 
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During the global financial crisis (i.e. 2007–2009), several banks experienced some 
difficulties because they failed to manage liquidity in a prudent manner (Berger & 
Bouwman, 2017). Thus, the crisis emphasised the importance of liquidity to the proper 
functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. Before the financial crisis, 
financial intermediaries were stable as funding was readily available and at low cost. The 
rapid reversal in market conditions illustrated how quickly liquidity can evaporate, and that 
illiquidity can reserve already earned profits as financial institutions are either forced to 
sell assets well below their market value or borrow at interest rates charges above their 
weighted return on assets (Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, & Lorenzoni, 2017).  
Lack of liquidity is one of the major reasons why banks fail, however, holding liquid assets 
has an opportunity cost of higher returns (Marozva, 2015). Bourke (1989) finds a positive 
significant link between bank liquidity and profitability. However, in times of instability 
banks may choose to increase their cash holding to mitigate risk. On the other side 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found that there is a negative correlation between liquidity 
and profitability levels. While it is generally agreed (Lartey, Antwi, & Boadi, 2013; 
Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan, & Wilson, 2015) that there is a negative relationship 
between liquidity and bank profitability, there is counter evidence which shows the need 
to consider the trade-off between resilience to liquidity shocks and cost of holding less 
profitable liquid assets as the latter is assumed to impact on the bank’s ability to take 
advantage of opportunities arising in the market which may result in increase in revenue, 
capital or ability to extend capital credit (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010). Liquidity 
management becomes a very important part in financial management decisions, where 
the liquidity management efficiency could be achieved by firms that manage a trade-off 
between liquidity and profitability (Bhunia & Khan, 2011; Alshatti, 2015). 
Brunnermeier, Krishnamurthy and Gorton (2013) notes that it is not the level of gearing 
that is important, but rather the proportion of debt that is comprised of short-term 
demandable deposits. As banks hold illiquid assets financed by short-term debt of which 
if bank run behaviour emerges this may result in increased systemic risk. Of the few 
studies that have looked at the bank liquidity and bank performance nexus most of them 
took a theoretical approach and the few studies that attempted to empirically test this 
phenomenon used net interest margin as the indicator for bank profitability (Berríos, 2013; 
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Chowdhury, Siddiqua, & Chowdhury, 2016). The linkage between net interest margin and 
liquidity is assumed to be positive. Empirical studies by Drakos (2003) and Hesse, Frank, 
and González-Hermosillo (2008) found a significant negative relationship bank 
performance and liquidity. However, Maudos and Solís (2009) though they found a 
negative relationship between market liquidity and net interest margin the relationship is 
not significant. 
While it is generally agreed that there is a negative relationship between liquidity and 
bank profitability there is counter evidence which shows the need to consider the trade-
off between resilience to liquidity shocks and cost of holding less profitable liquid assets. 
The latter is assumed to impact on the bank’s ability to take advantage of opportunities 
arising in the market which may result in increase in revenue, capital or ability to extend 
capital credit (Bordeleau & Graham 2010). Banks on the asset side hold low yielding 
securities such as treasury bills and highly rated short-term corporate bonds in order to 
minimise a scramble for liquidity when credit use increases in time when money is 
constricted (Holmstrom & Tirole 1998). Thus, in essence, a liquid financial institution has 
a smaller portion of its assets in long-term loans and a greater proportion of its assets in 
short-term securities that can be quickly liquidated into cash that can then be loaned out, 
however a highly liquid bank may mean lack of profitable projects to invest the money. 
According to Maudos and De Guevara (2004), and Saunders and Schumacher (2000), 
there is a positive significant relationship between market liquidity risk and net interest 
income.  
4.2 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter, the three broad hypotheses namely: (i) The liquidity mismatch index (LMI) 
is the appropriate measure of bank liquidity systemic risk, (ii) The BLMI and ALMI are a 
function of bank-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, and (iii) Bank profitability 
is influenced by its level of liquidity as measured by BLMI and the ALMI, were developed 
and discussed. The discussion lay a background for the next chapter. The next chapter 
spell out the research methodology that is used in this study.  
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the hypothesis development in terms of the appropriate 
measure of liquidity in the context of asset and liability mismatches, and the determinants 
of bank liquidity were put into perspective. In this chapter, the methodologies that were 
applied in addressing the research objectives and the hypothesis that were developed 
are presented. Methodology, according to Della Porta, and Keating (2008), is referred to 
as the process of turning a research problem into a workable strategy.  
The chapter begins with a justification of the research paradigm, which guided the 
proposed research design. Subsequently, the research objectives and questions are 
recapped. Model specifications follow thereafter, where empirical models that capture 
both time series analysis and cross-sectional analysis are specified. Since the study 
comprised the investigation of different banks in South Africa over a long period of time, 
panel data model specifications to capture the bank-specific cross-sectional and time 
differences are also presented. Furthermore, the population, the sample selection and 
the sample size are discussed briefly. This is followed by discussion of diagnostic tests 
that were carried out. The last section focuses on drawing conclusions and summarising 
the chapter.  
5.2 Research paradigm and design 
In this section, the context for data collection, the analysis and interpretation, and the 
determination of the research questions raised are discussed. Research design is defined 
by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009:136) as the grand plan in which the research 
addresses the research objectives or research questions. Gelo, Braakmann, and Benetka 
(2008) define research design as the framework that links the philosophical fundamentals 
and the methodological assumptions of a research approach. A quantitative research 
approach was used in this research to investigate the nexus between bank liquidity and 
the independent variables. According to Tustin, Ligthelm, Martin, and Van Wyk 
(2005, p.  89), quantitative research is described as a systematic way of collecting primary 
data from a huge population, collect some information out of these data and then 
generalise on a wider population. Dimitrov (2008, p. 39) views quantitative research as a 
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presentation of numerical data and an interpretation of outcomes in a bid to get as much 
information as possible reflected in the observed numerical values. Della Porta, and 
Keating (2008) explain that, in the field of social sciences, the traditional approach in 
positivism is not materially different from that in the natural sciences. The point raised 
here is that the world exists as an objective and independent entity, independent from its 
observer (Porta, and Keating, 2008).  
In this study, the objective was to give a detailed account of and examine methodically 
the nexus between liquidity and its determinants. Since the positivist approaches assume 
that, in natural as in social sciences, the researcher can be independent from the object 
under investigation, this study analysed the determinants of liquidity using secondary data 
in an unbiased way and without any undue influence on the data. Bryman (1984) suggests 
that a positivist research approach can be equated to a quantitative research approach 
as both are mainly used in methodological writings as they are inclined towards working 
definitions, objectivity, replicability, and causality.  
Although the present research did not intend to test the causality between liquidity and 
the independent variable, methods used in this research primarily assumed that the 
identified liquidity determinants cause liquidity. Emil Durkheim (1982, p. 159) indicates 
that the law of causality has been tried and tested, and that it proved to work well in 
different spheres of research. Originally employed in the field of physical and chemical 
sciences, it has through time, been adapted to research in biological studies, 
subsequently in the psychological world, and now equally useful in social science 
research. On the same note, Wood-Harper (1992) and King (1996) indicate that 
positivism – when it relates to social sciences, the social structure and social facts or 
when viewed in the context of concepts and therefore cause–effect relationships – could 
be investigated and the outcomes thereof could be applied to the greater population.  
In line with the above discussion, this study adopted the positivist epistemology, as the 
purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between bank liquidity and 
micro- plus macro-economic fundamentals. The primary purpose of the research was to 
explain and confirm relationships between independent and dependent variables in line 
with Gelo et al.’s (2008) explanation of the positivist approach. Further, the study 
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accordingly used secondary data and therefore did not have a direct influence, neither 
was there any indirect influence on the objects under investigation. Additionally, this study 
followed the standards of quantitative research by applying the deductive approach to this 
research in order to reveal the correlation between liquidity and micro- plus macro-
economic fundamentals. In this research, the explanatory empirical research design was 
used to examine existing numerical data by employing various econometric techniques 
in order to determine cause-and-effect relationships between variables, as well as 
possible policy implications of the findings. The relationships between bank liquidity and 
specific macro- plus micro-economic variables in selected South African banks were 
investigated using a combination of econometric (quantitative) techniques.  
5.2.1 Data and variables 
This study employed monthly and annual financial and economic data drawn from the 
iress INET BFA database, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), Bankscope – Bureau 
van Dijk, the World Bank databases on African Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance. Some of the macro-economy variables were sourced from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. This study implemented a liquidity 
measure, the LMI, proposed by Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2011, 2012, 
2013), later modified by Bai et al. (2014). In order to test the LMI empirically, the modified 
liquidity mismatch indices (MLMI) were regressed against the determinants of liquidity as 
adapted from previous studies for example studies by Lucchetta (2007), Moore (2009) 
and Vodová (2011, 2012, 2013a). This study focused on South Africa; hence, single-
country data were employed. Since the approach was both longitudinal and cross-
sectional, the study therefore conducted a panel study using pooled time series and 
cross-sectional data on selected South African banks. 
From a country population of 16 locally registered banks in South Africa (see Table 5.1 
below), a sample of 12 banks was selected for this study, namely Standard Bank-South 
Africa, FirstRand Bank Ltd, Absa Bank Ltd, Nedbank Ltd, Investec Bank Ltd, Capitec 
Bank Ltd, Grindrod Bank Ltd, Mercantile Bank Ltd, Bidvest Bank Ltd, Sasfin Bank Ltd, 
HBZ Bank Ltd, and Albaraka Bank Ltd. The banks under consideration in this study 
constituted 99% of the assets of all South African registered banks. These banks were 
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included in this study because of the availability of bank-specific data on the variables 
under investigation for the study period running from 2005 to 2015. Four small banks were 
excluded from the analysis because data on non-performing loans and bank profitability 
was inaccessible for the period of study. The study primarily used annual data. However, 
some weekly and monthly data were used to compute annual averages for the modified 
liquidity mismatch indices (MLMI).  
Table 5.1: South African banking sector: names of banks registered or licensed in 
terms of the Banks Act (no. 90 of 1990) as at 31 December 2015. 
Name of bank Total assets as at 31 
December 2015 (R 
Billions)  
Ranking of 
bank by total 
assets  
Standard Bank-South Africa Ltd 1 214 1 
FirstRand Bank Ltd 980 2 
Absa Bank Ltd 927 3 
Nedbank Ltd 813 4 
Investec Bank Ltd 377 5 
Capitec Bank Ltd 62 6 
African Bank Ltd 55 7 
Grindrod Bank Ltd 11 8 
Mercantile Bank Ltd 10 9 
Bidvest Bank Ltd 6 10 
Sasfin Bank Ltd 6 11 
Albaraka Bank Ltd 5  12 
UBank Ltd 5 13 
HBZ Bank Ltd 4 14 
The South African Bank of Athens Ltd 3 15 
Habib Overseas Bank Ltd 1  16 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2015).  
We had three main categories of the dependent variables in this study, namely the 
standard traditional liquidity measures, the Basel III liquidity measures and the liquidity–
mismatch index (LMI). Table 5.2 below shows details of dependent variables used in this 
study. 
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Table 5.2: Liquidity measures (dependent variables) 
VARIABLE MEASURE  DATA SOURCES 
STANDARD TRADITIONAL LIQUIDITY MEASURES  
 
L1 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
 Bankscope – 
Bureau van Dijk 
 South African 
Reserve Bank 
 
L2 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
 
 
L3 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
L4 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
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 South African 
Reserve Bank 
 iress INET BFA 
database 
Sources: Adapted from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2014), Brunnermeier et 
al. (2013) and Vodová (2013a) 
In previous empirical studies (Cucinelli, 2013; Vodová (2013b), the balance sheet-related 
liquidity ratios were used. Vodová (2011) and Moore (2009) provided and used the 
following four liquidity ratios in their studies:  
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L1 =
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
                       (5.1) 
The liquid asset to total asset ratio is a ratio that has been used in previous studies to 
capture the asset liquidity of the bank (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux & Thornton, 1992; Vodová 
2011). This ratio gives information about the general liquidity shock absorption capacity 
of a bank (Berhanu, 2015). The higher the ratio, the higher the liquidity and the more 
stable is the financial institution in question. 
L2 =
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠+𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
         (5.2) 
A variation of liquid assets to deposits plus short-term borrowing ratios were previously 
empirically employed by Kosmidou, Tanna & Pasiouras (2005), Shen et al. (2009) and 
Vodová (2013a). This ratio indicates the vulnerability of a bank to changes in different 
forms of funding, such as deposits from individuals/households, public and non-public 
enterprises, non-profit-making organisations (NPOs) and other financial institutions. 
Likewise, the higher value of this liquidity ratio, the less sensitive the bank is to liquidity 
shocks and therefore, the less vulnerable such bank is to failure (Malik & Rafique, 2013). 
L3 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
           (5.3) 
Some studies use loans to total assets ratio as a measure of liquidity (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2006). The loans to total assets ratio shows the 
proportion of loans as part of total assets and indicates the portion of assets of the bank 
that are tied up in illiquid loan assets. The higher the ratio, the less attractive the bank is 
(Berger et al., 2016). A higher ratio indicates that the bank may fail to pay its dues as 
loans cannot be converted to cash easily. 
 
L4 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠+𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
         (5.4) 
The loans to customer and short-term funding ratio was previously used, amongst other 
by Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Kosmidou (2008), and Naceur and Kandil (2009) as 
a measure of bank liquidity. This ratio relates to banks’ illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. 
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The higher the value of these ratios, the more illiquid the bank is and therefore the higher 
its vulnerability to liquidity shocks (Kosmidou, 2008),.  
Vodová (2013b) utilised these four measures of liquidity in an attempt to determine what 
it is that influences liquidity level for commercial banks. The panel data regression 
analysis (Baltagi, 2008) was used, as recommended by (Kolapo et al., 2012) to identify 
the determinants of South African commercial banks’ liquidity while employing the four 
liquidity measures discussed in this section as dependent variables. 
5.2.2 Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
The financial turmoil of 2007–2009 resulted in the introduction of the Basel III. Banks were 
required to implement the Basel III requirements since 2015. The BCBS, under the Basel 
III accord, requires banks to hold liquid assets of high quality (BCBS, 2013). LCR is the 
ratio particularly needed to implement in a bid to promote short-term resilience (BCBS, 
2009). Since 2015, it is a requirement that banks should hold liquid assets against 
anticipated net liquid outflows over a 30-day stress period. According to BCBS (2013), 
the numerator of the LCR represents high-quality liquid assets (HQLA). HQLA are those 
assets that banks can easily liquidate without losing much value (BCBS, 2013). Primarily, 
liquid assets constitute cash, short-term interbank lending, reserves with the central bank, 
marketable securities and any form of lending to the central bank. Whereas the 
denominator is the expected net cash outflow within 30 days, i.e. the difference between 
bank-anticipated cash inflow and bank-anticipated cash outflow.  
𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠−𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
> 100%         (5.5) 
The liquidity weights of the HQLA are determined by the margin requirements required 
for each asset (BCBS, 2013). The amount of haircut (this is the margin requirement for 
each asset) is determined by the central bank (BCBS, 2013). Asset liquidity weights are 
determined as 100 minus the haircut, and this will indicate to what extent a bank is 
stressed due to lack of market liquidity. The prescribed cash outflows are subject to run-
off rates, which are aimed at capturing the probability of depositors or investors 
withdrawing their money and/or investments (BCBS, 2013). In essence, this component 
of LCR measures the funding liquidity risk of a particular institution.  
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5.2.3 Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
According to the BIS (2014), banks under the Basel III requirement are supposed to 
maintain a stable funding profile in the form of an NSFR. The NSFR requires banks to 
have stability in their funds as related to the structure of their assets and other off-balance 
sheet activities.  
The NSFR is calculated by dividing the available amount of stable funding by the required 
amount of stable funding (BCBS, 2014). Ideally, this ratio should be greater or equal to 
100% on an on-going basis (BCBS, 2013). The available stable funding is the portion of 
equity capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over a given time under review for the 
calculation of the NSFR, and this extends to one year (BCBS, 2014). The availability of 
the stable funding required of a particular bank is driven by the liquidity characteristics 
and remaining maturities of the different assets held by that bank including off-balance 
sheet assets. 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
≥ 100%       (5.6) 
The NSFR considers both the liability- and the asset-side of the balance sheet as NSFR 
calibrates the extent to which bank assets are liquid and the assumed stability of a bank’s 
obligations. The stability of liabilities should be considered within the context of two 
aspects:  
 the funding tenor – where long-term liabilities are considered more stable than 
short-term liabilities; and  
 funding type and counterparty – here short-term deposits, i.e. any investment 
maturing within a year from both retail customers and small business customers – 
are presumed more stable than wholesale funding of the same maturity from other 
institutions (King, 2013).  
On the asset side, the NSFR requires a determination of right amounts of the required 
stable funding for bank assets (BCBS, 2014). Four asset characteristics that were 
considered:  
 resilient credit creation – there is need for liquid assets to enable a bank to issue 
loans and continue with its business;  
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 bank behaviour – to keep relationships with customers intact, banks may consider 
rolling over maturing loans;  
 asset tenor – short-term assets are assets that mature within the year and under 
normal circumstances would require a smaller proportion of stable funding as 
banks ordinarily would require a significant portion to be settled; and  
 asset quality and liquidity value – high-quality assets can be liquidated easily or 
converted to asset-backed securities and therefore may be used readily as 
collateral when borrowing additional funds, and there is no need for stable funding 
requirement (BCBS, 2014).  
There is also a need to consider additional obligations resulting from off-balance sheet 
commitments. According to the BIS (2014), the NSFR definition is a more detailed 
elaboration of the LCR.  
5.2.4 Liquidity mismatch index (LMI) 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002), a proper measure of liquidity must be capable of 
incorporating and exhibiting the five main characteristics of what liquidity is all about:  
 the tightness of the market – a market that is characterised by low cost of 
transaction is considered liquid and vice versa;  
 execution immediacy – this is the speed at which traders can trade in the market. 
In a highly liquid market, traders can transact swiftly;  
 the market depth – involves trading in the market with limit orders;  
 the market breadth – relates to the market influence of large orders. In a highly 
liquid market, trading huge volumes does not significantly affect the prices of the 
security; and  
 market resiliency – this measures the extent to which the temporary price deviation 
is quickly corrected.  
The LMI measures the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding 
liquidity of liabilities (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). This measure incorporates both the 
asset side and the liability side (Brunnermeier, 2013). Therefore, the LMI for an entity i at 
a given time t is the net of the asset and liability liquidity, defined as,  
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where assets ( k
i
t Ax ) and liabilities ( 'k
i
t Lx ) are balance sheet items that vary over time 
depending on their asset class (𝑘) or liability class (𝑘′) . The liquidity weights, 0kt A  
and 0' ktL  are key components that are computed (Bai, et al., 2016).  
5.2.4.1  Asset side liquidity weights  
On the bank’s financial position, the asset side comprises furniture, property, fittings, and 
intangible assets, trading assets, leases, loans securities and cash. The liquidity weight 
on the asset side should ideally represent the market liquidity, which is defined by Holden, 
Jacobsen, and Subrahmanyam (2014) as the ability of an institution to trade a significant 
portion of a security at a low cost in a short time. Therefore, the liquidity weight represents 
the amount of liquidity a bank could access using a particular asset over a very short 
period. Under a liquidity shock (Calem, Covas, & Wu, 2013), the institution should be able 
honour its obligations with cash raised through borrowing against a given asset or by 
selling against that asset (Banks, 2014).  
Bai et al. (2016) propose asset weights that range from 0 to 1 depending on the asset 
class, and these vary over time. Using the data from the banks’ balance sheets, the 
computed asset liquidity weight is set at 𝜆𝑡𝐴𝑘 = 1 to represent cash and cash equivalent 
and 𝜆𝑡𝐴𝑘 = 0 to represent mainly the non-current goodwill and intangible assets. The 
other assets were assigned weights between 0 and 1; therefore, the asset liquidity 
weights for these assets were set at 0 <  𝜆𝑡𝐴𝑘 < 1 and the asset liquidity weight was 
assigned to cash and cash equivalents because these assets are extremely liquid and 
can be converted into cash at the very shortest time as compared to other assets 
(Valverde, Solas, & Fernández, 2016). Since it is very difficult to sell non-current assets 
and time-consuming to sell non-current assets, lower liquidity weights are assigned to 
them. The weight is constructed from haircut data on repo transactions (Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2016). Bai et al. (2016) show that haircuts are natural measures of asset liquidity 
sensitivity as they are said to vary with measures of asset price volatility and tail risk for 
a given asset class. Using data from the Money Market Fund sector (Schmidt, 
Timmermann, & Wermers, 2016), Bai et al.’s (2016) haircut is computed as follows:  
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,             (5.8) 
where m is the haircut measure, P is the fair value of collateral and D the notional amount. 
The haircut rates are low for high-quality collateral and high for riskier assets (Wray, 
2016).  
A significant number of scholars tested the effectiveness of the haircut rates empirically 
and found a strong evidence that haircut spreads are in fact negative across money 
market dealers and across market periods. See in this regard Gorton and Metrick (2009) 
and Issa and Jarnecic (2016), both worked in the cross-section (across dealers) and in 
the time-series (across market periods). Although there is marginal evidence that haircut 
spreads increase after a shock to the funding liquidity of dealers, the spreads nonetheless 
remain negative and therefore only provide a small capital loss (Bali, Peng, Shen & Tang, 
2013). Overall, the results are consistent with the alternative explanation that dealers 
seeking to reuse collateral prefer immediacy and are not in a position to set preferable 
terms of trade (Eisenbeis & Herring, 2015).  
Haircuts are dependent on the likelihood of default by counterparties, the liquidity needs 
of the lender, and the type of collateral used (Dang, Gorton, & Holmström, 2010b and 
Dang, Gorton, & Holmström, 2013). Therefore, haircuts do vary across asset classes. 
Another presentiment on the use of haircut prices is that most haircuts primarily driven by 
the triparty repo market and only loans are excluded. According to Gorton and Metrick 
(2009) and Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010), prices of haircuts in the triparty market 
(Begalle, Martin, McAndrews, & McLaughlin, 2016) were relatively stable as compared to 
the bilateral repo market and this measure of liquidity fails to capture the liquidity condition 
of a market accurately. 
Dang et al. (2013) indicate that repo haircuts are a puzzle, since finance theory (Engle & 
Mistry, 2014; Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, Luo, & Rebelo, 2016) shows that risk of a 
financial instrument is priced. Therefore, the collateral value should not be discounted but 
left to reflect the market prices. The use of haircuts is problematic since haircuts are not 
uniform to all the dealers in the money market, even in a situation where different 
counterparties use the same type of collateral (Corrigan & De Terán, 2007). Moreover, 
the repo haircut data for each bank are inaccessible in an ideal world (Bai et al., 2016).  
P
Dm 1
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In this study, it was realised that in South Africa and in most of the world, haircut data are 
inaccessible since they constitutes proprietary information and are part of the competitive 
strategies of the bank. However, there is abundant practical finance literature (Sarr and 
Lybek, 2002; Goyenko et al., 2009; Charoenwong, Chong & Yang, 2014; Holden, 
Jacobsen & Subrahmanyam, 2014; Tsuchida, Watanabe & Yoshiba, 2016) on liquidity 
that can be utilised when setting asset liquidity weights. Instead of using asset price 
haircuts, in this study, bank stock spread was used to capture the elasticity of liquidity as 
reflected by the spread on bank stock prices. Stock price volatility is argued to be a good 
representative of uncertainty in the stock market (Smith, 2012). Bank stock volatility 
reflects the stock market volatility, although we need a proxy that is a good representative 
of the entire capital market (Chaibi & Ciupac-Ulici, 2014).  
However, it has been proved that fixed income and stock markets are highly correlated 
(Liu, 2016). Therefore, the bank stock spread volatility can provide particularly informative 
evidence on the price fluctuations in the securities market. The empirically computed 
liquidity weight captures the time-varying liquidity conditions that most of the studies done 
so far did not estimate. In the current study, the liquidity index (LIX) (Danyliv, Bland, & 
Nicholass, 2014) was incorporated in the computation of assets liquidity weight. The 
liquidity index takes into account both the price range and volume traded. Using selected 
bank stock prices over the period under investigation, the asset liquidity weight was 
computed as follows  
𝑚 = [1 −
1
𝐿𝐼𝑋𝑡
] 𝜋 ,               (5.9) 
where 
1
𝐿𝐼𝑋𝑡
 is the inverse of the LIX. The calculated weight is adjusted by 𝜋 which is the 
coefficient allocated to the assets depending on the level of liquidity. The asset weights 
were computed in the similar way as indicated Bai et al. (2016) and the assets took the 
weights between 0 and 1, implying that assets liquidity weights for these assets were also 
set to 0 <  𝜆𝑡𝐴𝑘 < 1. 
In this section, we have discussed the assets weights, the next section discusses the 
liquidity weights. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) showed that market liquidity is 
dependent on the demand from traders, of which this demand is dependent on the trader’s 
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funding position. More so, according to Bai et al. (2016), the main driver of LMI is the 
funding liquidity. The next section discusses the liquidity weights on the liability side of 
the LMI.  
5.2.4.2 Liability-side liquidity weights  
Liability-side liquidity is synonymous with funding liquidity, which is defined by the IMF 
(2008), Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009), and the BCBS (2010), Brunnermeier et al. 
(2013), as the ability of the organisation to settle its obligations as they fall due. The 
weights of liability-side liquidity is based on computation proposed by Brunnermeier et al. 
(2012) in which they model access to liquidity as following a Poisson process (Meeker, 
Hahn & Escobar, 2017). There is a probability θ that represents the ability of an institution 
to raise capital in any given day (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). Then, the LMI is based on 
the expected liquidity outflow going forward. This leads to the following function: 
 1,0),( sf , which measures the probability that the firm is unable to access free liquidity 
by date s, where s = 1 corresponds to one day and s = 30 to corresponds to thirty days. 
The probability is decreasing in s at a decay rate governed by the parameter θ. Then, 
liability-side liquidity weight for a given contract ', kt L with maturity s is proportional to
),( sf . See in this regard Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) and Legroux, Rahmouni-
Rousseau, Szczerbowicz, and Valla (2017). In times of crisis, the liquidity stress is likely 
to last longer so that θ is smaller and ),( sf  becomes bigger, in such periods, the ', kt L
is expected to be lower. Bai et al. (2016) modulate the asymptotic liquidity weight by 
transforming the funding liquidity factor that captures variation in θ, and the resulting 
function is as follows:  
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  ,         (5.10) 
where 
'k
L  is the asymptotic liquidity weight and tFL  is the state-dependent funding factor 
and 
'k
L controls the exposure of an underlying debt entity to the funding constraint in the 
financial market. Bai et al. (2016) indicate that there is no uniformly accepted proxy for 
liquidity risk, so there is also no uniformly accepted candidate to measure tFL . It was the 
aim of this research to determine the appropriate measure for tFL empirically. Smith 
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(2010) documented the fact that most liquidity measures or proxies are contaminated with 
credit risk.  
To capture to feedback between LMI and liquidity stress, Bai et al. (2016) and Legroux et 
al. (2017) define the endogenous funding liquidity factor as a combination of its market 
price proxy and the aggregate LMI resulting in the following equation: 
)()1( ttt LMITOISFL   ,         (5.11) 
where   is a scaling parameter that scales down the magnitude of aggregate LMI to a 
similar level of spread between treasury bills and the OIS-TBill spread. Instead of using 
OIS–TBill spread in the present study, the spread between the treasury bills rate and the 
South African benchmark overnight rate (SABOR) was used. This measure, according to 
Nagel (2014), measures the time variation of a money market instrument accurately. In 
this study, the liability weights were captured empirically through the modification of the 
state-dependent funding factor and produced 5.12.  
𝐹𝐿𝑡 = [1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑡]𝜋
′ ,          (5.12)  
where 𝜋′ is the coefficient allocated to the liability depending on the level of liquidity. When 
substituting for liquidity sensitivity weights and aggregate bank level LMI and then 
linearising the exponential term, the closed-form solution for the aggregate LMI was as 
follows:  













i k
LLk
i
t
tLLLk
k
i
t
itkk
k
i
t
i
t
kk
kkk
Lx
STBSLx
LIX
x
MLMI
'
''
'
'''
)1(,1
)1()1(,)
1
1(, '
',


  (5.13) 
It was found in the present study that the aggregate measure of liquidity (LMI) was centred 
on the sensitivity of the weights of assets and liabilities. Bai et al. (2016) admit that, in 
their attempt to come up with empirically robust LMI weights attached to assets and 
liabilities, they were heavily dependent on their judgement than empirical evidence. In 
particular, the constant scales assigned to different asset categories were ad hoc. 
Therefore, there is a definite need for more empirical work to improve the liquidity weights 
and hence the liquidity measure. In this study, the bank stock market spreads were used 
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to capture the liquidity conditions of assets. Consistent with literature and other empirical 
studies, the SABOR–Treasury bill spread (STBS) was used to capture the elasticity of 
liabilities due to liquidity shocks.  
According Bai et al. (2016), for liquidity to be useful in the context of macro-prudential, 
the measure should be in a position to placate three fundamentals. These should namely 
be –  
 in a position to be aggregated so that it can capture the liquidity condition of the 
whole banking sector quantitatively;  
 useful at bank level as it should point out the institutions that are more susceptible 
to liquidity shocks; and 
 connected to time variation as liquidity conditions vary through time.  
The MLMI satisfies all the above conditions. Section 5.3.7 discusses the independent 
variables.  
5.3.5 Micro- and macro-economic independent variables 
 
The present study investigated both macro-economic and bank-specific variables in order 
to establish the relationship between the liquidity dependent variable and its 
determinants. The determinants of bank liquidity are broadly classified into bank-specific 
and external determinants. Bank-specific determinants are factors that are mainly 
influenced by a bank management decisions and the primary policy goals of banks. These 
determinants include profitability, deposits, capital ratio, non-performing loans, loan 
growth and bank size. On the other hand, the external determinants comprise mainly the 
macro-economic factors, namely interest rates, inflation, GDP and government debt. 
Bank concentration is also used while acknowledging the fact that there are other factors 
of bank liquidity in South Africa, such as market sector concentration and bank’ gearing 
ratios. In Table 5.3, a summary of the independent variables as well as their proxies is 
reflected.  
5.3.5.1 Profit variables 
In this study, profitability of a bank was considered one of the main determinants of 
liquidity. Profit was measured in two ways in this study, i.e. as return on assets and as 
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return on equity. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by earnings before interest and 
tax divided by total assets, whereas return on equity (ROE) is calculated by dividing net 
profit by total equity (Marozva, 2012). In this study, the profitability of a bank was 
considered an endogenous factor. Ideally, the higher the profitability of a bank, all other 
things being equal, the higher the bank liquidity. As the bank is profitable, the higher its 
ability to fund its obligations, the higher the value of collateral in case the bank needs to 
raise funds to cover its short-term deficit. It is expected that banks, which are profitable, 
are more stable and therefore they can access funds on the interbank market more easily 
than unprofitable banks.  
Table 5.3 Summary of independent variables and proxies 
Independent 
variables 
Proxies and definitions Proxies by Expected sign 
of coefficient 
Lagged liquidity ratio 
 
Liquidity buffers should be persistent 
over time 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999) 
Positive  
Profit ROA – is calculated as the operating 
profit divided by total assets. 
ROE – is calculated as net profit over 
total equity  
Aspachs et al. (2005); 
Bonner, Van Lelyveld and 
Zymek (2015) 
 
Positive/negative  
Deposits  Deposits are defined as total retail 
deposits over total assets 
Bonner et al. (2014) Positive  
Capital ratio (CR) CR – is reflected by equity as 
percentage of total assets 
Tseganesh (2012); Choon 
et al. (2013); Vodová 
(2013a); Bonner et al. 
(2014)  
Positive/negative 
Size of bank Size – the natural logarithm of total 
assets of the bank 
Poorman and Blake, 
(2005); Pasiouras et al. 
(2006); Shen et al. (2010); 
Tseganesh (2012);  
Negative/ Positive 
Loan growth (LG) LG – the expansion or contraction of 
the loan portfolio of a bank 
Cornett et al. (2010); 
Vodová (2012)  
Negative 
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Non-performing loans 
(NPL) 
NPL – loans that are outstanding both 
in principal and interest for a long time 
contrary to the terms and conditions in 
the loan contract 
Vodová (2013b); Choon et 
al. (2013); Audo (2014) 
Negative 
External funding 
dependence (EFD) 
EFD – the ratio of external funding to 
total liabilities 
Munteanu (2012) Positive 
Global financial crisis A Dummy variable is used to capture 
the effects of the global financial crisis 
1=For years 2007–2009. This was the 
period of the global financial crisis.  
0=all other years under investigation.  
Berrospide (2012) Negative  
Economic growth 
measured by Gross 
domestic product 
(GDP) 
GDP: Growth rate of real domestic 
product 
Tseganesh (2012); Vodová 
(2012); Choon et al. (2013) 
Negative  
Interest rate  Interbank lending rate Lucchetta (2007) Negative 
 
 
5.3.5.2 External funding dependence 
There is need for assessing the reliance of banks on external sources of funding besides 
retail deposits or wholesale funding as this has implications on the probability of the bank 
facing liquidity risk. The study used ratio of external funding to total liabilities as a proxy 
of the external funding dependence (EFD). External funding is the sum of short-term 
liabilities, which include mainly money market funding (Munteanu, 2012). This is in line 
with Shen et al. (2009) who also considered EFD one of the causes of liquidity risk and 
they also used the ratio of external funding to total liabilities to represent this dependence. 
Saunders and Cornett (2006) confirm that banks primarily rely on money market funding 
instead of demand deposits and long-term funding to fund loans. Shen et al. (2009) show 
that banks that rely on wholesale funding and borrowing from open market operations 
instead of core deposits to fund their loan book and other day-to-day operations have a 
higher probability of facing liquidity problems than banks that rely mainly on core deposits 
and less on wholesale funding and money market borrowings. Therefore, the former 
117 
 
category of banks may face liquidity problems in the short run and long run as they borrow 
a significant amount on the money market. The EFD is expected to be negatively related 
to the bank liquidity buffer (Munteanu, 2012). Viewing the relationship from another angle, 
it is thus obvious that EFD and bank liquidity risk are positively related.  
5.3.5.3 Size of the bank 
In this study, log total assets is used as the proxy of bank size. Total assets represents 
well the bank’s general capacity to undertake its intermediary function (Shen et al. 2010). 
The size of a bank, as measured by its total assets, positively contributes to the bank’s 
liquidity levels through the implicit guarantee that bigger banks are more stable as 
compared to smaller banks. The larger the bank the better its ability to mobilise funds in 
open market operations and the lower the cost of funds, as such bank is deemed to have 
high creditworthy. On the other hand, if the bank becomes too large this can affect its 
operations negatively because of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. This would require 
banks of this nature to hold more liquid assets as compared to their counterparties, which 
implies that the relationship between bank size and liquidity is not linear as the 
relationship should show whether a bank is enjoying economies of scale or suffering from 
diseconomies of scale (Tseganesh, 2012);. In a bid to capture the non-linearity of this 
relationship, the study squared the total assets. Shen et al. (2009) found that there is a 
non-linear relationship between liquidity risk and the size of a bank. They realised that 
indeed liquidity risk was positively related to the size of a bank. However, above a certain 
level of bank size, the relationship was negative. 
Primarily, the relationship between bank size and the bank liquidity buffer is assumed to 
be negative because the bigger the bank the better its ability and capacity to venture into 
risky speculative adventures, and more so, it can also invest in long-term risk assets. A 
bigger bank can get funding easily when it has shortage because of a larger clientele 
base and huge branch networks in some cases. Since banks have huge asset bases, 
they can use these assets as collateral to borrow more funds at lower cost in times of 
need (Lucchetta, 2007. Empirical studies (e.g. Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Steffen, 
Hackethal, & Tyrell, 2010) showed that the size of a bank has a negative relationship with 
liquidity buffers. Large banks have the capacity to hold proportionally fewer liquid assets 
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than small banks. Contrary to what many scholars found, Tseganesh (2012) and 
Pasiouras et al. (2006) argue for a positive relationship between bank liquidity levels and 
bank size. Their arguments are based on the fact that, as the bank size increases, this is 
followed by growth in branch network. As bank branch network increases, the bank is 
required to hold a significant level of liquid assets in order to meet a higher demand of 
loans and also unpredictable withdrawals. Thus, Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2008) show 
that a bank’s level of liquidity buffers is dependent on the scale and scope economies, 
which are correlated to such bank’s efficiency and competitiveness.  
5.3.5.4 Capital ratio 
The capital ratio is measured by: equity as percentage of total assets. The bank capital 
comprises ordinary shares, retained earnings, capital and contingency reserves (Miles, 
Yang, & Marcheggiano, 2013). The proxy for capital adequacy in this study was in line 
with the proxy used by Gorton and Winton (2000) and Berger and Bouwman (2009). The 
capital ratio (Miles et al., 2013) represent a comprehensive measure of a bank’s overall 
ability to finance relatively illiquid assets with relatively long-term equity funding (Bonner 
et al., 2014). There are two conflicting theories regarding the relationship between liquidity 
and capital ratios. According to the financial fragility–crowding out hypothesis, we expect 
a negative relationship between capital and liquidity (Kim & Sohn, 2017). Nigist (2015) 
confirms that the financial fragility-liquidity structure advocates for lower capital and higher 
liquidity. On the other hand, higher capital ratios can result in lower liquidity creation due 
to crowding out of deposits. Gorton and Winton (2000) point out that equity capital 
provides less liquidity hedge than core deposits of a bank. Thus, their study indicates that 
higher capital ratios are associated with shifting of the investors’ investments from highly 
liquid deposits to illiquid bank capital, thereby minimising the general liquidity for 
investors. Under the risk absorption theory (Fungáčová et al., 2017), capital is assumed 
to be positively related to bank liquidity. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the premises 
of the risk absorption theory.  
However, Berger and Bouwman (2009) found mixed results. They found a negative 
relationship between capital and liquidity for small banks, and a positive relationship for 
larger banks. They gave proof that high capital ratios may be detrimental to liquidity 
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creation, and claim that most regulatory authorities do not take this into account when 
determining capital adequacy ratios. Horváth (2012) observed a strong positive 
relationship between liquidity creation and capital ratios – mainly for larger banks up until 
the financial crisis. Capital was found to negatively Granger-cause liquidity creation for 
mainly small banks (Horváth, 2014). Oino (2014) examined the relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation and found a positive relationship, which was a partial 
confirmation of the results obtained by Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Horváth (2012). 
Studies conducted by Tseganesh (2012), Vodová (2012), Choon et al. (2013), Vodová 
(2013a), and Laurine (2013) confirmed that there is a negative relationship between 
liquidity and capital ratios moreover this relationship is significant.  
5.3.5.5 Loan growth  
The loan growth rate is the percentage increase or percentage decrease of a bank’s loan 
portfolio. The banks’ loan portfolio is characteristically the principal business, largest 
asset and the dominant source of revenue (Ongore & Kusa, 2013). This is therefore one 
of the biggest sources of risk to a bank’s soundness and safety (Paligorova & Santos, 
2017). The loan portfolio is naturally not liquid. An increase in the loan portfolio typically 
means a decrease in liquid assets and an increase in long-term illiquid asset (Cornett et 
al., 2010). The number of liquid assets held by banks is dependent on the level of loan 
demand, which is the premise on which the loan book grows (Pilbeam 2005, p. 42). 
Theoretically, when loan growth rate decreases, the bank naturally ends up holding more 
short-term liquid assets, whereas if the demand for loans increases, the banks will have 
to respond to this by issuing more loans thereby holding fewer short-term liquid assets 
(Cornett et al., 2010). The switch from liquid assets to illiquid assets is part of the 
operations of banks as they are profit-making organisations and loan portfolios provide 
higher return. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between bank liquidity and 
loan growth rate. In an empirical study carried out by Aspachs et al. (2005), there was a 
negative relationship between loan growth and bank liquidity holding.  
 
5.3.5.6 Interest rates 
The interbank lending rate was used as a proxy for interest rates. Ideally, the interbank 
lending rate signifies the opportunity cost of not keeping liquid assets to meet obligations 
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as they are due and also issue out loans as they are demanded. When investigating the 
relationship between liquidity and interest rates, Agénor et al. (2004) found that banks’ 
level of liquid assets buffer is positively related to the volatility of interest rate. According 
to Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984), the level of liquid assets kept by banks 
is said to dependent on what banks lose (the opportunity cost) by holding on to liquid 
assets. Interest rates measure the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets, meaning that 
interest rates have a negative relationship with liquidity. 
Lucchetta (2007) showed that interest rates have a significant influence on banks when 
making decisions on asset allocations. Lucchetta’s (2007) results indicate that interest 
rates as measured by interbank interest rate are positively related to banks’ liquid asset 
buffers, and that the decision by banks to extend loans in the interbank market is 
dependent on the level of interest rates. This argument is based on the fact that lending 
or borrowing is based on the price of liquidity, which in turn depends on the demand and 
supply of loanable funds and the interbank borrowing rate (Tsiang, 2014). Rauch et al. 
(2010) using an increase in interest rates as a proxy for tight monetary policy, pointed out 
that bank liquidity is negatively related to interest rates.  
5.3.5.7 Economic growth  
The growth rate of real domestic product was used as proxy for economic growth in line 
with other researchers. This represents the overall economic progress of a country 
(Tsaganesh, 2012). Ideally, when the economy is progressing, the GDP will be growing, 
and this leads to banks increasing their liquidity buffers because during economic 
prosperity, the demand for loans tends to increase. The lending activity of banks tend to 
increase with the growth of GDP. This confirms a positive relationship between banks’ 
liquidity buffers and economic growth. Moore (2010) found a positive relationship between 
bank liquidity and the business cycle. On the contrary other scholars (Choon et al., 2013; 
Audo, 2014) found a  negative relationship between economic growth and level of liquid 
assets the bank keeps as buffer. The negative relationship implies that the in times of 
economic down turn, banks tend to hold on to more liquid assets. 
The above argument is elaborated on by Aspachs et al. (2005) who argue that banks 
have a tendency to hoard cash and cash equivalent assets during periods of economic 
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recession or depression, in times when business opportunities are not promising. Banks 
reduce their liquid asset holding during economic expansion when business is booming 
and lending opportunities pick up.  
In summary, we expect that an increase in economic growth will result in banks reducing 
their liquid assets as they issue more loans. Nevertheless, economic agents are reluctant 
to save during periods of economic growth; thus, banks get very few deposits from their 
clients in periods of economic expansion, subsequently reducing their liquid asset buffers. 
5.4 Econometric model specification 
As a preliminary to the detailed empirical analysis, the study presents the descriptive 
statistical analysis of all the variables under investigation. The proxies for these variables 
were presented in Table 5.3. The study focused on investigating the determinants of the 
traditional standard liquidity measures, the Basel III liquidity measures and the LMI. The 
study performed an empirical assessment of the relationships between the three liquidity 
measures as mentioned and their determinants using panel data from 12 selected banks 
in South Africa. This methodology had some similarities to other earlier studies (e.g. 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011; Vodová , 2013a; Bonner, Van Lelyveld, & 
Zymek, 2015), which examined the determinants of liquidity, although they used data 
drawn from different markets and economies. These studies used traditional measures 
of liquidity. However, in this research, three measures of liquidity – including the new 
measure that properly incorporates the liquidity spirals, i.e. the LMI – were used. The 
major advantage of this study was that it was possible to compare the determinants of 
liquidity across the three categories of liquidity. The data used in this sample of South 
African Banks was readily available from published financial statements and BA900 forms 
filed by banks to the central bank. Since all the banks were in South Africa, policy 
difference between countries was not a problem. Nevertheless, this study adopted a 
panel data analysis approach primarily employing the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) model. This approach meant that the study could account for whether there were 
bank-specific variations or time-specific variations. 
Baltagi (2008), in a discussion of the pros and cons of the usage of panel data, indicates 
that panel data analysis has several benefits. Since panel data relates to banks (N), over 
a period of time (T), there is a likelihood of heterogeneity in these banks. The advantage 
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of panel data is that it assumes that banks which are being investigated are 
heterogeneous, while cross-sectional and times-series studies do not control for 
heterogeneity; therefore, they tend to report results that are biased (Hsiao, 2003). In a 
macro panel setup, Baltagi (2008) shows that, if heterogeneity is ignored, i.e. the non-
controlling of the individual institution specific variables, this could result in the 
misspecification of the model. Other advantage of panel data are that panel data improves 
the availability of more informative data implying more variability and less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Hurlin, 2004; Hurlin 
& Venet, 2008). With the pooled panel model, the number of observations increases 
significantly as compared to time-series data and cross-section data (Baltagi, 2008). The 
main criticism of panel data is that studies that use lengthy time series on countries, but 
do not consider the effect of cross-country dependence, often result in poor fit, 
misspecification bias and false inferences being drawn (Baltagi, 2008). 
In this study of the determinants of liquidity, the study had to decide whether to use a 
fixed effects model (FEM) or a random effects model (REM). In a panel data model, the 
individual effect units can be modelled as either random effects or fixed effects. There is 
still a debate on the determination of the appropriateness of whether to use fixed effects 
(FE) or random effects (RE) estimators (Baltagi, Bresson, & Pirotte, 2003). In this study, 
the study employed Hausman’s (1978) estimation test to decide which model to use.  
5.4.1 The generalised method of moments (GMM) 
The main estimation used in this study was the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). 
The generic GMM dynamic model has the following form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,         (5.14) 
where – 
 the variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 represent one of the liquidity measures for bank i in time t;  
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of independent variables for bank i in time t, to be more precise, 
they represent the bank-specific variable and macro-economic variables;  
 𝛼 is the slope of the lagged liquidity variable;  
 𝛽 is the elasticity of the explanatory variables, i.e. slope of variables;  
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 𝜇𝑖 denotes fixed effects in bank I;  
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term; and  
 the subscript i denotes the cross-section and t represents the time-series 
dimension. 
According to earlier studies, to remove bank-specific effects, the first difference of the 
GMM model above is presented as follows: 
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  (1 − α)∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (5.15) 
However, the differenced model is not efficient as it does not eliminate the correlation 
between the error component and the lagged variables because 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 remain 
correlated. Consequently, the study also ran the model using the GMM estimation 
technique with lagged values of the regressors as instruments. The study employed the 
one-step GMM system estimation approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) with level and lagged values of the variables being used as instruments. 
The one-step GMM system estimation approach is assumed an improvement from 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimation technique. A dynamic estimation model is 
assumed, as this is consistent with Opler et al. (1999) who indicate that the current 
liquidity position depend on the previous period liquidity position. Thus, lagged liquidity 
independent variables are persistent over time 
For the empirical estimation, the relationship between the liquidity and the independent 
variables of bank-specific factors, and macro-economic factors can be expressed 
mathematically in equations 5.16 through 5.19. 
The objective to examine the key determinants of the modified liquidity mismatch indices 
in selected South African banks was achieved by regressing the BLMI and the ALMI 
against their determinants in 5.16 and 5.17.  
 
∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (5.16) 
∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5.17) 
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The objective to examine the key determinants of the determinants of Basel III liquidity 
measures and other standard traditional liquidity measures was achieved by regressing 
the Basel III and other standard traditional liquidity measures against their determinants 
in 5.18 and 5.19.  
 
∆𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
              (5.18) 
∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (5.19) 
Where-   
𝑩𝑳𝑴𝑰𝒕 is the bank liquidity mismatch index for bank i in time t, 
𝑨𝑳𝑴𝑰𝒕 is the aggregate liquidity mismatch index for all banks at time t, 
𝑺𝑳𝑴𝒕  is the standard liquidity measure for bank i in time t, 
𝑩𝑳𝑴𝒕  is the Basel III liquidity measure for bank i in time t, 
𝑩𝑺𝑭𝒊𝒕 is the vector of bank-specific explanatory variables for bank i in time t, 
𝑴𝑬𝑭𝒊𝒕 is the vector of macro-economic explanatory variables for bank i in time t, 
𝜶  is an auto-regression coefficient, 
𝜷  is the coefficient which represents the sensitivity of independent variables, 
𝝐𝒊𝒕 is the error term. 
𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊𝒕 denotes the dummy variable for the existence of crisis.  
Further, the regression between the MLMI and bank performance was analysed, where 
return on assets (ROA) was the regressant (dependent variable) while the BLMI and ALMI 
were part of the regressors in the linear models. For the empirical estimation, the 
relationship between the ROA and the newly developed liquidity measures were 
expressed in 5.20 and 5.21. This was done to achieve the objective to analyse the BLMI 
and ALMI as determinants of bank performance 
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∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = (𝜙 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆2 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆3 ∑ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝜆4 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡           (5.20) 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = (𝜙 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1 ∑ ∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆2 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆3 ∑ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝜆4 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡           (5.21) 
Where - 
  
𝑩𝑳𝑴𝑰𝒕 is the bank liquidity mismatch index for bank i in time t, 
𝑨𝑳𝑴𝑰𝒕 is the aggregate liquidity mismatch index for all banks in time t, 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕  is the interest margin for bank i in time t, 
𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕  is the non-performing loans a proxy for credit risk for bank i in time t, 
𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 is the capital ratio for bank i in time t, 
𝜙  is an auto-regression coefficient, 
𝝀 is coefficient which represents the sensitivity of independent variables, 
𝝁𝒊𝒕 is the error term. 
𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊𝒕 denotes the dummy variable for the existence of crisis and the ownership   
structure of the bank 
Although there is a plethora of literature on liquidity and bank profitability indicating that 
liquidity is one of the derivers of bank performance, most of these theoretical models and 
empirical models provide detail on how asset liquidity affects bank returns. However, 
there is a need to empirically test the effect of liquidity measures that account for both 
assets and liabilities. The MLMI is a good example and this was put into perspective and 
tested empirically.  
5.5 Chapter summary and conclusion  
The main objective of this chapter was to justify the identified most appropriate approach 
and research design philosophically. The main approach and methodologies employed 
in this study were comprehensively expounded. This discussion included connecting the 
research objectives, questions and hypotheses to the specified empirical models. The 
estimation models were clarified as groundwork to test the relationships between bank 
liquidity and its regressors using specified models.  
In summary, the first models related to finding the deterministic relationship between bank 
liquidity and bank-specific and industry-specific macro-economic variables. The GMM 
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model was adopted. Hausman specification test were also carried out to determine the 
appropriate model between the REM and the FEM. The estimation models were run 
through the Stata software. The next chapter presents the results of the empirical 
analysis, as it related to panel data investigations of the selected South African banks. 
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CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of applying research techniques discussed in Chapter 
5. The research techniques were used to test the liquidity measures empirically against 
their determinants. The study carried out the data analysis, and presents the empirical 
results here and discusses them. Specifically, the modified LMI was constructed at bank 
level and aggregate level. The constructed liquidity mismatch indices were subsequently 
tested empirically by regressing them against the bank-specific factors as well as macro-
economic factors. Other conventional liquidity measures and the Basel III liquidity 
measures were also tested in a bid to validate the bank liquidity mismatch index (BLMI) 
and the aggregate liquidity mismatch index (ALMI).  
The main aim of this study was to test the BLMI and the ALMI empirically. These new 
liquidity measures, and the Basel III liquidity measures, capture both the funding liquidity 
risk and the market liquidity risk. Furthermore, they are in line with the fact that the more 
each bank stocks many liquid assets, the lower the probability that individual banks will 
face some liquidity problems. However, the IMF (2011) argues that the Basel III liquidity 
measures fail to address the additional risk of simultaneous shortfalls that arise from the 
nexus of various financial institutions across the universe of financial markets. Therefore, 
IMF (2011) recommend the development of a macro-prudential liquidity measure that 
captures the liquidity spirals, which can be used to mitigate systemic liquidity risks. In this 
study, we constructed the ALMI as a new macro-prudential liquidity measure.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 presents a discussion of the descriptive 
statistics of the variables under investigation. The construction of the BLMI and the ALMI 
is explained and presented in Section 6.3. Pre-test diagnostics are reported in Section 
6.4. In Section 6.5, the empirical results from regressing the eight liquidity measures 
against their determinants are presented. As part of robust checks and validation of the 
new measure of liquidity, testing of the newly constructed BLMI and ALMI are reported in 
Section 6.6 as one of the regressors of the ROA. Finally, the summary to conclude the 
chapter is presented in Section 6.7. 
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6.2 Data and descriptive statistics  
In this section, we discuss the data sources and the sample used in the current study. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics are discussed briefly in the same section.  
6.2.1 Data 
Most of the data used in this research were acquired from the SARB in the form of macro-
economic variables and the BA900 returns of South African registered banks. The BA900 
returns are balance sheets of individual banks, which should be filed by the central bank 
supervision department every month. Other bank-specific information was acquired 
directly from the annual financial statements of the banks analysed in this thesis. The 
data used consisted of a sample of 12 banks (names outlined in Chapter 5), and these 
were observed from 2005 to 2015. In some cases, weekly or monthly data were used and 
then transformed to the yearly equivalent. The study opted for a short panel data analysis 
due to limitation to the availability of data for some of the banks. Monthly data for the 
construction of liquidity measures were available, nevertheless only yearly data were 
available for the regressors. A balanced panel data was used for the period under 
observation.  
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics for the annual panel data 
In this section, the summary statistics of the variables used in the estimations for the 
entire sample of the banks were considered in this research. Eight liquidity measures 
were used in this study, and using pooled estimations, the descriptive statistics for the 
liquidity measures are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for liquidity variables in the pooled estimation 
model  
Variable Obs Mean SD Minimum–Maximum 
L1 132 0.91   0.12   0.28–0.99 
L2 132 1.42 0.31   0.82–2.74 
L3 132 0.75   0.12 0.24–0.92 
L4 132 1.17   0.26   0.65–2.30 
LCR 132 7.32   156.16  -313.15 – 1733.28 
NSFR 132 1.04   0.23  0.86–2.52 
BLMI 132 0.15   0.11 0.09–0.47 
ALMI 132 0.16   0.05   0.06– 0.21 
Notes: Obs = Number of observations; SD = Standard deviation  
Source: Author’s computation 
From the summary of descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, the total observations for each 
liquidity (dependent) variable were 132. The descriptive statistics were drawn from the 
calculated standard liquidity measures (L1, L2, L3, & L4), the Basel III liquidity measures 
(LCR & NSFR), and the MLMI measures (BLMI & ALMI).  
The data showed that the average liquid assets to total assets ratio was close to 1, an 
indication that the greater portion of a bank’s balance sheet is made up of liquid assets. 
The mean for the L1 liquidity measure was 0.91 for the period under review, and the SD 
was 0.12. The minimum liquid assets to total ratio was 0.28, while the maximum was 0.99. 
This shows that some of the banks can hold as little as 28% of their balance sheet in the 
form of liquid assets while on the other extreme end, banks could have 99% of their assets 
as liquid.  
With regard to liquid assets to deposits plus short-term borrowings ratio, it was observed 
that the average was 1.42, and the SD was 0.31. On average, banks keep a higher level 
of liquid assets as compared to current liabilities. As the ratio is above 1, this was an 
indication that banks generally will be able to pay for their obligations as they fall due. 
Therefore, it was concluded that banks in South Africa, banks are minimally vulnerable to 
changes of shocks in different forms of funding. The minimum for the L2 liquidity measure 
was 0.82 while the maximum was 2.73. The lowest ratio of 0.82 shows that, at the time 
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of this research, banks were prepared to take the risk of keeping fewer liquid assets 
relative to short-term liabilities probably because in time of shocks they may have a better 
borrowing capacity and thereby have to rely on interbank or open market operation 
borrowings.  
The descriptive statistics indicated that, for the period under review, the mean of loans to 
total assets ratio was 0.75. Banks on average hold 75% of their assets in the form of 
loans. This is expected in the banking sector since loan issuance is the core business of 
commercial banks. The SD for L3 was 0.12, the minimum ratio was 0.24 and the 
maximum standing was 0.92. There was a significant difference between the minimum 
and the maximum values and an indication that banks followed different business models 
where other banks could afford to loan out almost 92% of their assets while other had to 
be content with 24%. Since the loans to total assets ratio showed the proportion of loans 
relative to total assets, this indicated the portion of assets of the bank that were tied up in 
illiquid loan assets, and the lower the ratio the more attractive the bank is with regard to 
this liquidity measure.  
The loans to customers and short-term funding ratio indicated in general the proportion 
of banks’ illiquid assets to liquid liabilities. The mean of 1.17 indicated the South African 
banks on average could afford to fund the illiquid loans with short-term liquid liabilities. 
Kosmidou (2008) argues that the higher the proportion of loans relative to short-term 
funding, the more illiquid the bank is and therefore the higher its vulnerability to liquidity 
shocks.  
The averages LCR and NSRF for the period under review were 7.32 and 1.04, 
respectively. The average LCR ratio for the banks showed that banks held a huge portion 
of high-quality liquidity assets even when the funding gap was anticipated to be positive. 
However, some banks were risk-averse as they held more than 333% HQLA when they 
expect a negative gap in their funding structures. On the other hand, banks may hoard a 
huge volume of high-quality assets even when they look forward to a favourable funding 
position.  
The average BLMI as a ratio of total assets of the bank was 0.15 and as expected was 
very close the ALMI ratio, which was 0.16. The liquidity mismatch index is an index that 
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captures the funding and assets liquidity of the bank. The LMI measures the mismatch 
between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities (Bai et al., 
2014). The higher the ratio the healthier is the bank and vice versa. According to 
Brunnermeier et al. (2013), the LMI is a liquidity measure that is important as a key 
response indicator as it can help in detecting the build-up of systemic risk before crisis. 
The variance for BLMI is almost four times that that for the ALMI, an indication of a well-
diversified portfolio when it comes to ALMI.  
The liquidity measures discussed here were then regressed against the following set of 
independent variables:  
 the capital ratio (CR) is measured by equity as a percentage of total assets;  
 deposits (Dep) are defined as total retail deposits over total assets;  
 size is the natural logarithm of total assets of the bank;  
 loan growth (LG) is the expansion or contraction of a bank’s loan portfolio;  
 non-performing loans (NPL) are loans that are outstanding both in principal and 
interest for a long time contrary to the terms and conditions in the loan contract;  
 EFD is the ratio of external funding to total liabilities,  
 economic growth measured by GDP is the growth rate of the real domestic 
product;  
 interest rate is represented by the interbank lending rate(ILR);  
 inflation, i.e. the consumer price index (CPI) is the increase in the general price of 
goods and services, over a period of time, in an economy;  
 profits (ROA) are calculated as the operating profit divided by total assets; and 
 funding cost (FC) is equal to total interest expense divided by total liabilities.  
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Table 6.2presents the descriptive statistics applicable to the regressors.  
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics for independent variables in the pooled estimation 
model 
Variable Obs Mean SD Minimum–Maximum 
CR 132 0.15   0.12   0.04–0.64 
Dep 132 0.66   0.14   0.32–0.90 
SIZE 132 17.19   2.59   12.94–20.96 
LG 132 1.19   0.23   0.65–2.01 
NPL 132 -0.01   0.03  -0.16–0.01 
EFD 132 0.82   0.12   0.48–0.99 
GDP 132 0.03   0.02    -0.02 –0.06 
IBLR 132 0.07   0.02     0.05–0.11 
FC 132 -0.04   0.03  -0.18– -0.00 
CPI 132 0.06   0.02      0.03–0.12 
ROA 132 0.03   0.03    0.00–0.19 
Notes: Obs = Number of observations; SD = Standard deviation  
Source: Author’s computation 
In this section, we discuss descriptive statistics for few variables as most of the variables 
here are presented in ratio format and may not provide meaningful information. A 
summary statistics for independent variables in Table 6.2 revealed that South African 
banks on average had a capital ratio of 14.96% at the time of this research. This shows 
that the banking sector was adequately capitalised over the period of investigation. The 
statistics also indicate that, over the period of investigation, there were banks that were 
poorly capitalised as the minimum of 3.72% indicates. However, most of the capital ratio 
of the banks was around the mean as the SD was 11.91%. From Table 6.2, it is clear that 
the bank loans in South Africa on average grew by 119% from 2005 to 2015. This is 
significant growth, which is in line with the increase in bank size as indicated by growth in 
asset base. The South African economy grew by 2.88% on average over the period 
between 2005 and 2015 while the inflation rate was 5.9% on average over the same 
period. Bank performance as measured by ROA was lower than the rate at which prices 
were increasing. Bank ROA were 3% on average although some of the banks recorded 
as high as 19.21% and others as low as 0.00%.  
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The standard, Basel III and MLMI liquidity measures, were regressed against the 
regressors presented in Table 6.2. The next section discusses the construction of the 
new liquidity measures, namely the BLMI and the ALMI.  
6.3 Construction of the MLMI 
The main purpose for carrying out this research was to investigate the liquidity risk 
embedded in the asset–liability mismatches of banks empirically. This was motivated by 
the bank failures during and after the crisis of 2007–2009. These failures prompted banks 
across the world to realise the significance of liquidity risk management. Although liquidity 
risk may cause bank failures, Davis (2008) indicates that banks can protect themselves 
against liquidity risk. Therefore, on the asset side, banks can hold a significant proportion 
of liquid assets. Banks can use cash immediately to settle current obligations or liquidity 
needs, while high-quality assets, e.g. treasury bills and government bonds, can be used 
readily as collateral when borrowing. On the liability side, banks need to have diverse 
sources of finance to minimise the effect of liquidity risk. Inasmuch as a bank can dispose 
of its current assets to obtain cash, just having a significant portion of current assets 
reduces the bank’s liquidity risk.  
An understanding of liquidity risk is achieved through examination of determinants of 
liquidity. The determinants of liquidity are tested on how and to what extent they influence 
Basel III liquidity measures, other traditional liquidity measures and the new liquidity 
measure (MLMI). In this study, an analysis of Basel III liquidity measures and selected 
traditional liquidity measures was done at bank-specific level while the analysis of the 
determinants of LMI was done on both bank level and macro-economy.  
The LMI used in this study was a modified one based on the LMI measurement proposed 
by Brunnermeier et al. (2013). This measurement captures the most important attributes 
of bank liquidity that include the overall funding liquidity and the market liquidity of its 
assets. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) observe that it is not the level of gearing that is 
important, but rather the proportion of debt comprising short-term demandable deposits. 
Thus, as banks hold illiquid assets financed by short-term debt which – if bank run 
behaviour emerges – may in turn result in increased liquidity risk. Since the standard and 
traditional measures of liquidity, such as leverage, are unable to pick up these aspects of 
135 
 
liquidity in a bank environment precisely, it was imperative for the study to model liquidity 
measures that incorporate information from both the asset side of the balance sheet and 
the liability side, i.e. the market liquidity and funding liquidity respectively.  
So far, most empirical studies have investigated market liquidity and funding liquidity 
separately. It is only recently that researchers started paying attention to asset–liability 
mismatches, and are now trying to build models that can capture this important aspect. 
Since the end of global financial crisis in 2009, there are scholars that indicated that 
liquidity standard measures failed to capture banking sector important characteristic of 
liquidity spirals (Bouwman, 2009; Bai et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). The 
empirical findings of this study highlight the determinants of liquidity and the importance 
of measuring bank liquidity in the context of asset–liability mismatches. 
6.3.1 Composition of the BLMI and the ALMI 
The composition as previously discussed in the methodology chapter (see Chapter 6) 
depends on the value of assets, liabilities and the weight for both assets and liabilities. 
The present study adopted the original measure of LMI at bank level. 
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The definitions of the components of the LMI remains the same where assets ( k
i
t Ax ) and 
liabilities ( 'k
i
tLx ) are balance sheet items that vary over time depending on their asset or 
liability class ),( 'kk . The liquidity weights, 0kt A  and 0' ktL , are key components 
that are computed, and in this study, they were time-varying.  
However, this study, the liquidity weights were modified and were different from weights 
reported by other scholars like Brunnermeier et al. (2013), Bai et al. (2014) and 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2016). These scholars utilised the haircuts on assets as a measure 
of asset weights. These weights were originally proposed by Bai et al. (2014) who argue 
that haircuts are natural measures of asset liquidity sensitivity as they are said to vary 
with measures of asset price volatility and tail risk (Kelly & Jiang, 2014) for a given asset 
class. For empirical analysis, the haircut is computed as 𝑚 = [1 −
𝐷
𝑃
], where m is the 
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haircut measure, P is the fair value of collateral and D, the notional amount. The haircut 
rates have been found to be lower for high-quality collateral and higher for riskier assets 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2016).  
Although the haircut measure seems to be accurate measure of assets sensitivity to 
liquidity shocks, however, their use is problematic since they are not uniform to all the 
dealers in the money market, even in a situation where different counterparties use the 
same type of collateral (Corrigan and De Terán, 2007). Moreover, the repo haircut data 
(Gorton, & Metrick, 2009) for each bank is inaccessible in an ideal world as banks are not 
keen to publish it (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). 
Therefore, using the JSE All Share Index over the period under investigation, the asset 
liquidity weight was computed using a combination of spread and volume. The measure 
uses the absolute spread which is the difference between the bid and the ask prices 
(Holden, 2009). This absolute bid–ask spread is scaled by the volume traded on a 
particular day. Many studies already investigated and recommended the use of spread 
as measure of market liquidity. See for example in this regard, Roll (1984), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), Chordia (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001). The equity trading 
volume measures the market depth, i.e. how easy it is to buy or sell a significant volume 
without affecting the market price. According to Danyliv, Bland, and Nicholass (2014), the 
average daily volume and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) are the widely used 
liquidity measures in the industry. Scholars such as Benston and Hagerman (1974) and 
Stoll (1978b) argue that stock trading volume, volatility and price are influential 
determinants of liquidity. The measure used in this study was Danyliv et al.’s (2014) 
inverted liquidity index (LIX). The LIX takes the following form: 
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Since this ratio can be very big, it is reduced to manageable values by using logarithms:  
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Danyliv et al. (2014) argue that the LIX liquidity measure captures the most important 
aspects of market liquidity as the calculation includes components that pertain to breadth, 
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depth, resilience and immediacy of the market. According to Shin (2012), if one is to have 
a long-run view, spreads are found to have increased significantly with the onset of the 
crisis. The asset liquidity weight is then determined from equation 6.4.  
𝑚 = [1 −
1
𝐿𝐼𝑋𝑡
] 𝜋,               (6.4) 
where 
1
𝐿𝐼𝑋𝑡
 is the inverse of LIX. The calculated weight is adjusted by 𝜋, the coefficient 
allocated to the assets depending on the level of liquidity. In the present study, the 
coefficients were adapted from previous studies by Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) and Bai 
et al. (2014) and following guidelines originally given by Brunnermeier et al. (2013). The 
asset weights were computed in the similar way as Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) and the 
assets took the weights between 0 and 1, implying that asset liquidity weights for these 
assets were also set to 0 <  𝜆𝑡𝐴𝑘 < 1. Table 6.3 shows the balance sheet information of 
the selected banks collected from the South African banks’ BA900 returns filed at the 
SARB. The assigned coefficient for each category is indicated in the same table. Graph 
6.1 shows the calculated 1 −
1
𝐿𝐼𝑋𝑡
. 
 
Figure 6.1: The calculated asset weight coefficient 
Source: Author’s computation (Data from iress INET BFA database) 
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Figure 6.1 shows the huge increase of asset weight coefficient in 2004 relative to the 
value in 2003. This is preceded by periods of high volatility until 2008. There was another 
significant increase in assets weight coefficient in 2009 and 2011. The coefficient has 
been stable since 2012. 
Table 6.3: Assets category and the allocated coefficient. 
 
Source: Author’s computation (Data from DA900 returns)  
Category  
CENTRAL BANK MONEY AND GOLD South African bank notes and subsidiary coin 1.00         
Gold coin and bullion 1.00         
Domestic currency deposits with SA Reserve Bank 1.00         
   Cash reserve deposits: Interest bearing 1.00         
   Cash reserve deposits: Non-interest bearing 1.00         
   Other deposits 1.00         
DEPOSITS, LOANS AND ADVANCES SA banks 1.00         
 NCDs/PNsc issued by banks, with an unexpired maturity of
        Up to 1 month 0.80         
        More than 1 month to 6 months 0.70         
        More than 6 months 0.50         
 Other deposits with and loans and advances to SA banksb 0.50         
INVESTMENTS AND BILLS, including 
trading portfolio assets 
Own bankers' acceptances
0.85         
Other bankers' acceptances 0.85         
Treasury bills 1.00         
SA Reserve Bank bills 1.00         
Promissory notes 0.85         
Commercial paper 0.85         
Land Bank bills 0.90         
Liquid 0.70         
Non-liquid 0.70         
Other 0.50         
NON-FINANCIAL ASSETS Tangible assets -           
Premises of the bank 0.20         
Other fixed property -           
Computer equipment, including peripherals -           
Other tangible assets, including vehicles, equipment, furniture and fittings -           
Intangible assets -           
Computer software -           
Other intangible assets including purchased goodwill -           
OTHER ASSETS Clients' liabilities per contra -           
Remittances in transit 0.20         
Current income tax receivables and deferred income tax assets 0.50         
Retirement benefit assets -           
Assets acquired or bought in to protect an advance or investment 
     Fixed property -           
     Shares -           
     Vehicles and other assets -           
     Other -           
𝜋k
i
t Ax
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To compute the liability side weight of the LMI, one needs to capture the feedback 
between LMI and liquidity stress. Bai et al. (2014) define the endogenous funding liquidity 
factor as a combination of its market price proxy and the aggregate LMI resulting in 6.5: 
)()1( ttt LMITOISFL   ,        (6.5) 
where  is a scaling parameter that scales down the magnitude of aggregate LMI to a 
similar level of spread between Treasury bills and the SABOR. Instead of using OIS–T-
Bill spread like Bai et al. (2014), we used the spread between the treasury bill rate and 
the SABOR. This measure, according to Nagel (2014), accurately measures the time 
variation of a money market instrument. Since the liquidity condition is assumed to be 
accurately depicted by the SABOR–Treasury bill spread (STBS), we dropped the 
)( tLMI  from our empirical analysis. The STBS is sufficient to capture the liquidity 
condition in a particular market. Inclusion of aggregate LMI in computing the weights 
could also require one to estimate the LMI at global level and determine its influence as 
well. Thus, in this study, we captured the liability weights empirically through the 
modification of the state-dependent funding factor and came up with the funding factor in 
equation 6.6.  
𝐹𝐿𝑡 = [ 1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑆 ]𝜋
′ ,           (6.6) 
where 𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑡 is the spread between Treasury bills and the SABOR. Likewise, the 
calculated weight was adjusted by 𝜋′, the coefficient allocated to the liabilities depending 
their period to maturity. Unlike Krishnamurthy et al. (2016), the time to maturity of a liability 
is captured in the assigned 𝜋′. Table 6.4 presents the liability categories and assigned 
coefficients while Graph 6.2 shows the STBS.  
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Figure 6.2: The SABOR–Treasury bill spread (STBS) 
Source: Author’s computation 
Data source: SARB: online down load facility  
https://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Statistics/Pages/OnlineDownloadFacility.aspx  
 
Figure 6.2 shows that the SABOR–Treasury bill spread significantly increased over the 
period 2003–2005. There was a steep decrease the STBS from 2006 to 2007 mainly 
because the TBill rate increased at a faster rate than the SABOR that remained relatively 
stable. There was a slight increase in 2007, which was followed by a decrease in 2008. 
Contrary to expectation, there was a sharp decrease in SABOR and TBill rates during the 
period of 2008 to 2010. Since the end of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, the 
STBS remained relatively stable with a slight increase after 2013. Since the spread is 
sometimes used to measure liquidity risk (Sarr and Lybek, 2002; Nagel, 2014), the graph 
shows that spreads increased in 2007 to 2008 signifying and increase in liquidity risk. 
This coincided with the begging of 2007-2009 global financial crisis.  
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Table 6.4 Liability category and the allocated coefficient  
 
Source: Author’s computation (Data from DA900 returns)  
 
  
DEPOSITS DENOMINATED IN RAND Cheque 1.00         
Savings 1.00         
Up to 1 day 1.00         
More than 1 day to 1 month 1.00         
More than 1 month to 6 months 0.95         
More than 6 months 0.90         
DEPOSITS DENOMINATED IN FOREIGN 
CURRENCY Cheque 1.00         
Savings 1.00         
Up to 1 day 1.00         
More than 1 day to 1 month 1.00         
More than 1 month to 6 months 0.95         
More than 6 months 0.90         
OTHER BORROWED FUNDS Short-term 1.00         
Medium-term 0.95         
Long-term 0.90         
FOREIGN CURRENCY FUNDING Short-term 1.00         
Medium-term 0.95         
Long-term 0.90         
OTHER LIABILITIES TO THE PUBLIC Short-term 1.00         
Medium-term 0.95         
Long-term 0.90         
OTHER LIABILITIES Short-term 1.00         
Medium-term 0.95         
Long-term 0.90         
Category  
𝜋′'k
i
t Lx
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6.4 Econometric model estimation results, discussion and analysis  
As part of the validation of the MLMI, we regressed the traditional and Basel III liquidity 
measures against their determinants and then compared them with how the MLMI 
performed against the same determinants over the same period. As part of robust check, 
we ran a dynamic panel data estimation using five different methodologies. The 
discussion following focuses mainly on the FE, Least square dummy variable (LSDV) and 
two-step system GMM results. We used the GMM over other methods because of the 
endogeneity problem between banks (Baum et al., 2003) and also the problem faced by 
many dynamic models that the dependent variable is correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable (Kiviet, Pleus, & Poldermans, 2017). As indicated by Roodman 
(2006), the system GMM estimations are free from problems of endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity liquidity persistence and autocorrelation. Nevertheless, the results of other 
estimation techniques are presented for comparison, and as part of the robust check of 
our main model. The detailed results are presented in Appendices 1–16.  
For the empirical estimation, the relationship between the liquidity and the independent 
variables of bank-specific factors, and macro-economic factors was expressed 
mathematically in equations 6.1 through 6.8 and the corresponding results were 
presented in appendices 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 in that order. 
∆𝐿1𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐿1𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
                   (6.1) 
∆𝐿2𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐿2𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
                   (6.2) 
∆𝐿3𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐿3𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
               (6.3) 
∆𝐿4𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐿4𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
               (6.4) 
∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
                    (6.5) 
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∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (6.6) 
∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡                     (6.7) 
∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
 ∆ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (6.8) 
From Appendices 1–16, the GMM, FE, LSDV_K is the LSDV corrected for Kiviet bias and 
the generalised lease squares GLS estimation models show that there is positive 
relationship between all the liquidity measures at time t and their lagged values at time t-
1, except for LCR. However, the lagged LCR is positive and significant under the GMM 
model, that is after correction of the endogeneity problem. This shows that the current 
liquidity position pf the bank is dependent on the liquidity buffers for the previous period. 
For all the eight liquidity measures under GMM, the coefficients are positive although only 
significant for LCR and ALMI. The relationship in other liquidity measures although 
statistically insignificant, has the predicted sign. The summary of the relationship between 
liquidity measures and their lagged values is shown in Table 6.5.  
The ALMI performed very well in this category, as the coefficient of the lagged value is 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient of the lagged BLMI was positive but not 
significant. Overall, the two MLMI measures of liquidity showed a positive and significant 
relationship with their lagged values.  
Consistent with Opler et al. (1999), the lagged liquidity independent variables showed 
that the liquidity measures under investigation were persistent over time. This confirmed 
the view that banks target a particular optimal level of liquidity for precautionary and 
transaction purposes. In line with precautionary motive to hold cash, Deléchat et al. 
(2012) argue that the positive relationship can be explained by the existence of some 
structural constraints to credit that result in banks holding higher volumes of liquid assets.  
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Table 6.5 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and the lagged dependent variable 
 
Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L.L1 0.495** 0.425*** 0.446 0.512*** 0.647 
 
(2.76) (12.28) (1.90) (5.18) (0.69) 
      
L.L2 0.318* 0.282*** 0.299 0.379*** 0.605 
 
(2.16) (15.54) (1.52) (4.23) (1.17) 
      
L.L3 0.437* 0.435*** 0.324 0.416*** 0.477 
 
(2.60) (9.95) (1.46) (6.14) (1.51) 
      
L.L4 0.375** 0.360*** 0.313 0.406*** 0.457 
 
(2.67) (12.63) (1.68) (5.30) (1.13) 
      
L.LCR -0.0696 -0.0811** -0.122*** -0.0246 0.134** 
 
(-1.90) (-2.61) (-8.04) (-0.49) (3.29) 
      
L.NSFR 0.313 0.320*** 0.225 0.307*** 0.747 
 
(1.97) (10.15) (0.91) (49.42) (1.77) 
      
L.BLMI 0.394* 0.350*** 0.372 0.434*** 0.462 
 
(2.62) (19.31) (2.14) (5.13) (1.46) 
      
L.ALMI 0.265*** 0.271** 0.138*** 0.203** 0.670*** 
 
(8.46) (2.91) (9.96) (2.77) (4.69) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; OLS = Ordinary least squares 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16. 
The summarised results for capital ratio as a determinant of liquidity are shown in Table 
6.6. The results show that there was a positive relationship between capital ratio for all 
traditional liquidity measures and both modified bank-specific and aggregate liquidity 
mismatch index. A positive significant relationship between BLMI and capital ratio shows 
that bank liquidity can be endogenously determined by the level of bank capital. BLMI is 
unique from other liquidity measures in the sense that it measures liquidity in the context 
of asset–liability mismatches and the measure is time varying.  
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Table 6.6 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and capital ratio 
 Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-CR 0.852* 0.828*** 1.066 1.021** 1.453* 
 
(2.02) (20.69) (1.63) (3.24) (2.77) 
      
L2-CR 2.747* 2.821*** 3.287 3.056** 9.570 
 
(2.03) (17.29) (1.65) (2.91) (2.19) 
      
L3-CR 0.944* 0.886*** 0.914 0.877* 1.626* 
 
(2.31) (10.44) (1.59) (2.23) (2.69) 
      
L4-CR 2.581* 2.646*** 2.819 2.623** 5.863* 
 
(2.21) (10.19) (1.69) (2.65) (2.87) 
      
LCR-CR 30.67 19.84 230.3 233.4 -23.15 
 
(0.16) (0.81) (0.86) (0.19) (-0.01) 
      
NSFR-CR -2.278* -1.861*** -2.816 -2.708*** -5.978*** 
 
(-2.32) (-13.03) (-1.75) (-4.19) (-4.90) 
      
BLMI-CR 0.746 0.755*** 0.944 0.874** 2.390** 
 
(1.80) (23.87) (1.68) (2.72) (3.32) 
      
ALMI-CR -0.0235 -0.00299 0.0487 0.0363 0.169 
 
(-0.98) (-1.26) (2.10) (0.42) (0.33) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16. 
These results are in line with the risk absorption hypothesis (Umar, Umar, Sun, Sun, 
Majeed & Majeed, 2017), which indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that banks hold capital 
in order to reduce the effect of both credit and liquidity risk. The capital ratio coefficients 
under L1, L3, L4 and BLMI were positive and both statistically significant and 
economically significant. Furthermore, Berger and Bouwman (2009) show that capital 
ratio is a main determinant for bank liquidity. Consistent with their findings, our results 
146 
 
indicated that capital ratio is key in explaining the increased holdings of liquid assets in 
South Africa and over the period under investigation. The results confirmed results by 
Horvàth et al. (2012) who found that capital positively affect bank liquidity creation when 
they argue that banks reduce their liquidity holdings by increasing their financing, 
particularly when their capital rises, consequently increasing liquidity risk. The results in 
our study are also in line with other earlier theoretical and empirical studies, such as 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Gorton and Winton (2000), and Berger and Bouwman 
(2009).  
BLMI and ALMI are both positively related to capital ratio. The relationship under the ALMI 
is not significant, nevertheless, as expected, there is a strong positive and significant 
relationship between BLMI and capital ratio. In this regard, the BLMI performed better 
than the L1, L2 and L3 measures of liquidity. L1 is calculated as liquid assets divided by 
total assets (Vodová, 2012). On the other hand, the L3 liquidity measure is shown as a 
ratio of loans to total assets. These ratios give information about the general liquidity 
shock absorption capacity of a bank (Cucinelli, 2013). The higher the ratio, the higher the 
liquidity and the more stable is the financial institution in question. The ratio has been 
used by several authors (such as Cucinelli, 2013; Moussa, 2015) as a proxy for liquidity. 
However, the L1 and L3 liquidity measures focus on the asset side of the balance sheet 
only.  
A good liquidity measure in the banking sector should be in a position to take into account 
the nature of the banking business that is asset–liability management (ALM). Failure to 
capture the liability side of the balance sheet is the major weakness of this measure. 
Market liquidity fails to capture the liquidity dynamics in periods when the market is 
characterised by fear, tension and suspicion (Valente, 2010). During periods of liquidity 
shock, capital market players are reluctant to part with their money, and are not willing to 
roll over their positions as they fall due. The L4 measure captures the relationship better 
than the other measures, and it is calculated as loans divided by deposits plus short-term 
borrowings (Vodová, 2012). Although this measure takes into account both the liability 
and asset side of the balance sheet of a bank, the ratio cannot be aggregated to be useful 
at macro level. Moreover, our original goal was to create a liquidity risk measure that 
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accounts for asset–liability mismatches. The BLMI and ALMI are such measures and they 
have captured the relationship with capital as per expectation.  
However, the Basel III liquidity measure shows a negative association with the capital 
ratio. The relationship is as expected when using LCR as an independent variable but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. This means there is a 
very strong negative relationship between NSFR as a measure of liquidity and the capital 
ratio. This in turn confirms the more recent theory of financial fragility–crowding out of 
deposit hypothesis, which suggests a negative relationship between bank capital and 
bank liquidity. According to Diamond and Rajan (2006), and Berger and Bouwman (2017) 
the higher the capital ratio, the lower is the deposit ratio, as higher capital crowds out 
deposits and hence lower liquidity. Earlier, Diamond and Rajan (2000) indicated that due 
to limited capital, highly fragile banks tend to hold higher liquidity buffers than more stable 
and less vulnerable banks.  
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Table 6.7 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and deposits 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-Dep 1.067* 1.105*** 1.145 1.065*** 1.619 
 
(2.38) (24.75) (1.61) (5.00) (1.68) 
      
L2-Dep 1.428 1.474*** 1.248 1.043* 7.479 
 
(1.68) (11.14) (0.87) (2.04) (1.53) 
      
L3-Dep 1.072* 0.984*** 1.115 1.021*** 1.973** 
 
(2.48) (11.60) (1.77) (5.26) (4.37) 
      
L4-Dep 1.390 1.424*** 1.118 0.912* 4.833* 
 
(1.81) (5.91) (0.90) (2.02) (2.58) 
      
LCR-Dep 242.0 192.5*** 214.9 194.1 -375.1 
 
(1.05) (7.73) (1.05) (0.46) (-0.20) 
      
NSFR-Dep -2.806** -2.423*** -3.122 -2.954*** -4.869* 
 
(-2.85) (-17.78) (-1.85) (-10.14) (-3.10) 
      
BLMI-Dep 0.392 0.359*** 0.341 0.286 1.778 
 
(1.44) (13.39) (0.75) (1.77) (2.04) 
      
ALMI-Dep -0.0240 -0.00296 -0.0182 -0.0206 0.165 
 
(-1.14) (-1.23) (-0.52) (-0.62) (0.35) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
In this study, ‘deposits’ were defined as total retail deposits over total assets (see Table 
5.3). As indicated in Table 6.7, deposits are robustly positively associated with standard 
measures of liquidity as well as the MLMI liquidity measures. For standard measures, the 
coefficients range from 1.62 to 7.48. The relationship is very strong and significant for L3 
and L4 liquidity measures with positive coefficients of 1.97 and 4.83 respectively. The L3 
measure indicates the portion of assets of the bank that are tied up in illiquid loan assets. 
The higher the ratio, the less attractive the bank is. While on the other side, the L4 liquidity 
ratio relates to banks’ illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. The higher the value of these 
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ratios, the more illiquid the bank is, and therefore the higher its vulnerability to liquidity 
shocks. A higher ratio indicates that the bank may fail to pay its dues as loans cannot be 
converted to cash easily. The BLMI and ALMI are positively related with deposits. 
However, the coefficients are not significant.  
The findings indicate that banks tend to keep higher liquidity buffers as deposits increase. 
According to Deléchat et al. (2012), the positive association between liquidity and 
deposits does not necessarily mean a direct causal relationship. Their view is that the 
fundamentals that make households and other institutions hold deposits may as well 
require banks to keep more precautionary liquidity on their positions. In this context, a 
better understanding of the interaction between deposits and liquidity may be gained if 
one could include the volatility of the bank deposits in the equation. The precautionary 
motive to hold cash is driven by the need to cater for erratic withdrawals of deposits more 
than it is by the volume.  
As part of prudential requirements, banks in South Africa, like any other banks in the 
world, are required to hold a certain percentage of deposits as reserves deposited by the 
central bank. The reserve requirement constitutes highly liquid assets, cash and cash 
equivalents. The amount to be kept in the form of these liquid assets is calculated as a 
percentage of time deposits and demand deposits. These reserves are meant to 
safeguard the solvency risk as well as the liquidity risk in times of sudden and unexpected 
deposit withdrawals. Since the reserve requirements are a function of deposit volume, it 
is naturally expected that liquidity buffers have to increase as the deposits increase.  
Contrary to BLMI, ALMI and standard liquidity measures, the Basel III measures show a 
negative association with deposits. The NSFR has a coefficient of 4.87 and is significant. 
This shows that banks hold illiquid assets as they believe deposits are stable and hence 
are associated with less risk. The NSFR considers both the liability and the asset side of 
the balance sheets as it calibrates the extent to which bank assets are liquid and the 
assumed stability of a bank’s obligations.  
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Table 6.8 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and bank size 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-SIZE -0.000557 -0.00110 -0.0104 -0.0110 0.00626 
 
(-0.19) (-1.88) (-1.36) (-0.93) (0.44) 
      
L2-SIZE -0.00411 -0.00412** -0.0212 -0.0205 0.0313 
 
(-0.52) (-3.19) (-0.60) (-0.55) (0.34) 
      
L3-SIZE -0.00615 -0.00729*** -0.0198 -0.0206 -0.00633 
 
(-1.76) (-5.15) (-1.02) (-1.16) (-0.25) 
      
L4-SIZE -0.0116 -0.0108*** -0.0242 -0.0246 0.00265 
 
(-1.64) (-4.43) (-0.64) (-0.62) (0.05) 
      
LCR-SIZE -2.375 -2.727*** -8.245 -8.625 37.45 
 
(-0.60) (-5.01) (-0.38) (-0.13) (1.08) 
      
NSFR-SIZE -0.00270 -0.00104 0.0336 0.0366 -0.0844 
 
(-0.42) (-1.00) (1.78) (1.27) (-1.15) 
      
BLMI-SIZE -0.0000556 0.000828 -0.00712 -0.00798 0.0181 
 
(-0.02) (1.70) (-0.75) (-0.69) (1.35) 
      
ALMI-SIZE -0.000124 -0.0000170 0.0118*** 0.00968 -0.00690 
 
(-0.28) (-1.26) (5.62) (1.61) (-1.01) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
In this study, the proxy of bank size was log total assets, which measures the bank’s 
general capacity to undertake its intermediary function. The size of a bank theoretically 
positively contributes to the bank’s liquidity levels through the implicit guarantee 
associated with bigger banks as compared to smaller banks. Therefore, primarily, the 
relationship between bank size and bank liquidity is assumed to be negative because the 
bigger the bank, the better its ability and capacity to venture into risky speculative 
adventures, and more so, the better it can invest in long-term risk assets. This is shown 
in the Table 6.8, where ALMI, NSFR and L3 liquidity measure are negatively related to 
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bank size. The association is very weak and insignificant though. Other scholars, such as 
Steffen et al. (2010) and Lucchetta (2007), indicate that the size of a bank is negatively 
related to bank liquidity. Large banks have the capacity to hold proportionally fewer liquid 
assets than small banks. The larger the bank, the better its ability to mobilise funds in 
open market operations and the lower the cost of funds as it is deemed to have higher 
creditworthy. 
Other liquidity measures show a positive relationship with bank size, in line with the view 
that, as the bank becomes too large, this could negatively affect its operations because 
of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. This would require banks of this nature to hold more 
liquid assets as compared to their counterparts. The results where the relationship is 
positive, confirm research by Pasiouras et al. (2006), Shen et al. (2009), and Tseganesh 
et al. (2012) who argue that there is a positive relationship between bank liquidity levels 
and the size of the bank. This argument is based on the fact that, as the size of the bank 
increases, this is followed by growth in branch network. As bank branch networks 
increase the bank in question is compelled to have a significant portion of its balance 
sheet in liquid for in order to meet a higher demand of loans and also unpredictable 
withdrawals. 
Focusing on 2-step GMM results, there is generally a negative association between bank 
size and liquidity amongst three indicated measures while the other five measures show 
a positive relationship. This could imply that South African banks follow a more 
conventional way of banking, namely when the bank size increases as business grows, 
they tend to hold a substantial level of liquid assets in order to meet day to day 
transactions associated with banks i.e. loan provisions and meet deposit withdrawals. 
There is a positive relationship between BLMI and the size of the bank, and this is in line 
with Bai et al. (2014) who indicate that LMI correlates positively with bank size. Thus, 
BLMI is able to capture the bank’s exposure to market-wide as well as bank-specific 
liquidity stress events. The new liquidity measure has shown to be quite informative in 
capturing the association with bank size and the market-wide liquidity condition. 
Therefore, we observe that large banks in South Africa are more liquid than small banks, 
even during periods of turmoil.  
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Table 6.9 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and loan growth 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-LG -0.0485* -0.0388*** -0.0554 -0.0600 -0.0392 
 
(-2.00) (-9.31) (-1.51) (-1.73) (-1.91) 
      
L2-LG -0.0516 -0.0430*** -0.0957 -0.105 -0.0765 
 
(-1.01) (-6.52) (-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.02) 
      
L3-LG -0.0999* -0.0988*** -0.121* -0.128** -0.105* 
 
(-2.17) (-12.10) (-2.95) (-2.85) (-2.28) 
      
L4-LG -0.179* -0.149*** -0.243 -0.255* -0.205* 
 
(-2.30) (-11.01) (-2.03) (-2.55) (-2.26) 
      
LCR-LG 76.59 67.24*** 62.85 58.14 12.27 
 
(0.75) (12.97) (0.85) (0.41) (0.21) 
      
NSFR-LG 0.126** 0.111*** 0.130 0.143* 0.0646 
 
(3.20) (10.69) (1.94) (2.26) (0.73) 
      
BLMI-LG -0.0340 -0.0326*** -0.0313 -0.0340 -0.0122 
 
(-1.88) (-11.70) (-0.86) (-1.19) (-0.85) 
      
ALMI-LG -0.00215 -0.000250 0.00446 0.00384 -0.00812 
 
(-0.67) (-1.16) (1.71) (0.48) (-1.04) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
 
In line with theory that there is a negative relationship between loan growth and liquidity, 
six liquidity measures (L1, L2, L3, L4, BLMI & ALMI) indicate a negative association with 
loan portfolio. As expected, L3 and L4 were significantly negatively related to loan growth 
rate. However, the theoretically baseless Basel III liquidity measures showed a positive 
association, which was statistically insignificant. The loan portfolio naturally is not liquid. 
Therefore, an increase in the loan portfolio typically means a decrease in liquid assets 
and an increase in long-term illiquid assets. The volume assets the bank hold that are 
liquid is determined by the amount of loan demanded, and this becomes the bases on 
which the loan portfolio grows (Pilbeam 2005, p. 42). Theoretically, when the loan growth 
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rate decreases, the bank naturally ends up holding more short-term liquid assets, 
whereas if the demand for loans increases, the banks will have to respond to this by 
issuing more loans thereby holding fewer short-term liquid assets. The switch from liquid 
assets to illiquid assets is part of the operations of banks as they are profit-making 
organisations and loan portfolios provide higher return. Therefore, our results confirmed 
the negative relationship between bank liquidity and loan growth rate. Aspachs et al. 
(2005) found the same relationship and they show a negative relationship between loan 
growth and bank liquidity holding. However, the Basel III liquidity measures indicate a 
positive relationship with loan growth although not statistically significant.  
  
154 
 
Table 6.10 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and external funding dependence  
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-EFD -0.924* -0.966*** -0.901 -0.845*** -1.066 
 
(-2.57) (-25.68) (-1.37) (-21.71) (-1.33) 
      
L2-EFD -2.709** -2.786*** -2.652 -2.459*** -6.358* 
 
(-2.94) (-22.18) (-1.51) (-12.61) (-2.47) 
      
L3-EFD -0.868* -0.793*** -0.797 -0.737*** -1.161 
 
(-2.53) (-11.68) (-1.41) (-4.61) (-1.92) 
      
L4-EFD -2.235** -2.270*** -2.042 -1.857*** -4.498*** 
 
(-2.75) (-11.84) (-1.40) (-5.89) (-5.27) 
      
LCR-EFD 72.09 59.02*** 116.6 115.1 836.5 
 
(0.52) (3.84) (0.67) (0.16) (0.78) 
      
NSFR-EFD 2.200** 1.882*** 2.200 2.081*** 2.322* 
 
(2.91) (16.73) (1.57) (6.07) (2.41) 
      
BLMI-EFD -0.873** -0.860*** -0.876 -0.818*** -1.630** 
 
(-2.77) (-38.58) (-1.61) (-23.66) (-3.33) 
      
ALMI-EFD 0.0144 0.00178 -0.00200 0.00105 -0.284 
 
(0.84) (1.23) (-0.07) (0.03) (-0.82) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
 
The results in Table 6.10 shows that there was a negative relationship between the 
standard liquidity measures, the MLMI liquidity measures and the EFD. There was need 
for assessing the reliance of banks on external sources of funding besides retail deposits 
or wholesale funding as this has implications for the bank’s probability of facing liquidity 
risk. The study used the ratio of external funding to total liabilities as a proxy of the EFD. 
External funding is the sum of short-term liabilities, which include mainly money market 
funding. This is in line with Shen et al. (2009) who also consider EFD one of the causes 
of liquidity risk. They also used the ratio of external funding to total liabilities to represent 
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this dependence. Saunders and Cornett (2006) confirm that banks primarily rely on 
money market funding instead of demand deposits and long-term funding to fund loans.  
Shen et al. (2009) further show that, if a bank relies on wholesale funding and borrowing 
from open market operations instead of core deposits to fund its loan book and other day-
to-day operations, the bank has a higher probability of facing liquidity problems as 
compared to banks that rely mainly on core deposits and less on wholesale funding and 
money market borrowings. Therefore, the former category of banks may face liquidity 
problems in the short run and long run as they borrow a significant amount in the money 
market. The EFD is expected to be negatively related to the bank liquidity buffer. Viewing 
the relationship from another angle, it is thus obvious that EFD and bank liquidity risk are 
positively related. However, the NSFR is positively related to EFD and the relationship is 
significant at the 5% significant level.  
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Table 6.11 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and GDP 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
      
      
L1-GDP 0.151 0.0737** 0.0878 0.0839 -0.329 
 
(0.81) (2.66) (0.54) (1.10) (-0.20) 
      
L2-GDP 0.645 0.449*** 0.540 0.568** 1.631 
 
(1.07) (5.91) (2.00) (3.11) (0.29) 
      
L3-GDP 0.398 0.345* 0.450 0.469*** -0.336 
 
(1.48) (2.22) (1.44) (6.38) (-0.36) 
      
L4-GDP 1.322* 0.480 1.345 1.424*** 2.159* 
 
(2.09) (1.20) (1.89) (10.23) (2.53) 
      
LCR-GDP -2576.1 -2540.9*** -2608.6 -2663.7*** 1566.0 
 
(-1.02) (-28.24) (-0.98) (-13.87) (0.59) 
      
NSFR-GDP -0.154 -0.270*** 0.0743 0.0142 -0.701 
 
(-0.30) (-4.39) (0.54) (0.07) (-2.10) 
      
BLMI-GDP 0.212 0.269*** 0.127 0.144** 0.210 
 
(1.09) (3.69) (0.87) (2.66) (1.26) 
      
ALMI-GDP -0.0295 -0.0321 -0.0653* -0.0511*** -0.365*** 
 
(-0.52) (-0.24) (-2.99) (-11.80) (-4.82) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
  
 
The growth rate of real domestic product was used as proxy for economic growth in line 
with other researchers, such as Kunofiwa and Odhiambo (2013), Iyke & Odhiambo, 
(2014). This represents the overall economic progress of a country (Tsaganesh, 2012). 
From Table 6.11 it is clear that liquidity is negatively related to GDP growth on four liquidity 
measures (L1, L3, NSFR and ALMI). The ALMI was statistically significant with a 
coefficient of 0.365. This implies that, as the economy is growing, banks in South Africa 
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in general hold less liquidity and vice versa. This is in line with the theory of bank fragility 
(Jayaraman & Kothari, 2014) which indicates that banks tend to resort to safer havens 
during periods of depression and recession. Therefore, during periods of economic 
downturn, banks are cautious and tend to concentrate their portfolios in short-term, highly 
liquid assets. Empirically, other scholars such as Tsaganesh (2012), Choon et al. (2013) 
and Audo (2014) also found that bank liquidity buffers are negatively related to economic 
growth.  
Aspachs et al. (2005) argue that banks hoard highly liquid assets during periods of 
economic recession and depression when business opportunities are not promising. 
Banks reduce their liquid asset holdings during economic expansions when business is 
booming and lending opportunities pick up. In a nutshell, results from the indicated 
liquidity measures revealed that an increase in economic growth results in banks reducing 
their liquid assets as they issue more loans, and a decrease in economic growth results 
in banks shifting from issuing loans and becoming more liquid. The negative influence 
means that the healthier the economy, the fewer the liquidity buffers kept by the banks. 
Liquidity measures, such as BLMI, LCR, L4 and L2, show a positive association between 
liquidity and economic growth. This confirms the hypothesis that economic agents are 
reluctant to save during periods of economic growth; thus, banks get very few deposits 
from their clients in periods of economic expansions, subsequently reducing their liquid 
asset buffers. Other scholars, such as Moore (2010) and Tseganesh (2012) argue that 
during periods of economic expansion, banks tend to increase their liquidity buffers 
because during economic prosperity the demand for loans tend to increase. The lending 
activity of banks therefore tends to increase with the growth of GDP. This confirms a 
positive relationship between banks’ liquidity buffers and economic growth. Moore (2010) 
in a study in Latin America and Caribbean countries finds that bank liquidity is positively 
related to the business cycle.  
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Table 6.12 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and inter-bank interest rates 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-IBR 0.0153 0.0392 -0.261 -0.222 -0.249 
 
(0.09) (1.43) (-1.23) (-0.49) (-0.12) 
      
L2-IBR 0.187 0.282*** -0.168 -0.00673 -4.908 
 
(0.34) (3.55) (-0.27) (-0.00) (-0.58) 
      
L3-IBR 0.416 0.584*** 0.0747 0.103 0.318 
 
(1.36) (3.98) (0.22) (0.17) (0.26) 
      
L4-IBR 0.505 0.503 0.0833 0.208 -2.602 
 
(0.72) (1.33) (0.10) (0.15) (-0.93) 
      
LCR-IBR 580.4 587.0*** 467.4 530.1 -2595.4 
 
(0.92) (6.65) (1.44) (0.29) (-1.16) 
      
NSFR-IBR 0.0942 0.161** 0.868 0.860 4.397 
 
(0.20) (2.60) (1.47) (0.78) (2.15) 
      
BLMI-IBR -0.0429 -0.103 -0.203 -0.154 -1.302 
 
(-0.23) (-1.37) (-1.10) (-0.35) (-2.17) 
      
ALMI-IBR -1.331*** -1.342*** -1.436*** -1.348*** -0.135 
 
(-19.49) (-7.09) (-76.58) (-6.35) (-0.59) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; IBR: represent the interbank rate 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
  
 
The interbank lending rate was used as a proxy for interest rates. The results showed 
that out of the eight liquidity measures investigated in this study, six of them showed a 
negative relationship with the South African interbank lending rates. Since the interbank 
lending rate represents the opportunity cost of not keeping liquid assets to meet 
obligations as they are due and also issue loans as they are demanded, the relationship 
indicated here confirmed this theoretical underpinning (Baumol (1952). Baumol (1952) 
argues that interest rates are the main determinant for speculative and precautionary 
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motive for holding/demanding cash, and the relationship is inverse. When investigating 
the relationship between liquidity and interest rates, Hackethal et al. (2010) found a 
negative relationship. According to Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984), the level 
of liquid assets kept by banks is said to dependent on what banks lose out (the opportunity 
cost) by holding on to liquid assets. The amount invested in liquid assets decreases with 
the opportunity cost of investing in liquid assets. In a nutshell, interest rates measure the 
opportunity cost of holding liquid assets meaning that interest rates have a negative 
relationship with liquidity.  
However, the L3 and NSFR liquidity measures showed a positive relationship with interest 
rates but the association was not significant. Lucchetta (2007) found that interest rates 
have a significant influence on banks when making decisions on asset allocations. Our 
results indicated that interest rates, as measured by the interbank interest rate, are 
positively related to the liquid asset buffers of banks, and that the decision by banks to 
extend loans in the interbank market is dependent on the level of interest rates. This 
argument is based on the fact that lending or borrowing is based on the price of liquidity, 
which in turn depends on the demand and supply of loanable funds and the interbank 
borrowing rate. Using a monetary policy interest rate as proxy for interest rate, Lucchetta 
(2007) found an opposite relationship to that was resulted from using the interbank 
lending rate as the relationship was negative.  
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Table 6.13 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and return on assets 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-ROA 0.0131 -0.0175 -0.0898 -0.160*** 0.468 
 
(0.10) (-0.51) (-0.24) (-4.98) (0.45) 
      
L2-ROA -0.227 -0.278** -0.231 -0.299 -1.968 
 
(-0.64) (-3.12) (-0.32) (-0.98) (-0.73) 
      
L3-ROA -0.120 -0.228* 0.386 0.235* 0.475 
 
(-0.55) (-2.48) (0.74) (2.10) (0.22) 
      
L4-ROA -0.355 -0.171 0.462 0.279 1.519 
 
(-0.86) (-0.77) (0.55) (0.97) (0.69) 
      
LCR-ROA 220.8 233.5*** -170.2 -164.5 890.6 
 
(0.57) (4.71) (-0.91) (-0.20) (0.67) 
      
NSFR-ROA -0.580 -0.638*** -0.0258 0.105 -0.904 
 
(-1.98) (-5.37) (-0.05) (0.29) (-0.44) 
      
BLMI-ROA 0.0212 0.0345 0.0541 0.0305 0.109 
 
(0.16) (1.63) (0.23) (0.47) (0.16) 
      
ALMI-ROA -0.0210 -0.00264 -0.0202 -0.0156 -0.147 
 
(-1.00) (-1.22) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.33) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
  
Most of the results in Table 6.13 show a positive relationship between liquidity risk 
measures and profitability. Nevertheless, the relationship under the 2-step systems GMM 
approach is not significant statistically. The profitability of banks was considered an 
endogenous factor and results confirmed the notion that the higher the profitability of the 
bank, all other things being equal, the higher the bank liquidity. According to Sudirman 
(2015), there is a positive association between bank profitability and liquidity because 
profitability is one of the main cradles of bank liquidity buffers. It is further argued that, if 
the bank is profitable, the higher its ability to fund its obligations and more so the higher 
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the value of collateral in case it needs to raise fund to cover its short-term deficit (Abiola 
& Olausi, 2014). It is expected that banks that are profitable are more stable and therefore 
can access funds on the interbank market more easily than unprofitable banks. 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) regressed the LMI under a stressed scenario with the return 
on assets (ROA) and found that there is a positive significant relationship between the 
LMI and profitability. Our results are further confirmed by Bourke (1989) who also found 
a positive relationship between bank profitability and liquidity.  
ALMI, NSFR, and L2 liquidity measures show a negative relationship with the ROA. The 
same argument that banks that are profitable are more stable and can access money 
easily can be used to explain the negative relationship between liquidity and profitability. 
We expect the relationship between bank profitability and bank liquidity to be negative. 
As the bank’s profitability increases, so also does its asset base all other things being 
equal and hence the greater is its ability and capacity to venture into risky speculative 
adventures. Furthermore, such bank could also invest in long-term risk assets. Trade-off 
between liquid assets and illiquid assets results in a bank holding illiquid assets in its 
balance sheet. According to Deléchat et al. (2012), there is a positive relationship 
between bank profitability as measured by net interest margin. Furthermore, Delechat et 
al. (2012) argue in favour of their findings that it is the bank-specific characteristics that 
affect the bank’s ability to raise additional funding. Therefore, it is the less profitable banks 
that hold more liquid assets as they have limited access to lines of credit. More profitable 
banks tend to hold less liquidity, possibly because they have access to emergency lines 
from the open market operation (OMO) or from the interbank borrowings.  
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Table 6.14 
Summary of results on the liquidity measures and 2007–2009 financial crisis  
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L1-DUMMY -0.00527 -0.00449*** -0.00573 -0.00654 -0.0248 
 
(-0.85) (-3.79) (-1.28) (-1.57) (-0.26) 
      
L2-DUMMY -0.0324 -0.0305*** -0.0360 -0.0377* -0.00741 
 
(-0.93) (-8.52) (-1.03) (-2.47) (-0.03) 
      
L3-DUMMY -0.0186 -0.0189** -0.0218 -0.0259*** -0.0347 
 
(-1.52) (-3.01) (-1.22) (-7.05) (-0.61) 
      
L4-DUMMY -0.0448 -0.0269 -0.0514 -0.0578*** -0.0253 
 
(-1.35) (-1.62) (-1.29) (-5.15) (-0.45) 
      
LCR-DUMMY -12.61 -13.55** -11.87 -8.734 125.2 
 
(-0.68) (-3.19) (-1.08) (-0.52) (1.32) 
      
NSFR-
DUMMY 0.0125 0.0121*** 0.0121 0.0138 -0.0680 
 
(1.13) (4.37) (1.06) (1.32) (-1.95) 
      
BLMI-
DUMMY -0.00193 -0.00234 -0.00223 -0.00216 0.00281 
 
(-0.20) (-0.77) (-0.21) (-0.41) (0.20) 
      
ALMI-
DUMMY 0.0287*** 0.0290*** 0.0291*** 0.0300*** 0.00355 
 
(26.57) (4.97) (31.27) (11.20) (0.60) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
Dummy: is a dummy variable which is used to capture the effects of the 2007- 2009 global financial crisis. 
The summarised results were taken from Appendices 1 to 16.  
  
The dummy variable captures the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. From Table 6.14, the 
MLMI measures and LCR show that banks tend to increase their liquidity buffers during 
times of crisis. The relationship is insignificant for LCR, BLMI and ALMI. In the context of 
the theory of moral hazard, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that during periods of 
liquidity crisis, firms fail to raise the significant portion of their desired investment from the 
market. On the other hand, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), through their adverse selection 
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theory, indicate that banks that are financially constrained have a tendency of holding on 
to more liquid assets. Therefore, banks have to hold enough liquid assets to be utilised in 
times of trouble or in times of need. That is the reason why banks hold a considerable 
portion of liquid assets in their portfolios during crisis periods despite the rate of return on 
these being very low, as the portfolios of banks include a proportionally significant portion 
of investments in traditional securities (fixed securities and equities). Without elaboration 
on the liquidity levels exhibited by each of these assets, one would agree, all other things 
being equal, that short-term fixed-income securities are more liquid than equities in times 
of crisis as liquidity shocks inevitable lead to a reduction of equity value and 
spontaneously making liquid assets more attractive.  
Berrospide (2012) argues that in times of crisis, banks tend to hold cash as a 
precautionary motive. Banks hold more liquidity buffers when they anticipate future 
expected losses on financial instruments due to them being impaired. In periods of 
financial turmoil, and mainly when banks have intensifying worries about the economic 
outlook, deepened insecurity about the credit characteristics of their customers could 
involuntarily push banks to reallocate their assets portfolios by moving assets from riskier 
long-term loans to short-term, safe and liquid financial instruments (Moinas et al., 2016) . 
Despite the fact that banks are compelled to increase their liquidity buffers as a fraction 
of their deposits in times of crisis, banks respond differently as they hoard large amounts 
of voluntary liquidity reserves over and above policy requirements (Ramos,1996). This is 
consistent with our findings here as the banks in South Africa increased their liquidity 
position during the period of crisis.  
Since the constructed BLMI and the ALMI were intended to capture the systemic risk and 
the exposure of a bank in times of trouble, these measures can be relied upon relative to 
their peers. Both measures show that banks hold a significant portion of liquid assets 
relative to liabilities in periods of crisis. These results give evidence that, in times of crisis, 
financial institutions actively reduce their obligations and increase their positions in more 
liquid assets with the aim of neutralising liquidity shocks. This is in sharp contrast to Bai 
et al (2014), and also Berger and Bouwman (2017) also who insist on a negative 
relationship as they argue that banks create more liquidity in good times that is before 
and after crises. This was expected in South Africa when the global financial crises started 
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in 2007 in America and other well-developed countries although the effects were only felt 
in South Africa between 2008 and 2010. South African banks were prepared. Our results 
clearly suggest that banks resorted to hoarding of liquid assets as a precautionary 
measure.  
Other liquidity measures fail to capture this fundamental relationship as they exhibit a 
negative relationship. One possible explanation for this relationship is that holding more 
liquid assets relative to illiquid assets is costly. However, hoarding of liquid assets by 
banks is beneficial in times of crisis; thus, it is expected that banks would exhibit higher 
levels of BLMI in times of crisis to combat systematic risk and become less exposed to 
crisis than banks with low BLMI banks. Another possible explanation is given by Adler 
(2012) who observes that the most of the traditional/standard liquidity measures and 
models on financial fragility were developed years before the actual global liquidity crisis. 
Furthermore, most of the studies on measures and application of liquidity were highly 
conceptual and lack testable predictions while others have strong empirical results but 
lack developed theory. In line with Brunnermeier et al.’s (2011) view, the standard liquidity 
measures have shown to be basic, inadequate and they failed to provide relevant 
information about the financial sector and its linkages to the real economy.  
6.5 Summary of results 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical testing of the standard Basel III and 
MLMI liquidity measures. The discussion in this chapter revealed that the relationship 
between liquidity measures and the determinants of liquidity, although somewhat the 
same, differed depending on the measure or proxy of liquidity used. Moreover, bank 
liquidity management decisions in South Africa are also not uniform across the liquidity 
risk measures, as they depend on the performance of the local markets and the 
performance of international markets. The determinants of liquidity range from bank-
specific factors to macro-economic factors. Some of these determinants reveal 
contradictory evidence amongst different liquidity measures. However, this study found 
that each liquidity proxy is unique as it is constructed from different variables that may be 
completely different from other proxies. The MLMI liquidity measures have outperformed 
their peers in explaining the association between financial crisis and liquidity creation. 
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The ALMI in particular – as expected – predicts the relationship between liquidity and 
economic growth better than all other measures under consideration. The next section 
validates the MLMI measures further by testing them as determinants of bank profitability.  
6.6 Bank profitability and MLMI 
In a bid to examine the appropriateness of the constructed MLMI measures further, the 
regression between the MLMI and bank performance was analysed. Where the return on 
assets (ROA) was the dependent variable and the BLMI and ALMI became part of the 
regressors in the linear model. The MLMI measures, credit risk as represented by non-
performing loans (NPL), and capital ratio (CR) are incorporated into equation 6.9 and 
6.810to motivate a linear regression framework. 
ROA = BLMI+NPL+CR             (6.9)  
ROA = ALMI+NPL+CR            (6.10)  
For the empirical estimation, the relationship between ROA and new liquidity measures 
can be expressed in equation 6.11 and 6.12. 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = (𝜙 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1 ∑ ∆𝐵𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆2 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆3 ∑ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝜆4 ∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1∆ + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡            (6.11) 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = (𝜙 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1 ∑ ∆𝐴𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆2 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜆3 ∑ ∆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝜆4 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡           (6.12) 
The models were estimated to investigate a simple deterministic relationship between the 
bank’s ROA and the independent variables of liquidity risk, credit risk and capital ratio. 
The F-statistic and P-values were used to establish the significance of the relationship 
between these variables and the results are presented in Tables 6.15 through 6.18.  
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Table 6.15: Dynamic panel-data estimations: ROA and BLMI 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.ROA 0.736*** 0.740*** 0.362*** 0.550*** 2.732* 
 (11.35) (49.02) (8.23) (22.42) (2.34) 
      
BLMI 0.00283 0.00235* -0.0149 -0.0267 -0.0162 
 (0.23) (2.26) (-0.50) (-0.43) (-0.19) 
      
NPL 0.0269 0.0264** -0.0302 -0.0156 -0.163 
 (0.64) (2.79) (-0.15) (-1.14) (-0.53) 
      
CR 0.0408 0.0420*** 0.160 0.152 -0.280 
 (1.95) (23.23) (1.43) (1.84) (-1.27) 
      
DUMMY 0.00309 0.00308*** 0.00621* 0.00525 -0.0395 
 (1.02) (34.21) (2.22) (0.69) (-1.12) 
      
_cons -0.000509 -0.000514 -0.00325  -0.00299 
 (-0.22) (-1.51) (-0.37)  (-0.41) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Table 6.16: Diagnostic statistics – ROA and BLMI 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K-BS SE 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas/Wald chi2 115.35 9158.38 456.36  784.77 
Prob>F/Prob>Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   46.65   
Prob>chi2   0.0000   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.4351   
Between   0.4433   
Overall 0.7703  0.7421   
      
rho    0.51183   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -1.01 
Prob>z     0.3140 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     0.64 
Prob>z     0.521 
      
Sargan test of overid     0.03 
Prob>chi2     0.856 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.05 
Prob>chi2     0.828 
      
Instruments          8 
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Table 6.17 
Dynamic panel data estimations: ROA and ALMI 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
L.ROA 0.735*** 0.743*** 0.362*** 0.539*** 0.540 
 
(10.64) (40.84) (7.85) (6.82) (1.38) 
      
ALMI -0.0681 -0.0628*** -0.0555 -0.0522 -0.0653 
 
(-0.83) (-9.39) (-1.31) (-1.67) (-1.01) 
      
NPL 0.0361 0.0319* -0.0337 -0.0436 -0.0372 
 
(1.12) (2.17) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.32) 
      
CR 0.0381 0.0388*** 0.134 0.122 0.115* 
 
(1.94) (8.12) (1.55) (1.63) (2.88) 
      
DUMMY 0.00102 0.00101 0.00503 0.00415 -0.0214 
 
(0.21) (1.87) (2.02) (0.89) (-0.57) 
      
_cons 0.0119 0.0109*** 0.00771 
 
0.0116 
 
(0.83) (7.97) (1.17) 
 
(0.82) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 6.18: Diagnostic statistics - ROA and ALMI 
 
OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2-step system GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas/Wald chi2  131.89 6916.55 497.6 
 
784.77 
Prob>F/Prob>Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
      
Hausman test 
  
44.88 
  
Prob>chi2 
  
0.0000 
  
R-SQUARED  
     
Within 
  
0.4433 
  
Between 
  
0.7770 
  
Overall 0.7758 
 
0.6790 
  
      
rho  
  
0.47867 
  
      
Arellano–Bond AR(1) 
    
-1.08 
Prob>z 
    
0.2790 
      
Arellano–Bond AR(2) 
    
-0.39 
Prob>z 
    
0.698 
      
Sargan test of overid  
   
0.11 
Prob>chi2 
    
0.946 
      
Hansen test of overid  
    
0.14 
Prob>chi2 
    
0.934 
      
Instruments          8 
Stat: Statistic  
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The ROA was used as the measure of bank performance in this study following earlier 
studies (Francis, 2013; Al-Jafari & Alchami, 2014) The ROA is calculated as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by bank’s total assets. The results in Table 6.15 show 
that there is a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between ROA and the 
BLMI. Likewise, Table 6.17 indicates a negative insignificant relationship between ROA 
and ALMI. These results confirm the proposition that, in times of uncertainty, banks 
choose to upsurge their liquid assets to alleviate the effect of the instability. Molyneux and 
Thorton (1992) argue for a negative correlation between liquidity and profitability levels. 
Our results are in line with other scholars’ findings, for example Drakos (2003), Hesse 
(2007), Maudos and Solis (2009), and Marozva (2015), who found a negative relationship 
between bank performance and liquidity. Bourke (1989) argues that insufficient liquidity 
is the main reason why banks fail. However, a bank that holds a significant proportion of 
their balance sheet in liquid assets loses out on opportunity cost of higher returns. 
Therefore, Bourke affirms a positive link between bank liquidity and profitability. 
There is a negative relationship between bank credit risk as measured by non-performing 
loans (NPLs) and ROA. Among other determinants of bank performance, NPLs play a 
central role because a significant part of banks’ revenue accumulates from loans from 
which interest is derived (Kolapo, Ayeni, & Oke, 2012). Thus, the higher the bank’s credit 
risk, the lower is the bank’s profitability. Our results are consistent with those by Williams 
(2007) which showed a negative association between credit risk and bank performance 
in Australia. Williams interprets the negative relationship as failure by banks to price credit 
risk precisely. Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) also found a negative relationship 
between credit risk and net interest margin.  
Table 6.17 shows that there is a positive significant linear relationship between ROA and 
capital ratio. For every 100% increase in capital, the bank profitability will change by 
11.5%. The increase in capital has a positive influence on bank’s profitability. This is in 
line with results by Arias (2011) and Yilmaz (2013), who point out that as the capital 
increases this automatically leads to a reduction in bank borrowing externally and 
consequently increasing bank profitability. Our findings also confirmed the theory that as 
banks accumulate more capital, their ability to resist external shocks is enhanced and 
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higher capital signifies the financial strength of a bank. Highly capitalised banks are 
assumed to have lower cost of capital due to lower costs of bankruptcy. 
6.7 Chapter summary  
Several interesting deductions from the results were presented in this chapter. Since the 
focus of this study was the building of the BLMI and the ALMI, and testing these 
empirically, the summary here concentrates on these two liquidity measures. First, there 
is a positive relationship between BLMI and capital ratio and the association is both 
statistically and economically significant. The observation that bank liquidity is dependent 
on capital ratio is in line with the risk absorption hypothesis (see section 2.4.10) which 
states that banks with a significant level of capital has a greater ability to absorb risk and 
therefore, can create more liquidity. Second, BLMI is significantly negatively related to 
EFD. The more the bank’s dependency on external funding the less its liquidity holdings, 
alternatively the higher is its liquidity risk. Third, the BLMI is correctly predicted by macro-
economic fundaments as it was negatively related to economic growth and the 
relationship is statistically significant. This is consistent with the view (Tsaganesh, 2012) 
that during periods of economic growth, banks tend to increase their lending activities 
resulting in the asset portfolio being disproportionally skewed towards a less liquid loan 
book. Fourth, both BLMI and ALMI show banks tend to hold a higher level of liquid assets 
in times of crisis. Fifth, the newly constructed liquidity measures are negatively related to 
ROA although the relationship is not significant. Finally, some of the results show different 
associations between the selected liquidity measures and the regressors. These 
discrepancies can only be explained by the fact that the liquidity measures under 
investigation were constructed differently and depending on the variables used the 
signs/relationship may differ.   
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CHAPTER 7  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is, firstly, to provide concluding remarks on theoretical and 
empirical findings in this research. Secondly, it provides a summary of the contribution of 
this study to the existing body of knowledge on liquidity risk in the light of asset–liability 
mismatches. Thirdly, it highlights some shortcomings of this study, and finally, it provides 
recommendations for future research.  
The empirical analysis began by resolving the issues around the appropriate measure of 
bank liquidity through construction of the bank liquidity mismatch index (BLMI) and the 
ALMI. Then, the standard liquidity measures, the Basel III liquidity measures and the new 
liquidity measures were regressed against the same determinants using a panel of 12 
banks over the period 2005–2015. The pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed 
(within), the generalised least squares (GLS), LSDV, and the 2-step GMM models were 
used to estimate the relationships. 
Therefore, this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 7.2 provides a theoretical basis for 
the construction of the BLMI and the BLMI. Section 7.3 lays out the main empirical 
findings of the study, and Section 7.4 highlights both theoretical and 
methodological/empirical contributions of this study. Section 7.5 acknowledges the 
shortcomings of the study and reflects recommendations for future research in the area 
of liquidity risk and liquidity management.  
7.2 The theoretical framework of the modified liquidity mismatch index 
It is widely understood that a robust financial system is the main driver of a well-
functioning economy (Hermes & Lensink, 2013). Thus, a growing economy is 
characterised by a stable and efficient banking sector. This also implies that a less 
resilient financial sector could lead the economy into recession and systemically global 
recession (Dungey & Gajurel, 2014). Certainly, bank liquidity was the centrepiece in the 
puzzle of the more recent financial crisis. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) and Berger and 
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Bouwman (2009) argue that it is liquidity that triggered the events that were witnessed 
during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.  
The global financial crisis underscored the importance of more rigorous, comprehensive 
and meticulous liquidity risk management techniques. Before the crisis, the Basel 
committee predominantly focused on providing guidance to banks on the capital side as 
the BCBS’s aim was to combat credit risk not knowing that liquidity risk was equally 
destructive (BIS, 2013). Brunnermeier et al. (2013) indicate that it is not the capital 
structure that is important, but the proportion of debt comprising short-term demandable 
deposits. It is against this background that the BCBS proposed the LCR and NSFR as 
measures to regulate liquidity in commercial banks. However, despite the overwhelming 
need for proper management of liquidity risk there is still no consensus on the definition 
of liquidity risk, let alone an ideal measure of liquidity. Thus, liquidity is an elusive 
phenomenon, which is difficult to understand and to quantify. The Basel III measures are 
the best liquidity measures that try to capture the multidimensional mechanism of liquidity.  
Nevertheless, other scholars and empirical studies, for example Brunnermeier et al. 
(2013), Bai et al. (2014), and Krishnamurthy et al. (2016), argue that the Basel III 
measures do not have a proper conceptual framework as they preceded theory. 
Moreover, these regulatory liquidity measures do not provide a proper linkage between 
the economy and the financial sector. To assume that the Basel III liquidity measures 
provide information about the banking system and its nexus with the economy is a fallacy 
Brunnermeier et al., (2013). It was this fallacy which compelled the study to interrogate 
current liquidity measures further since the performance of the overall economy cannot 
be inferred from both the Basel III and standard liquidity measures.  
The present study built on the work by Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Bai et al. (2014) and 
Krishnamurthy et al (2016) who developed system-wide LMI. The present study modified 
their approach by constructing two measures, the BLMI and the ALMI, liquidity measures 
that evaluate bank-specific liquidity in the form of BLMI and the market-wide liquidity in 
the form of the ALMI. Like the Basel III and other standard liquidity measures, the 
proposed measures are inclusive of both the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. 
However, the liquidity measures developed in this study investigated the mismatches 
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between the liabilities and the assets of individual banks. These assets and liabilities of a 
given bank were incorporated into the new measure taking into account liquidity stress 
events as the assets and liabilities were parameterised by liquidity weights. The weights 
designed and allocated were both theoretically and empirically motivated and derived 
from lessons learnt during the turmoil of 2007–2009. Krishnamurthy (2016), Bai et al. 
(2014) and Adler (2014) assert that, after the liquidity crisis, illiquidity and other financial 
frictions are now of paramount importance to financial markets and the overall economy. 
They also further observe that there are little academic literature and few models on 
financial fragility and on possibility of a liquidity crisis.  
The BLMI and the ALMI can be used to predict crises as the indices constructed also took 
into account market-wide liquidity developments. In line with Duffie’s (2012) proposition 
that a good liquidity measure should at least capture the systemic risk of the financial 
sector. The new liquidity measures were developed in a manner that considers the 
adverse systemic spillovers in the financial sector. Moreover, these measures integrate 
the market liquidity and the funding liquidity. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) argue that a good 
measure should be able to capture the fact that banks hold illiquid assets financed by 
short-term debt and when bank run behaviour emerges, the liquidity measures should 
capture the increased systemic risk. Thus, the modified liquidity mismatch indices 
developed in the current study are a significant improvement to the existing liquidity 
measures as the MLMI measures significantly capture the multidimensional aspects of 
liquidity. The measures can be relied upon when measuring the vulnerability of a 
particular bank due to its bank level-specific factors as well as market-wide deteriorations 
in liquidity. The ALMI could act as bank’s eagle eye view of the financial system, 
particularly in terms of systemic risk and liquidity risk.  
Liquidity measures proposed in this study could be used to administer a liquidity stress 
test. Arguably, a proper liquidity measure should be in a position to identify the bank’s 
cross-section liquidity risk thereby realising the level of the liquidity risk of a specific bank. 
Thus, when there is an adverse movement in liquidity conditions at market level, the bank 
with the worst BLMI should suffer the greatest damage. The liquidity condition of a 
particular bank can be portrayed by deterioration in the performance by the bank in the 
form of poor profitability ratios as well as stock returns (Bai et al., 2014).  
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Lastly, the ALMI is a theoretically motivated macro-prudential liquidity measure as our 
approach in its construction began with the bank-specific liquidity measures and then 
aggregating them to market-wide liquidity measure. Our approach is different from Bai et 
al. (2014) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) as they started from a system-wide perspective 
and then narrowed it down to a specific bank. Therefore, their LMI weights were 
parameterised by liquidity weights that were scaled by this market-wide factor. There is a 
need for proper development of a macro-prudential liquidity measure because the existing 
standard liquidity measures and the Basel III liquidity measures cannot be aggregated 
and therefore, cannot be used in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. 
That is the reason why the DSGE models assumed away financial friction and worse still, 
the models did not include the influence of the financial sector (Adler, 2014).  
With the ALMI now, the DSGE models should get rid of their assumptions that markets 
are frictionless as indeed markets have frictions, and the assumption that corporates, 
individuals and other economic agents by-pass the financial intermediaries and invest 
directly, as reality shows otherwise. The DSGE models can now incorporate the role of 
banks during crisis and thereby improve their prediction accuracy in terms of how the 
economy may be affected. According to Brunnermeier at al. (2013), we now have ample 
data, which allows us to build macro-finance models unlike in the past.  
7.3 Summary of results 
In this study we developed, implemented and validated the liquidity mismatch index 
initially proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2012). The LMI takes into account both the 
liability and asset side of the balance sheet of the bank; thus, the measure considers 
market liquidity and funding liquidity. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) show that there are 
strong negative interrelationships between funding liquidity risk and a measure for market 
liquidity, an indication that market liquidity is dependent on funding liquidity where higher 
funding liquidity risk implies lower market liquidity. The LMI transformed into BLMI and 
ALMI, the measures which also capture and show the interaction between the market 
liquidity and funding liquidity in the context of asset–liability mismatches. The empirical 
findings of this study highlighted the determinants of liquidity and the importance of 
measuring bank liquidity in the context of asset–liability mismatches. Specifically, the 
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determinants of liquidity were tested in terms of how and to which extent they influence 
Basel III liquidity measures, other traditional liquidity measures and the new liquidity 
measures, the BLMI and the ALMI. 
To test the new liquidity measures empirically against their determinants, we constructed 
the BLMI and ALMI using data from 12 registered banks in South Africa in the period 
2005–2015 (11 years). Using panel data methodology, the study investigated the time-
series and cross-sectional patterns of these banks. In the analysis, several interesting 
presumptions from the results are reflected. Since the focus of this study was the building 
of a theoretically motivated liquidity measure that could account for systemic liquidity risk, 
we focused on the mixed results from the BLMI and the ALMI. Conclusions drawn are 
deemed very robust because they were observed from five dynamic estimation models 
and other liquidity measure were also tested for comparison . Most of the results are 
consistent with theory.  
The cross-section analysis revealed some stimulating patterns in the way that banks in 
South Africa manage liquidity risk. Results revealed that there is a significant positive 
relationship between BLMI and bank capital. This is an indication that banks with higher 
capital levels tend to hold relatively more liquid assets than short-term liabilities. At 
market-wide level, the results show that banks increase their liquidity buffers or 
alternatively reduce their short-term obligations when capital increases. This shows that 
the effects of the risk absorption hypothesis (see Section 2.4.10) is greater than financial 
the fragility–crowding-out theory (see Section 2.4.10). This is in sharp contrast with most 
empirical studies, e.g. Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Chikoko (2013) who found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between bank liquidity and capital level. Our 
results, consequently, support the effects of bank capital requirements as an increase in 
capital ratio would promote financial stability. 
The relationship between the bank size and the new liquidity measures is not consistent. 
There is a negative relationship between bank size and BLMI (see Table 6.8). However, 
on the other side, the aggregate liquidity measures show a statistically significant positive 
relationship under the fixed effects model. This is different to the widely accepted notion 
that the larger the bank, the better is its capacity to borrow from the market in times of 
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need, therefore larger banks can hold proportionally fewer liquid assets than small banks. 
Our results do not support the too-big-to-fail hypothesis (Farag et al., 2013) and moreover 
the present results are different from other empirical results, such as by Steffen et al. 
(2010) and Lucchetta (2007). However, our results confirm Bai et al.’s (2014) findings, 
which indicate that LMI correlates positively with bank size. 
We investigated the reliance of banks on external sources of funding besides retail 
deposits or wholesale funding as we believe that external funding dependency has some 
effect on the possibility of the bank facing liquidity risk. There is a negative significant 
relationship between the BLMI and EFD. This is in line with the theory of moral hazard 
(Farag et al., 2013) where a highly geared bank have incentives to take on excessive 
liquidity risk by holding fewer liquid assets and by further increasing short-term debt. We 
found no evidence to support Shen et al.’s (2009) proposition that banks which depend 
on external funding end up in serious liquidity problems as the South African banking 
sector was resilient during the 2007–2009 crisis. Neither did our results support the view 
that external funding is costly and therefore banks should minimise depending on external 
funding. This is fertile ground for further research as very few studies have so far tested 
this phenomenon empirically – even with the standard liquidity measures. 
We found a positive relationship between BLMI and bank profitability as measured by 
ROA. The results indicated that banks that are highly profitable tend to hold more liquid 
assets relative to short-term liabilities. In this study, the profitability of a bank is considered 
an endogenous factor and the results confirm the notion that the higher the bank’s 
profitability the higher its liquidity. According to Sudirman (2015), there is a positive 
association between bank profitability and liquidity because profitability is one of the main 
drivers of bank liquidity buffers. 
We obtained mixed results on the relationship between economic performance and the 
new liquidity measures. Using LSDV results corrected for Kiviet’s bias (Kiviet et al., 2017), 
there is a positive significant relationship between BLMI and GDP growth. Results from 
the present study show a negative significant relationship with ALMI. The study assumes 
the economic performance may predict market-wide liquidity better. Therefore, in line with 
theoretical prediction we found a negative relationship between ALMI and economic 
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growth. This is supported by the theory of bank fragility, which postulates that banks tend 
to invest their money in safe securities during periods of depression and recession. 
Therefore, during periods of economic downturn, banks has tendency of investing most 
of their funds in short-term, highly liquid assets thereby reducing investment in illiquid 
long-term assets. Empirically, other scholars such as Tseganesh (2012), Choon et al. 
(2013), and Audo (2014) also found that bank liquidity buffers are related negatively to 
economic growth.  
The results however indicate that market-wide liquidity measure and bank-specific 
liquidity measures are influenced differently by GDP growth. The BLMI shows a negative 
relationship with economic performance. This is contrary to bank the fragility theory, which 
shows that banks tend to increase their liquidity buffers and reduce short-term liabilities 
in times of recession. The relationship however confirms the hypothesis that economic 
agents are reluctant to save during periods of economic growth; thus, banks get very little 
deposits from their clients in periods of economic expansion, subsequently reducing their 
liquid asset buffers. Other scholars (Moore, 2010; Vodová, 2012) argue that, during 
periods of economic expansion, banks tend to increase their liquidity buffers because the 
demand for loans tends to increase during economic prosperity. The lending activity of 
banks therefore tends to increase with the growth of GDP. 
In line with theory (Cornett et al. 2010) both the BLMI and the ALMI have a negative 
association with the loan portfolio. The loan portfolio is not liquid. Therefore, an increase 
in the loan portfolio typically means a decrease in liquid assets and an increase in long-
term illiquid assets. The amount of liquid assets held by banks is dependent on the level 
of loan demand, which is the basis on which the loan portfolio grows (Pilbeam, 2005, p. 
42). 
Our results further showed a negative relationship between the new liquidity measures 
and interest rates. Moreover, the relationship was significant for ALMI. Since the interbank 
lending rate represents the opportunity cost of not keeping liquid assets to meet 
obligations as they are due and also failure to issue loans as they are demanded, the 
relationship indicated here confirms this theoretical underpinning. Our results confirms 
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Baumol’s (1952) argument that interest rates are the main determinants for speculative 
and precautionary motive for demanding cash and the relationship is negative. 
We used a dummy variable to capture the period of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. 
Our results showed that banks increase their liquidity buffers during times of crisis. We 
deliberately included this measure as a way to investigate the bank liquidity behaviour 
during periods of turmoil. Contrary to what one would have expected, the liquidity 
positions of banks, as measured by BLMI and ALMI, did not deteriorate during the crisis 
period. In fact, banks in South Africa indicated that their liquidity mismatch increased over 
the same period. This can only be explained by the theory of moral hazard (Repullo, 
2003), where Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that, during liquidity crises, firms fail to 
raise the significant portion of their desired investment from the market; therefore, tend to 
keep highly liquid assets.  
On adverse selection theory, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) indicate that banks that are 
financially constrained have a tendency of holding on to more liquid assets. Therefore, 
banks have to hold enough liquid assets to be utilised in times of trouble or in times of 
need. The new liquidity measures helped us understand liquidity developments in the 
financial sector and especially the interconnectedness of financial institutions in the 
financial sector. The most important aspects exhibited by these measures were found to 
be a liquidity barometer at micro and also at macro level. Furthermore, they take in 
account both the funding and the asset side of the balance sheet and capture the asset–
liability mismatches.  
Finally, the results indicate that there is a negative relationship between bank 
performance as measured by ROA and the BLMI. Likewise, there is a negative 
insignificant relationship between bank profitability and ALMI. Our results differ from the 
proposition by Bourke (1989), namely that insufficient liquidity is the main reason why 
banks fail; thus, the higher the liquidity, the better for bank performance.  
7.4 Contribution of the study and policy implications  
Thus far, the bank liquidity risk has been studied scantly in both emerging and developed 
markets, and such studies were done using standard liquidity measures. Amongst the 
known empirical studies on liquidity phenomenon, liquidity was explored within the 
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segments of market liquidity and funding liquidity; yet, these two are profoundly 
interconnected. Liquidity standard measures also failed to grasp the banking sector 
important characteristic of liquidity spirals (Bai et al., 2014; Bouwman, 2009; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). Despite the introduction of theoretically baseless Basel III 
liquidity measures, there are still some shortcomings as both the standard and Basel III 
liquidity measures are not comprehensive enough, cannot be aggregated and therefore 
cannot be used as part of DSGE models (Brunnermeier et al. (2013). 
Similar to prior studies, the empirical evidence in the present study showed that banks 
have a tendency to reduce their liquidity mismatches as interest rates increase. In 
addition, banks increase their liquidity as the loan portfolio deteriorates. The ALMI, like 
the LMI, is an aggregate measure and therefore provides a macro-prudential liquidity 
measure that can be utilised in DSGE models. This study makes seven major 
contributions to the literature on the liquidity risk embedded in the asset–liability 
mismatches of banks. 
Thus, the study advanced the frontier of knowledge by developing two liquidity measures, 
which together with the Basel measures and traditional liquidity measures were compared 
and contrasted using a 2-step GMM model. The constructed BLMI and ALMI appeared 
to perform better than the existing liquidity measures. Firstly, the BLMI and ALMI were an 
improvement on Basel III and standard liquidity measures since they had been built upon 
Brunnermeier et al.’s (2013) LMI. The LMI is a quantum leap from the traditional liquidity 
measures (Bai et al., 2016), as it considers the most essential features of bank liquidity 
spirals. This measure is inclusive of the funding liquidity of a bank and the market liquidity 
of its assets. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) observe that it is not the level of gearing that is 
important, but rather the proportion of debt comprising short-term demandable deposits. 
Moreover, the LMI can account for bank systemic risk and can be estimated empirically 
unlike other liquidity measures that cannot be measured in timely fashion (Brunnermeier 
& Oehmke, 2012). Despite, the extensive pluses associated with LMI, Bai et al. (2014) 
highlight the major shortcomings of the LMI inform of how the liquidity weights were 
computed. The liquidity weights used in empirical testing of the LMI were arbitrarily 
chosen and were therefore not backed by theory. The development of the new measures 
181 
 
of liquidity in terms of the BLMI and ALMI was the main contribution of this study. The 
MLMI measures were developed based on theoretically motivated liquidity weights.  
The asset liquidity weights were modified considerably and are different from the weights 
computed and utilised by Brunnermeier et al. (2013), Bai et al. (2014) and Krishnamurthy 
et al. (2016). These scholars utilised the haircuts on assets as a measure of asset 
weights. Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) argue that haircuts are natural measures of asset 
liquidity sensitivity because they vary with measures of asset price volatility and tail risk 
for a given asset class. However, Corrigan and De Terán (2007) indicate that haircut 
usage in the determination of assets weight is not consistent since haircuts are not 
uniform to all dealers in the money market, even in a situation where different 
counterparties use the same type of collateral. Moreover, the repo haircut data for each 
bank are inaccessible in an ideal world (Krishnamurthy et al., 2016). Instead of using 
haircuts, we computed the asset liquidity weight, using a combination of spread and 
volume, where the absolute bid–ask spread was scaled by the volume traded on that day. 
This is a theoretically and empirically validated measure of market liquidity (e.g. Roll, 
1984; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Chordia , 2001, Huberman and Halka, 2001).  
Another modification was done on the liability weights. Instead of using OIS–TBill spread 
as per Bai et al. (2014), we used the spread between the treasury bill rate and the 
SABOR. This measure, according to Nagel (2014), accurately measures the time 
variation of a money market instrument. Since the liquidity condition was assumed to be 
accurately depicted by the SABOR–TBill spread (STBS, we used it in the calculation of 
liability side liquidity weights.  
Furthermore, we contribute to the body of knowledge by empirically testing the new 
liquidity measures against the determinants of liquidity as means of validating the BLMI 
and the ALMI. Thus, the empirical findings of this study highlight the determinants of 
liquidity and the importance of measuring bank liquidity in the context of asset–liability 
mismatches. An understanding of liquidity risk was achieved through examination of 
determinants of liquidity. The determinants of liquidity were tested in terms of how and to 
which extent they influence Basel III liquidity measures, other traditional liquidity 
measures and the new liquidity measure (MLMI). An analysis of Basel III liquidity 
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measures and selected traditional liquidity measures was done at bank-specific level 
while the analysis of the determinants of LMI was done at both bank level and market-
wide level, taking into account that banks manage their assets and liabilities in the sphere 
of interdependence in the financial sector. The analysis was therefore, done in the context 
of interbank linkages, since in modern finance theory, financial markets are 
interconnected in multiple ways. In addition, the ALMI provide more information on the 
fragility of the financial sector because it is an aggregate measure of liquidity that can be 
used as part of DSGE models. Our results provide new insights into the study of liquidity 
risk in light of asset–liability mismatches since we investigated how the determinants of 
liquidity are endogenous.  
Firstly, we found that banks increased their liquidity buffers during times of turmoil as both 
BLMI and ALMI improved during the period 2007–2009. Secondly, the improvement in 
economic performance as measured by GDP growth resulted in a rise in the LMI at 
market-wide level. However, the increase in GDP growth resulted in a decrease in the 
LMI at bank level. Thirdly, we found no evidence to support the theory that banks that 
heavily depend on external funding end up in serious liquidity problems as the south 
African banks were resilient during the 2007–2009 crisis. Neither did our results support 
the view that external funding is costly and therefore banks should minimise depending 
on external funding. Fourthly, we also found that bank liquidity is influenced by both bank-
specific factors and macro-economic factors. Nevertheless, the liquidity measures had 
different associations with the determinants. Finally, there is negative relationships 
between bank performance as measured by ROA and the MLMI measures.  
The findings in this study imply that any policy implemented with the intention of 
increasing bank capital is good for bank liquidity since the financial fragility crowding out 
hypothesis is outweighed by the risk absorption hypothesis as the relationship between 
capital and bank liquidity is positive. Banks should monitor closely the banks specific and 
market wide liquidity developments because MLMI measures were found to negatively 
affect bank performance.  
183 
 
7.5 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research 
This study was limited to registered banks in South Africa that had accessible data for the 
period 2005 to 2015. Consequently, a small cohort was left out from the analysis due to 
difficulty of obtaining financial statements for these banks. Most of the banks excluded 
were small in terms of asset base; therefore, their inclusion could have provided some 
important insights on liquidity and bank size. It would be interesting to find how small 
banks reacted during the global financial crisis. Furthermore, inclusion of a comparative 
study between banks registered in South Africa and non-South African banks operating 
in South Africa may be insightful, especially as international banks can get liquidity 
assistance from their parent companies in time of need. Since banks can get help from 
the parent company in times of crises, an analysis of the banks as part of holding 
companies could be justified.  
The banks were analysed over a period that included the period of global financial crisis, 
and the study even controlled this by way of a dummy variable. However, we recommend 
the period under investigation to be split into period before the crisis, during the crisis and 
after the crisis. Understanding the liquidity dynamics in each period, especially in the 
context of asset–liability mismatches, may provide banks with relevant liquidity 
management techniques suitable for each period.  
This study revealed that banks that have higher liquidity mismatch are associated with 
lower performance, and also that banks that have higher returns also have higher liquidity 
mismatch. It is not clear whether it was liquidity that caused bank profitability or if it was 
bank profitability that caused liquidity. Therefore, future research should focus on 
understanding which causes which. Moreover, further research could look at the optimal 
amount of liquidity that a bank can hold accounting for the trade-off, which is there 
between low-return liquid assets and the higher return from an illiquid long-term loan 
portfolio. Finally, there is a need to analyse BLMI on Fama - French’s three-factor model 
(Fama & French, 1996) as the fourth factor and to determine how liquidity affects the 
stock return of a specific bank. Since the ALMI is an aggregate measure, it would be 
interesting to see it empirically tested as part of DSGE models. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of L1 liquidity measure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Pooled OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.L1 0.495** 0.425*** 0.446 0.512*** 0.647 
 (2.76) (12.28) (1.90) (5.18) (0.69) 
      
CR 0.852* 0.828*** 1.066 1.021** 1.453* 
 (2.02) (20.69) (1.63) (3.24) (2.77) 
      
Dep 1.067* 1.105*** 1.145 1.065*** 1.619 
 (2.38) (24.75) (1.61) (5.00) (1.68) 
      
SIZE -0.000557 -0.00110 -0.0104 -0.0110 0.00626 
 (-0.19) (-1.88) (-1.36) (-0.93) (0.44) 
      
LG -0.0485* -0.0388*** -0.0554 -0.0600 -0.0392 
 (-2.00) (-9.31) (-1.51) (-1.73) (-1.91) 
      
EFD -0.924* -0.966*** -0.901 -0.845*** -1.066 
 (-2.57) (-25.68) (-1.37) (-21.71) (-1.33) 
      
GDP 0.151 0.0737** 0.0878 0.0839 -0.329 
 (0.81) (2.66) (0.54) (1.10) (-0.20) 
      
IBR 0.0153 0.0392 -0.261 -0.222 -0.249 
 (0.09) (1.43) (-1.23) (-0.49) (-0.12) 
      
ROA 0.0131 -0.0175 -0.0898 -0.160*** 0.468 
 (0.10) (-0.51) (-0.24) (-4.98) (0.45) 
      
DUMMY -0.00527 -0.00449*** -0.00573 -0.00654 -0.0248 
 (-0.85) (-3.79) (-1.28) (-1.57) (-0.26) 
      
_cons 0.444** 0.520*** 0.589**  -0.135 
 (3.11) (14.05) (3.54)  (-0.18) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Appendix 2 : Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of L1 liquidity measure 
  OLS     GLS       FE      LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 62.81 26190.52 9963.7  3472.31 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   18.35   
Prob>chi2   0.0594   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.8239   
Between   0.8249   
Overall 0.9291  0.8208   
      
rho    0.64854879   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -0.99 
Prob>z     0.321 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.02 
Prob>z     0.308 
      
Sargan test of overid     0.39 
Prob>chi2     0.822 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.06 
Prob>chi2     0.97 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 3 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of L2 liquidity measure 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.L2 0.318* 0.282*** 0.299 0.379*** 0.605 
 (2.16) (15.54) (1.52) (4.23) (1.17) 
      
CR 2.747* 2.821*** 3.287 3.056** 9.570 
 (2.03) (17.29) (1.65) (2.91) (2.19) 
      
Dep 1.428 1.474*** 1.248 1.043* 7.479 
 (1.68) (11.14) (0.87) (2.04) (1.53) 
      
SIZE -0.00411 -0.00412** -0.0212 -0.0205 0.0313 
 (-0.52) (-3.19) (-0.60) (-0.55) (0.34) 
      
LG -0.0516 -0.0430*** -0.0957 -0.105 -0.0765 
 (-1.01) (-6.52) (-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.02) 
      
EFD -2.709** -2.786*** -2.652 -2.459*** -6.358* 
 (-2.94) (-22.18) (-1.51) (-12.61) (-2.47) 
      
GDP 0.645 0.449*** 0.540 0.568** 1.631 
 (1.07) (5.91) (2.00) (3.11) (0.29) 
      
IBR 0.187 0.282*** -0.168 -0.00673 -4.908 
 (0.34) (3.55) (-0.27) (-0.00) (-0.58) 
      
ROA -0.227 -0.278** -0.231 -0.299 -1.968 
 (-0.64) (-3.12) (-0.32) (-0.98) (-0.73) 
      
DUMMY -0.0324 -0.0305*** -0.0360 -0.0377* -0.00741 
 (-0.93) (-8.52) (-1.03) (-2.47) (-0.03) 
      
_cons 1.949*** 2.006*** 2.344**  -0.670 
 (6.81) (35.56) (3.24)  (-0.24) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
 
 
233 
 
Appendix 4: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of L2 liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 85.42 18783.07 20645.75  123.28 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   32.06   
Prob>chi2   0.0004   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.7842   
Between   0.853   
Overall 0.8963  0.8139   
      
rho    0.58742222   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -0.75 
Prob>z     0.456 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.04 
Prob>z     0.299 
      
Sargan test of overid     0.09 
Prob>chi2     0.956 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.15 
Prob>chi2     0.929 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 5 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of L3 liquidity measure 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.L3 0.437* 0.435*** 0.324 0.416*** 0.477 
 (2.60) (9.95) (1.46) (6.14) (1.51) 
      
CR 0.944* 0.886*** 0.914 0.877* 1.626* 
 (2.31) (10.44) (1.59) (2.23) (2.69) 
      
Dep 1.072* 0.984*** 1.115 1.021*** 1.973** 
 (2.48) (11.60) (1.77) (5.26) (4.37) 
      
SIZE -0.00615 -0.00729*** -0.0198 -0.0206 -0.00633 
 (-1.76) (-5.15) (-1.02) (-1.16) (-0.25) 
      
LG -0.0999* -0.0988*** -0.121* -0.128** -0.105* 
 (-2.17) (-12.10) (-2.95) (-2.85) (-2.28) 
      
EFD -0.868* -0.793*** -0.797 -0.737*** -1.161 
 (-2.53) (-11.68) (-1.41) (-4.61) (-1.92) 
      
GDP 0.398 0.345* 0.450 0.469*** -0.336 
 (1.48) (2.22) (1.44) (6.38) (-0.36) 
      
IBR 0.416 0.584*** 0.0747 0.103 0.318 
 (1.36) (3.98) (0.22) (0.17) (0.26) 
      
ROA -0.120 -0.228* 0.386 0.235* 0.475 
 (-0.55) (-2.48) (0.74) (2.10) (0.22) 
      
DUMMY -0.0186 -0.0189** -0.0218 -0.0259*** -0.0347 
 (-1.52) (-3.01) (-1.22) (-7.05) (-0.61) 
      
_cons 0.473* 0.491*** 0.746  0.00671 
 (2.59) (10.16) (2.16)  (0.01) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
 
235 
 
Appendix 6: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of L3 liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 52.53 1396.14 878.23  867.5 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   42.93   
Prob>chi2   0.0000   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.6969   
Between   0.6954   
Overall 0.8171  0.6686   
      
rho    0.5583521   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -2.15 
Prob>z     0.032 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.17 
Prob>z     0.244 
      
Sargan test of overid     0.6 
Prob>chi2     0.741 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.39 
Prob>chi2     0.824 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 7 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of L4 liquidity measure 
  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2 step System GMM 
      
L.L4 0.375** 0.360*** 0.313 0.406*** 0.457 
 (2.67) (12.63) (1.68) (5.30) (1.13) 
      
CR 2.581* 2.646*** 2.819 2.623** 5.863* 
 (2.21) (10.19) (1.69) (2.65) (2.87) 
      
Dep 1.390 1.424*** 1.118 0.912* 4.833* 
 (1.81) (5.91) (0.90) (2.02) (2.58) 
      
SIZE -0.0116 -0.0108*** -0.0242 -0.0246 0.00265 
 (-1.64) (-4.43) (-0.64) (-0.62) (0.05) 
      
LG -0.179* -0.149*** -0.243 -0.255* -0.205* 
 (-2.30) (-11.01) (-2.03) (-2.55) (-2.26) 
      
EFD -2.235** -2.270*** -2.042 -1.857*** -4.498*** 
 (-2.75) (-11.84) (-1.40) (-5.89) (-5.27) 
      
GDP 1.322* 0.480 1.345 1.424*** 2.159* 
 (2.09) (1.20) (1.89) (10.23) (2.53) 
      
IBR 0.505 0.503 0.0833 0.208 -2.602 
 (0.72) (1.33) (0.10) (0.15) (-0.93) 
      
ROA -0.355 -0.171 0.462 0.279 1.519 
 (-0.86) (-0.77) (0.55) (0.97) (0.69) 
      
DUMMY -0.0448 -0.0269 -0.0514 -0.0578*** -0.0253 
 (-1.35) (-1.62) (-1.29) (-5.15) (-0.45) 
      
_cons 1.616*** 1.602*** 1.974***  0.532 
 (4.90) (14.41) (4.47)  (0.23) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
` 
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Appendix 8: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of L4 liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 44.24 8347.45 653.97  84.37 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   -28.5   
Prob>chi2      
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.6928   
Between   0.7940   
Overall 0.8215  0.7333   
      
rho    0.5107136   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -0.89 
Prob>z     0.375 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.07 
Prob>z     0.285 
      
Sargan test of overid     2.06 
Prob>chi2     0.357 
      
Hansen test of overid      1.18 
Prob>chi2     0.555 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 9 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of LCR liquidity measure 
  (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.LCR -0.0696 -0.0811** -0.122*** -0.0246 0.134** 
 (-1.90) (-2.61) (-8.04) (-0.49) (3.29) 
      
CR 30.67 19.84 230.3 233.4 -23.15 
 (0.16) (0.81) (0.86) (0.19) (-0.01) 
      
Dep 242.0 192.5*** 214.9 194.1 -375.1 
 (1.05) (7.73) (1.05) (0.46) (-0.20) 
      
SIZE -2.375 -2.727*** -8.245 -8.625 37.45 
 (-0.60) (-5.01) (-0.38) (-0.13) (1.08) 
      
LG 76.59 67.24*** 62.85 58.14 12.27 
 (0.75) (12.97) (0.85) (0.41) (0.21) 
      
EFD 72.09 59.02*** 116.6 115.1 836.5 
 (0.52) (3.84) (0.67) (0.16) (0.78) 
      
GDP -2576.1 -2540.9*** -2608.6 -2663.7*** 1566.0 
 (-1.02) (-28.24) (-0.98) (-13.87) (0.59) 
      
IBR 580.4 587.0*** 467.4 530.1 -2595.4 
 (0.92) (6.65) (1.44) (0.29) (-1.16) 
      
ROA 220.8 233.5*** -170.2 -164.5 890.6 
 (0.57) (4.71) (-0.91) (-0.20) (0.67) 
      
DUMMY -12.61 -13.55** -11.87 -8.734 125.2 
 (-0.68) (-3.19) (-1.08) (-0.52) (1.32) 
      
_cons -237.1 -182.4*** -146.6  -1006.9 
 (-0.88) (-8.68) (-0.55)  (-1.34) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Appendix 10: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of LCR liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K-BS SE 
2 step 
System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 0.77 1698.87 1411.23  5.08 
Prob>F 0.6546 0.0000 0.0000  0.0070 
      
Hausman Test   0.5   
Prob>chi2   1.0000   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.086   
Between   0.1511   
Overall 0.0999  0.0767   
      
rho    0.08749605   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -1.14 
Prob>z     0.256 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.33 
Prob>z     0.183 
      
Sargan test of overid     2.85 
Prob>chi2     0.241 
      
Hansen test of overid      1.17 
Prob>chi2     0.558 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 11 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of NSFR liquidity measure 
  (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2 step System GMM 
      
L.NSFR 0.313 0.320*** 0.225 0.307*** 0.747 
 (1.97) (10.15) (0.91) (49.42) (1.77) 
      
CR -2.278* -1.861*** -2.816 -2.708*** -5.978*** 
 (-2.32) (-13.03) (-1.75) (-4.19) (-4.90) 
      
Dep -2.806** -2.423*** -3.122 -2.954*** -4.869* 
 (-2.85) (-17.78) (-1.85) (-10.14) (-3.10) 
      
SIZE -0.00270 -0.00104 0.0336 0.0366 -0.0844 
 (-0.42) (-1.00) (1.78) (1.27) (-1.15) 
      
LG 0.126** 0.111*** 0.130 0.143* 0.0646 
 (3.20) (10.69) (1.94) (2.26) (0.73) 
      
EFD 2.200** 1.882*** 2.200 2.081*** 2.322* 
 (2.91) (16.73) (1.57) (6.07) (2.41) 
      
GDP -0.154 -0.270*** 0.0743 0.0142 -0.701 
 (-0.30) (-4.39) (0.54) (0.07) (-2.10) 
      
IBR 0.0942 0.161** 0.868 0.860 4.397 
 (0.20) (2.60) (1.47) (0.78) (2.15) 
      
ROA -0.580 -0.638*** -0.0258 0.105 -0.904 
 (-1.98) (-5.37) (-0.05) (0.29) (-0.44) 
      
DUMMY 0.0125 0.0121*** 0.0121 0.0138 -0.0680 
 (1.13) (4.37) (1.06) (1.32) (-1.95) 
      
_cons 1.022* 0.944*** 0.692  3.586 
 (2.46) (18.00) (1.00)  (1.51) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
 
241 
 
Appendix 12: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of NSFR liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K-BS SE 2 step System GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 23.35 6752.85 4933.36  1147.85 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   32.5   
Prob>chi2   0.0003   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.7429   
Between   0.5517   
Overall 0.8717  0.6208   
      
rho    0.71576976   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -0.47 
Prob>z     0.641 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -2.14 
Prob>z     0.032 
      
Sargan test of overid     3.28 
Prob>chi2     0.94 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.31 
Prob>chi2     0.855 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 13 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of BLMI liquidity measure 
  (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
      
L.BLMI 0.394* 0.350*** 0.372 0.434*** 0.462 
 (2.62) (19.31) (2.14) (5.13) (1.46) 
      
CR 0.746 0.755*** 0.944 0.874** 2.390** 
 (1.80) (23.87) (1.68) (2.72) (3.32) 
      
Dep 0.392 0.359*** 0.341 0.286 1.778 
 (1.44) (13.39) (0.75) (1.77) (2.04) 
      
SIZE -0.0000556 0.000828 -0.00712 -0.00798 0.0181 
 (-0.02) (1.70) (-0.75) (-0.69) (1.35) 
      
LG -0.0340 -0.0326*** -0.0313 -0.0340 -0.0122 
 (-1.88) (-11.70) (-0.86) (-1.19) (-0.85) 
      
EFD -0.873** -0.860*** -0.876 -0.818*** -1.630** 
 (-2.77) (-38.58) (-1.61) (-23.66) (-3.33) 
      
GDP 0.212 0.269*** 0.127 0.144** 0.210 
 (1.09) (3.69) (0.87) (2.66) (1.26) 
      
IBR -0.0429 -0.103 -0.203 -0.154 -1.302 
 (-0.23) (-1.37) (-1.10) (-0.35) (-2.17) 
      
ROA 0.0212 0.0345 0.0541 0.0305 0.109 
 (0.16) (1.63) (0.23) (0.47) (0.16) 
      
DUMMY -0.00193 -0.00234 -0.00223 -0.00216 0.00281 
 (-0.20) (-0.77) (-0.21) (-0.41) (0.20) 
      
_cons 0.475*** 0.477*** 0.616**  -0.321 
 (5.67) (27.44) (4.26)  (-0.96) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Appendix 14: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of BLMI liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 215.95 19848.15 3276.23  27.35 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   25.43   
Prob>chi2   0.0046   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.8311   
Between   0.8224   
Overall 0.9185  0.8155   
      
rho    0.67536741   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -1.01 
Prob>z     0.311 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -0.15 
Prob>z     0.88 
      
Sargan test of overid     1.09 
Prob>chi2     0.579 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.42 
Prob>chi2     0.812 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 15 
Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of ALMI liquidity measure 
  (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K 2 step System GMM 
      
L.ALMI 0.265*** 0.271** 0.138*** 0.203** 0.670*** 
 (8.46) (2.91) (9.96) (2.77) (4.69) 
      
CR -0.0235 -0.00299 0.0487 0.0363 0.169 
 (-0.98) (-1.26) (2.10) (0.42) (0.33) 
      
Dep -0.0240 -0.00296 -0.0182 -0.0206 0.165 
 (-1.14) (-1.23) (-0.52) (-0.62) (0.35) 
      
SIZE -0.000124 -0.0000170 0.0118*** 0.00968 -0.00690 
 (-0.28) (-1.26) (5.62) (1.61) (-1.01) 
      
LG -0.00215 -0.000250 0.00446 0.00384 -0.00812 
 (-0.67) (-1.16) (1.71) (0.48) (-1.04) 
      
EFD 0.0144 0.00178 -0.00200 0.00105 -0.284 
 (0.84) (1.23) (-0.07) (0.03) (-0.82) 
      
GDP -0.0295 -0.0321 -0.0653* -0.0511*** -0.365*** 
 (-0.52) (-0.24) (-2.99) (-11.80) (-4.82) 
      
IBR -1.331*** -1.342*** -1.436*** -1.348*** -0.135 
 (-19.49) (-7.09) (-76.58) (-6.35) (-0.59) 
      
ROA -0.0210 -0.00264 -0.0202 -0.0156 -0.147 
 (-1.00) (-1.22) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.33) 
      
DUMMY 0.0287*** 0.0290*** 0.0291*** 0.0300*** 0.00355 
 (26.57) (4.97) (31.27) (11.20) (0.60) 
      
_cons 0.224*** 0.212*** 0.0365  0.309 
 (12.78) (8.08) (1.05)  (1.89) 
      
N 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Appendix 16: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of ALMI liquidity measure 
  OLS GLS FE LSDV_K-BS SE 
2 step System 
GMM 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
      
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
      
F-stas 759.87 451.97 46579.26  63.86 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
      
Hausman Test   23.57   
Prob>chi2   0.0088   
R-SQUARED       
Within   0.9636   
Between   0.0000   
Overall 0.9550  0.6353   
      
rho    0.9241842   
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -5.66 
Prob>z     0.0000 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -0.75 
Prob>z     0.452 
      
Sargan test of overid     1.04 
Prob>chi2     0.594 
      
Hansen test of overid      0.6 
Prob>chi2     0.741 
      
Instruments          13 
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Appendix 17: BLMI and ALMI computations  
 
Bank 
 
 
 
Date Bank level LMI Aggregate LMI 
1 2015 115,119,059.755588 797,964,812.106101 
1 2014 108,053,433.527647 822,513,883.690802 
1 2013 104,075,689.257252 682,582,916.216018 
1 2012               120,145,979.951225               667,073,523.970703 
1 2011 146,399,297.527632 732,384,140.467896 
1 2010 109,265,307.394963 620,230,228.461251 
1 2009 100,414,128.119842 548,576,516.772922 
1 2008 90,527,687.810817 497,691,071.215788 
1 2007 78,810,917.273792 513,760,852.641302 
1 2006 48,368,867.019565 252,924,975.510743 
1 2005 39,563,397.477298 153,524,918.213924 
1 2003 14,227,845.473667 96,566,815.885509 
1 2002 5,642,215.959955 89,952,586.442110 
1 2001 994,616.174009 56,339,785.784911 
2 2015 990,280.886216 802,782,079.820543 
2 2014 1,188,576.294853 828,767,474.738014 
2 2013 1,071,790.953345 686,460,715.857061 
2 2012 945,495.709903 670,776,256.469106 
2 2011 759,674.935691 733,265,289.953094 
2 2010 643,425.283692 620,346,420.204908 
2 2009 444,344.064679 550,062,529.842120 
2 2008 345,422.204061 499,631,834.120782 
2 2007 331,675.714721 501,809,634.362749 
2 2006 279,566.899343 249,198,813.191267 
2 2005 281,532.096195 145,176,081.618238 
2 2003 220,206.395557 73,772,900.884436 
2 2002 143,563.058829 74,175,448.383707 
2 2001 154,710.449925 44,169,092.927993 
3 2015 336,595.035241 802,782,079.820543 
3 2014 (364,897.206457) 828,767,474.738014 
3 2013 548,607.234687 686,460,715.857061 
3 2012 253,707.410652 670,776,256.469106 
3 2011 (293,112.223282) 733,265,289.953094 
3 2010 (681,787.575026) 620,346,420.204908 
3 2009 182,707.403423 550,062,529.842120 
3 2008 387,790.291909 499,631,834.120782 
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3 2007 261,099.507912 501,809,634.362749 
3 2006 324,660.996631 249,198,813.191267 
3 2005 279,675.602826 145,176,081.618238 
3 2003 146,845.586717 73,772,900.884436 
3 2002 130,673.617377 74,175,448.383707 
3 2001 133,650.399309 44,169,092.927993 
4 2015 23,959,936.482211 802,782,079.820543 
4 2014 21,859,736.720199 828,767,474.738014 
4 2013 20,917,538.714181 686,460,715.857061 
4 2012 20,169,992.730339 670,776,256.469106 
4 2011 18,365,516.453654 733,265,289.953094 
4 2010 9,791,138.144257 620,346,420.204908 
4 2009 4,800,191.688895 550,062,529.842120 
4 2008 3,758,364.142403 499,631,834.120782 
4 2007 1,897,523.481777 501,809,634.362749 
4 2006 893,350.908220 249,198,813.191267 
4 2005 650,767.250659 145,176,081.618238 
4 2003 392,815.217920 73,772,900.884436 
4 2002 298,872.744243 74,175,448.383707 
4 2001 113,165.526413 44,169,092.927993 
5 2015 190,878,942.992340 802,782,079.820543 
5 2014 206,282,792.479498 828,767,474.738014 
5 2013 171,699,431.189216 686,460,715.857061 
5 2012 153,567,717.301636 670,776,256.469106 
5 2011 172,497,061.636413 733,265,289.953094 
5 2010 125,474,126.717246 620,346,420.204908 
5 2009 108,392,644.616618 550,062,529.842120 
5 2008 84,203,267.465672 499,631,834.120782 
5 2007 99,332,544.619891 501,809,634.362749 
5 2006 44,517,348.418877 249,198,813.191267 
5 2005 36,368,359.583327 145,176,081.618238 
5 2003 27,982,297.343327 73,772,900.884436 
5 2002 24,707,187.459808 74,175,448.383707 
5 2001 17,319,936.402771 44,169,092.927993 
6 2015 10,286.699011 802,782,079.820543 
6 2014 (153,603.000352) 828,767,474.738014 
6 2013 216,248.744029 686,460,715.857061 
6 2012 37,992.111586 670,776,256.469106 
6 2011 294,135.738685 733,265,289.953094 
6 2010 24,305.884188 620,346,420.204908 
6 2009 78,171.830368 550,062,529.842120 
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6 2008 181,549.444965 499,631,834.120782 
6 2007 272,736.855539 501,809,634.362749 
6 2006 145,412.203133 249,198,813.191267 
6 2005 111,275.113202 145,176,081.618238 
6 2003 27,633.868869 73,772,900.884436 
6 2002 25,309.125710 74,175,448.383707 
6 2001 24,767.792432 44,169,092.927993 
7 2015 38,996.447509 802,782,079.820543 
7 2014 (37,856.414517) 828,767,474.738014 
7 2013 (32,334.956325) 686,460,715.857061 
7 2012 (56,317.046645) 670,776,256.469106 
7 2011 (34,477.909111) 733,265,289.953094 
7 2010 (88,567.464888) 620,346,420.204908 
7 2009 20,499.876200 550,062,529.842120 
7 2008 (6,488.408437) 499,631,834.120782 
7 2007 (5,568.817810) 501,809,634.362749 
7 2006 (41,870.928178) 249,198,813.191267 
7 2005 (48,313.915667) 145,176,081.618238 
7 2003 (37,049.617210) 73,772,900.884436 
7 2002 (18,882.805139) 74,175,448.383707 
7 2001 (9,937.220923) 44,169,092.927993 
8 2015 92,341,427.786295 802,782,079.820543 
8 2014 98,225,720.133244 828,767,474.738014 
8 2013 86,361,900.907585 686,460,715.857061 
8 2012 75,214,812.067544 670,776,256.469106 
8 2011 71,532,800.734163 733,265,289.953094 
8 2010 56,467,121.619108 620,346,420.204908 
8 2009 36,088,752.347026 550,062,529.842120 
8 2008 27,491,608.530559 499,631,834.120782 
8 2007 26,558,586.797738 501,809,634.362749 
8 2006 11,457,961.045874 249,198,813.191267 
8 2005 7,433,687.362733 145,176,081.618238 
8 2003 8,623,054.177619 73,772,900.884436 
8 2002 8,393,536.776480 74,175,448.383707 
8 2001 1,330,452.806969 44,169,092.927993 
9 2015 1,388,884.982125 802,782,079.820543 
9 2014 1,567,451.123299 828,767,474.738014 
9 2013 1,655,561.349475 686,460,715.857061 
9 2012 1,674,309.182217 670,776,256.469106 
9 2011 1,572,927.139098 733,265,289.953094 
9 2010 1,075,008.373208 620,346,420.204908 
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9 2009 978,194.093007 550,062,529.842120 
9 2008 920,101.709118 499,631,834.120782 
9 2007 849,172.578081 501,809,634.362749 
9 2006 653,472.494742 249,198,813.191267 
9 2005 207,412.854399 145,176,081.618238 
9 2003 274,531.308279 73,772,900.884436 
9 2002 276,725.428364 74,175,448.383707 
9 2001 (122,371.917428) 44,169,092.927993 
10 2015 180,460,067.311548 802,782,079.820543 
10 2014 176,374,921.647295 828,767,474.738014 
10 2013 130,260,499.652614 686,460,715.857061 
10 2012 124,072,993.531017 670,776,256.469106 
10 2011 115,181,328.741627 733,265,289.953094 
10 2010 102,585,793.556069 620,346,420.204908 
10 2009 85,525,175.975714 550,062,529.842120 
10 2008 57,990,588.663868 499,631,834.120782 
10 2007 60,129,617.162113 501,809,634.362749 
10 2006 35,483,231.291771 249,198,813.191267 
10 2005 26,747,212.25 145,176,081.62 
10 2003 16,905,055.04 73,772,900.88 
10 2002 27,419,036.65 74,175,448.38 
10 2001 26,274,317.04 44,169,092.93 
11 2015 191,416,444.99 802,782,079.82 
11 2014 208,680,344.99 828,767,474.74 
11 2013 164,849,127.17 686,460,715.86 
11 2012 170,224,332.25 670,776,256.47 
11 2011 205,403,559.69 733,265,289.95 
11 2010 215,099,179.97 620,346,420.20 
11 2009 211,466,443.44 550,062,529.84 
11 2008 231,676,961.20 499,631,834.12 
11 2007 245,164,433.43 501,809,634.36 
11 2006 110,667,275.56 249,198,813.19 
11 2005 41,755,217.99 145,176,081.62 
11 2003 27,704,421.02 73,772,900.88 
11 2002 22,826,241.61 74,175,448.38 
11 2001 10,030,600.21 44,169,092.93 
12 2015                1,023,888.74               802,782,079.82 
12 2014 837,263.39                828,767,474.74 
12 2013 958,856.00       686,460,715.86 
12 2012 822,508.77      670,776,256.47 
12 2011 705,428.01    733,265,289.95 
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12 2010 575,176.55 620,346,420.20 
12 2009 185,263.32 550,062,529.84 
12 2008 214,218.16 499,631,834.12 
12 2007 158,114.04 501,809,634.36 
12 2006 175,699.60 249,198,813.19 
12 2005 174,694.55 145,176,081.62 
12 2003 99,160.07 73,772,900.88 
12 2002 108,106.81 74,175,448.38 
12 2001 95,878.12 44,169,092.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
